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EDUCATIONAL REVISIONISM AND RECENT SCHOOL REFORM:
THE CASE OF ROCHESTER 1960-1973

A Dissertation Presented

By

John Brainerd Russo

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

May

1977

Education



John Brainerd Russo 1977

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
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
A Dissertation Presented

By


John Brainerd Russo

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School of Education

Dedicated to
Susan and Alexander
and in Memory of Steve

ABSTRACT

Educational Revisionism and Recent School Reform:
The Case of Rochester 1960-1973

May 1977

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Using case study and documentary research methods, the dissertation studies recent attempts at educational reform in Rochester, New York. Rochester was chosen for the study because its recent history seems to indicate the extensive demographic change, influential liberal community, urban unrest, and ethnic and economic stratification that represents the period nationwide. Further, the organization of production, the proximity and close association between the corporate and public sectors, and attempts at major educational reforms (school reorganization and desegregation) seem to invite the type of analysis intimated by the radical scholars of American education.

Distinct from the work of earlier historians and social scientists, the revisionist historians of education and radical economists have concluded that schooling in the United States has permitted minimal social and economic mobility to lower social and ethnic groups. According to these radical scholars, this has systematically occurred through the repressive aspects of educational promotion, the selection of certain personality traits, and acceptance of organizational forms which complement the values and modes of production in the economic system. When

this historical perspective has focused on periods of school reform, these radical scholars have concluded that: (1) School reform has largely been a response to major demographic changes. (2) School reform often represents a liberal response to a threatened socio-economic order. (3) School reform has been the result of a discontinuity between the social relations in the workplace and the social relations in the schools. (4) In the school reform process, the corporate sector plays a decisive role in determining the direction and content of the reform. (5) The most lasting school reforms reflect a more efficient mechanism of performing schooling's traditional functions of educational expansion, sorting, and socializing of students.

The results of the dissertation indicate that demographic changes in Rochester necessitated by lower class labor mobility and fueled by the contradictions in material life and racism acted as a catalyst for the riots of 1964 and eventually at attempts at social and educational reform. Many of these reforms both reflected modern liberal philosophy and the transformations in the production process while attempting to reproduce the types of social relations necessary to function in the workplace. Despite the social conflict (riots and the organization of non-white community by Saul Alinsky), business and corporate leaders were able to maintain their hegemony through their active participation in the definition and resolution of community grievances. Finally, despite the attempts to alter the structure and content of schooling in Rochester, most major school reforms initiated in recent years have not survived the reform period. Those reforms that have survived seem to have the capability to perform the traditional school functions more efficiently than their predecessors while preparing students for future socio-economic roles.

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INTRODUCTION

American educational history has been subject to a drastic and controversial reinterpretation in the last fifteen years through the work of modern revisionist historians¹ and radical economists.² Approaching the subject of schooling with ideological and methodological differences, these scholars nonetheless hold in common the contention that schooling in the United States has served the controlling power structure and allowed lower social and ethnic groups only minimal economic and social mobility. The historical outlines drawn by these scholars have focused on the periods of major educational reform: the "Common School" and Progressive eras. Only recently have these critics of American education begun to study the most recent period of pedagogical and social reform

¹Among the most influential revisionist studies are Michael Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform: Education Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); The Sorting Machine: National Educational Policy Since 1965, (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1976); Marvin Lazerson, Origins of the Urban School: Public Education in Massachusetts 1870-1915, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Clarence Kariyer, et al., Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973); Shaping the American Educational State: 1900 to Present, (New York: Free Press, 1975); David Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

²The most important studies by radical economists are Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, (New York: Basic Books, 1976) and Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism, (New York: David McKay, 1974).

initiated in the 1960's--the Alternative School Movement.¹

The analysis of recent reform by the revisionists and radical scholars is of general importance to everyone interested in education and social change. It is so, for at least two important reasons: First, with the resurgence of the "Back to Basics" movement, educational reforms initiated during the 1960's have declined or have been reinterpreted in the traditional context where they serve to facilitate the schools' traditional functions (extended education [holding], conservative socialization, and economic sorting). How this occurred is at once both perplexing and critical for those involved in change. Second, and more specifically, the interpretation of these events by revisionist and radical scholars seriously questions both the functioning and the motives of modern educational reformers. Consequently, it raises the following questions: Is recent educational reform simply a response to the economic and demographic changes that occurred during the 1960's? Do the reforms merely represent a liberal response to the threatened social order caused by the Civil Rights and Anti-War Movements? Did the corporate sector play a decisive role in determining the direction of educational reform? Were the reforms initiated during this period merely reflections of changes in the organization and the social relations associated with the work place? Is the "Back to Basics" movement and the generally conservative atmosphere that presently exists in 1976 reminiscent of the

¹Used here in its broadest historical meaning, the term "alternative school" often denotes more specific elements of reform instituted during this period (roughly 1960-1973) including "open education", individualized instruction, behavioral objectives and modification, values clarification, etc., as well as alternative schools themselves.

conservatism that followed earlier reform eras in education?

At this time, most research on recent educational reform by the revisionists and radical economists has concerned itself with general educational policies initiated during the 1960's.¹ However, relatively few case studies exist that explore the process and impact of modern school reform at any specific locale. Yet, such research is of particular importance because it complements the static historical outlines suggested by the radical scholars. In so doing, it provides concrete examples to validate historical and philosophical claims while providing a mechanism to explore subtle influences that are often overlooked in the systematic analysis. Without this body of scholarship, the work of the revisionist historians and radical scholars can be viewed as being inconclusive.

Purpose of the Study

This dissertation attempts to study modern education reform at the local level. Using methodologies associated with documentary case study and comparative analysis, it aims to synthesize information gained by such analysis in light of revisionist and radical economic thought. Specifically, this will be done in two ways: First, the study will focus on the demographic, sociological, and economic characteristics of Rochester, New York, during the 1960's. Rochester seems appropriate for this type of analysis because its recent history seems to indicate the extensive demographic changes, influential liberal community, urban

¹Bowles and Gintis, op. cit.; Joel Spring, op. cit.

unrest, and ethnic and economic stratification that are representative of the period nationwide. Further, the proximity and close association between the corporate and public sectors seem to invite the type of analysis intimated by the revisionist historians.

Second, the dissertation studies the initiation of educational reforms both citywide and individual school levels. The citywide analysis will attempt to determine the individuals and forces that provided the impetus for educational change, the educational reforms that were enacted, and finally, the eventual outcomes of the reform movement. At the school level, it traces how the larger reform influences were translated eventually into an educational program. Together, through the analysis of citywide educational and individual school reform, sufficient data will be developed to accurately test the historical paradigm created by the radical scholars.

Definition of Terms

Educational Revisionists

Revisionism, as an approach to educational history is relatively recent in origin. It represents one intellectual strand of a larger historical reassessment of United States domestic and foreign policy, which focuses on the development of the corporate-liberal state, the appearance of new organization values, the maintenance of elite class structures, and the origins of American Imperialism.¹ Following the tendencies of

¹James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Robert H. Wiebe,

of such analysis, educational revisionism has attempted to re-examine the development of administrative bureaucracies, meritocratic sorting, and the ideology of educational opportunity.

In the course of its evolution, educational revisionism has developed two major currents: cultural and radical revisionism. Cultural revisionism, of which Lawrence Cremin and Bernard Bailyn are leading advocates, stresses an expanded view of education encompassing religion, community, and the family. In part, this emphasis comes from a rejection of what they would consider parochial analysis developed by earlier educational historians. Bernard Bailyn reflects this influence when he states:

The main emphasis and ultimately the main weakness of the history written by the education missionaries of the turn of the century derived directly from their professional interests. Seeking to demonstrate the immemorial importance of the evolution of theories and procedures of the work in which they were engaged, they directed their attention almost exclusively to the part of the educational process carried on in the formal institution.¹

Cultural revisionists maintain that public education from its earliest beginnings in colonial America has been the bond uniting American society in the face of changing social, religious and familial values. By integrating the diversified cultures (immigrant and Indian) through an exposure to secular values that promoted democratic and

The Search For Order, 1877-1920, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: Delta Books, 1962); Stephen Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

¹ Bernard Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society, (New York: Vantage Books, 1960), p.9.

egalitarian virtues, public education according to these writers reduced the potential for social conflict by instilling a common heritage. With its "genius"¹ in a commitment to popularization, public education was valorized as a vehicle for success, supposedly giving everyone an equal opportunity to find the American Dream. Viewing the social history of the 1890's from this perspective, for example, Lawrence Cremin writes:

To look back on the nineties is to sense an awakening of social conscience, a growing belief that this incredible suffering was neither the fault nor the inevitable lot of the sufferers, that it could certainly be alleviated, and that the road to alleviation was neither charity nor revolution, but in the last analysis, education.²

This revisionist conception of history is at once both idealistic and materialistic. It views education as the model by which the contradictions caused by urbanization and industrialization would be alleviated. Popular during the early 1960's, this position reflected the confidence of many individuals at that time that a renewed commitment to education could solve many of the current problems associated with racism and socioeconomic disparities, and the challenge associated with the "space race." Although these historians are credited with enlarging the perception of what constitutes education, cultural revisionists have come under serious criticism.

To some more radical historians and social critics, it seemed that the cultural revisionists have merely replaced the narrow inspirational histories of an earlier era, with an equally glorified view that

¹Lawrence Cremin, The Genius of American Education, (New York: Vintage Paper, 1965).

²Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School, (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p.59.

was little more than a "morality tale linking the evolution of American Democracy to the triumph of public education."¹ These critics, referred to as radical revisionists, pushed the analysis still further, contending that cultural revisionists never seriously questioned whether schools had achieved their ideals or whether the American social framework was altered by changes in education. For instance, Colin Greer, in his rejection of the cultural revisionist position, suggests that "to interpret rhetorical good intentions as actual priorities, is to read and judge a society quite sympathetically." Consequently, "it is not very good history or sociology."² By failing to address the essential contradictions between educational ideals and their eventual outcomes within a society, radical revisionists like Clarence Karier, frequently conclude that "liberal history (read cultural revisionism) does not connect and add meaning to our present world."³

It is the radical revisionist concept of today's society that forms the foundation of their historical perspective. In having seen the failure of the liberal social and educational reforms to ameliorate the inequalities during the 1960's, the radical revisionists conclude that American society is fundamentally racist, materialistic, and controlled by vested-interests. Given this framework, they see schools as having acted to maintain class structure and racist ideals. This has been

¹ Colin Greer, The Great School Legend, (New York: Viking Press, 1972), p.45.

² Ibid., pp.35-36.

³ Karier, et al., Roots of Crisis, p.5.

achieved through the development of educational bureaucracy, meritocratic sorting, and a liberal educational philosophy and ideology that tends to then mask static power relations and that has been essentially immune to reform.

Unlike the idealists' conception of history promoted by the cultural revisionists, these radical revisionists tend to be voluntaristic; that is, to view history as the natural outgrowth of conscious decision making on the part of the individuals or groups of individuals working in their common interest. According to this view, where conflict exists between individuals or groups, it is the result of differences in value systems. These value systems come in conflict in areas such as organizational development,¹ social philosophy,² and educational methodology.³ However, as Michael Katz explains in his discussion of the educational bureaucracy, the value "clash is not described by conventional categories of economic or class division."⁴

Given this voluntaristic conception of history, their use of traditional Marxist categories of class represents that type of analysis usually confined to bourgeois sociology (i.e., elite or income analysis). Rather than looking at the social relations and modes of production,

¹Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State; Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America, (New York: Praeger Publ., 1971).

²Karier, et al., Roots of Crisis; Walter Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975).

³Lazerson, Origins of the Urban School; Tyack, The One Best System.

⁴Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools, p.55.

their use of income or class analysis serves only to bring out the "subtle interplay of factors" and the "patterns of interaction formed when major alterations in the conditions of life, mediated by the tensions and values of men, provoke innovations in social philosophy."¹ Most often, those patterns in interaction are explained as the "consistent triumph of the self-interest of those who 'have' over the aspirations of those who 'have not'."² Now, it is at this level where these revisionists differ from the radical economist.

Radical Economists

The theoretical orientation of American radical economists such as Samuel Bowles, Martin Carnoy, and Herbert Gintis³ is Marxist. Unlike their European counterparts, their version of historical materialism is highly empirical and draws predominantly on the research methodologies developed within modern social science.⁴ Consequently, their data and

¹Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, p.14.

²Greer, The School Legend, p.5.

³Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America; Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism.

⁴The resurgence of intellectual Marxism in Europe over the last 20 years has favored a more philosophical orientation. This has taken two forms: the neo-Hegelian philosophy of the Frankfurt School and the existentialism and marxist humanism of Jean-Paul Sartre and Roger Garaudy. However, more recently, the work of Jurgen Habermas and Louis Althusser represents a movement to a more empirical emphasis. For a detailed analysis of differing Marxist theories of history, see Helmut Fleischer, Marxism and History, (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1969); Dick Howard and Karl Klare, The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism Since Lenin, (New York: Knoph, 1963); Roger Garaudy, The Alternative Future, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Louis Althusser, For Marx, (New York: Pantheon, 1970); and Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

research often resembles that of the radical revisionists'. Their conclusions, however, are significantly different.

To these radical scholars, the development of mass education in the United States is the product of the dialectical conflict involved in the accumulation of capital and the transformations in the social relations of production. As capital is accumulated and the capitalist class increases its control of the means of production, antagonistic relations develop between wage-laborers (includes marginally and unemployed workers) and the capitalists. As a result of the incipient rebellion, the capitalist class must channel the discontent into "isolated daily struggles of workers" or suppress it "through ameliorative social reforms, through coercive force of the State, through racist, sexist, ageist, credentialist, and other strategies used by employers to divide and rule; and through ideological perspectives which served to hide rather than clarify the sources of exploitation and alienation of the capitalist order."¹

Mass education has played a central role in this process. In Schooling in Capitalist America, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis conclude that schooling functions in this society to enhance labor power and prepare individuals to accept authority structures (employee-employer) and other social relations necessary for capital accumulation and hegemony. Stated more precisely, the social relations of production are reflected in the social relations of the schools (correspondence principle).² However, periodically, a discontinuity develops between the two

¹Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, p.232.

²Ibid., p.5.

sectors (production and educational) when the static (slower changing) social relation in the educational sector cannot mirror the rapidly changing social relations in the dynamic production sector. This results in the need for educational reform. In most cases, this requires only minor adjustments (pluralist accommodations) in educational values and goals that correspond to the changing economic reality. However, during certain crisis periods in American society--where there is a "serious disjuncture between the school system and the economy" and where "schools function as an arena for struggle among major social groups"¹--educational reform becomes a social bromide for incipient rebellion and socio-economic disparities. To illustrate their analysis, the radical economists historically show that educational reform has followed major changes in the organization of production and labor force composition.

The ideological distinctions between the revisionist historians and the radical economist is by no means static. In recent months, especially among the radical revisionists, there has been a definite movement towards a Marxian analysis. After several years of intensive research on the impact of public education on mid-Nineteenth Century Hamilton, Ontario, Michael B. Katz has concluded that rather than urbanization and industrialization, changes in education were more fundamentally associated with changes in local capitalist development.² At the same time, Joel Spring in his most recent book, The Sorting Machine, has concluded that the War on Poverty and other compensatory programs

¹Ibid., p.238.

²Michael B. Katz, Presidential Address to the History of Education Society, Boston, MA, October, 1976.

initiated during the 1960's with their strong emphasis on education "served as a means of conservatively dealing with the issues of social class differences."¹ Meanwhile, liberalism and its intellectual corollary (cultural revisionism) have continued to fall in disrepute from the intellectual right and left.² These trends seem to indicate a growing intellectual interest in a neo-Marxian reinterpretation of American educational history.

Research Design

As the intellectual differences between the radical revisionists and economists become more functional than real, a synoptic analysis encompassing both groups is suggested. Such a synthesis becomes possible for two reasons. First, both the revisionists and economists have dealt with essentially the same question concerning the nature of school reform and, therefore, have drawn heavily on each others' research. Secondly, the themes suggested by revisionists such as demographic change (urbanization), technological change (industrialization), and value clash have economic antecedents. For example, demographic change often is associated with labor mobility and socio-economic inequalities; and value clash can represent a form of conflict over economic self-interest. Together, the mutuality of concern and economic antecedents provide the structural basis for the synoptic analysis.

This dissertation attempts such an analysis in the study of modern school reform. This requires the identification of the major

¹Spring, The Sorting Machine, p.228.

²Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp.1-23.

themes suggested by the radical scholars (radical revisionists and economists) and their application to historical events surrounding school reform in Rochester, New York. The first chapter will attempt to identify these themes by presenting a historical outline suggested by the radical scholars. This interpretive framework will be presented against a general economic profile that shows the historical instability of the American economic system. This approach is used to underscore the arguments raised by the radical economists while providing a linear structure necessary to span the chronological distances encompassed by the revisionist historians. From this general historical overview, the five major themes of the radical scholars emerge and provide the rubric to study modern school reform in Rochester. These themes are:

1. School reform is a response to major demographic changes occurring in the United States.

2. School reform represents a liberal response to a threatened social order.

3. School reform has been the result of a discontinuity between the social relations in the workplace (production sector) and the social relations in the schools (reproductive sector).

4. The corporate sector plays a decisive role in determining the direction of school reform.

5. The most lasting school reforms reflect a more efficient mechanism of performing schooling's traditional functions of educational expansion (holding), sorting, and socializing students.

The second chapter begins the study of educational reform in Rochester by presenting general demographic data about the city. This will include such items as population changes, racial composition, and age distribution. In addition, this chapter provides extensive information concerning the economic conditions that existed in Rochester during the 1960's, including information about the size and characteristics of

the labor force, the labor-management relations, working conditions, economic base (industrial output and capital expenditures) and the business and community relations.

The third chapter examines the major social issues that influenced changes in the city's educational system. These issues center around the riots of 1964 and the community's response to them. This chapter takes account of the conditions (social and economic) that contributed to the riots, a description of the characteristics of those involved, the community's response, the controversy surrounding the organization of community actions by Saul D. Alinsky, and finally a study of the conflict between community organizations and the dominant industrial power in Rochester, Eastman Kodak.

The fourth chapter examines the system-wide educational reform initiated in Rochester in the last fifteen years. Basically, this represents an attempt to locate the driving influences behind the movement for the reorganization and desegregation of the city's public schools. Included in this chapter is an examination of pedagogical, socio-economic, demographic and political undercurrents that contributed to the reform process.

The fifth chapter studies the development of one specific reform--the development of an alternative junior high school. This micro-analysis of educational reform will be helpful in determining nuances that are sometimes obscured by a more general investigation of reform at the community level. Further, it provides insights as to how systematic reforms influenced specific school organization and methodology.

The sixth chapter critically discusses the appropriateness of the

arguments raised by the radical scholars in relation to recent social and historical outlines generated by the revisionists and radical economists with the historical data engendered in the study. In addition to the specific historical data, other recent community studies will be included in this chapter when deemed appropriate to clarify the analysis.

In summarizing the insights gained by the dissertation, a special effort will be made to make wider generalizations that seem to be implied by the specific analysis of reform in Rochester. Finally, the dissertation will conclude by proposing areas for future investigation that have been suggested by the study.

The dissertation requires the use of the following methodological and research procedures: The investigation of federal, state, and local census data is necessary to determine general demographic characteristics of Rochester. Similarly, economic data such as capital expenditures and labor market characteristics are examined to determine the general economic climate. To gain a full understanding of the issues and events that have contributed to educational reform within Rochester's public schools, an examination of primary sources such as School Board minutes, school records, newspaper accounts and minutes of committees is required.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter represents an attempted synthesis of the work of various prominent revisionist historians of education with the often complementary observations of radical economists. This reading of the educational history of the United States, which outlines the problematics of both social and economic change, is especially revealing when focused on periods of educational reform.¹ Most specifically, as the data and graph will indicate, the educational reform movements as seen by the radical scholars parallel prolonged periods of economic prosperity and educational conservatism is predominant during economic downturns and war-time prosperity.


This outline of educational history has been placed against an economic backdrop that indicates the cyclical nature of the American economic system. This has been done to accentuate the economic determinism of the radical economists while providing a linear time structure necessary to bridge the chronological distance between the studies made by revisionist historians.


As Graph 1A indicates, economic instability is indigenous to our

¹The three major periods of educational reform under consideration (the antebellum, progressive, and current reform movements) are those suggested by Michael Katz as not only being movements to improve urban schools but as extensions of broader attempts to solve problems of industrial society.

GRAPH 1A

ECONOMIC INSTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1800





present system. The horizontal lines on the graph represent the relative economic conditions that have existed at any time in the economy. Plotted against chronological time, the variability in the economy is pronounced. Although general economic categories have been used, the fluctuations represented by the graph are indicative of the macroeconomic changes that have marked our economic history.

Economic and Social History

The early part of the Nineteenth Century was a time of vast economic development and expansion in the United States. Despite economic periodicity, each downturn was successfully followed by periods of increased prosperity. From its beginnings as an agricultural, small manufacturing and trade society, the economic life of the country grew steadily with changes in technology and the work process.¹ Further, the abundance of natural resources, security of the oceans, and availability of inexpensive labor, contributed to the fertile environment for the development of capitalism. Economic historian Douglas Dowd summarized his interpretation of the period:

¹Both radical economist and revisionist historians agree that the onset of the factory system had a profound impact on the lives of the common laborer. Michael Katz in The Irony of Early School Reform (p.8), provides a moving passage that describes the redefinition of man and his labor that evolved with the change in mode of production, "Unskilled labor and powerful machines were combined in manufacturing processes based on division of labor. For many, work no longer remained a craft, an acquired skill, an important part of man's life; instead men began to be alienated for their work, increasingly re-defined as the repetitive operation of a machine, the making of a motion that was only one small part of the production of a shoe, a piece of cloth, a rifle, or a watch."

The nineteenth century was the American economy's reckless youth, a period of rapid expansion in every which way, as our geographic boundaries and structure of production were both filled in and expanded. It was a period of extraordinary buoyancy. Each panic or crisis was followed by successively higher peaks of economic activity. Optimism was the rule; for those at the top level of business it was justified.¹

However, for those who were not at the top or for the physical environment, this period was filled with hardship. The classic example is the cotton industry, whose prosperity dominated the economic sphere to the mid-Nineteenth Century. Its success and profitability was largely based on inexpensive slave labor and unsound soil conservation.²

The dynamic changes in the technology associated with the introduction of the factory system caused concurrent alterations in the domestic, social, and demographic features of Nineteenth Century life. Previously, in Colonial America, the family had been the basic productive and educative unit.³ But with the introduction of the factory system, its role and influence began to wane. The traditional work and training functions were diminished as the dislocation between home and workplace increased, and as women and children were introduced into factories. Additionally, there developed a discontinuity of age, that is, children and adults became more obviously separate than in the rural setting,

¹Douglas Dowd, The Twisted Dream: Capitalist Development in the United States Since 1776, (Cambridge: Winthrop Pub., 1974), p.84.

²So tremendous was the depletion of the soil environment that without the westward migration, the economy may well have collapsed.

³For an enlightening analysis of Colonial American life, see Bernard Bailyn, Education and the Forming of American Society, (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp.15-21.

resulting in a radically different concept of youth and adolescence.¹ Subsequently, with emotional disengagement occurring between both family members and community, social relationships became more individualistic, eventually causing a breakdown in the extended family system.²

Both cities and the new factory towns changed demographically as the uprooted farm families and new immigrants sought work in urban areas. The nature of the social and ethnic stratification within the city generated a secularization of values that mirrored the commercialization of goods and services. Caught in this dynamic, children were exposed to a myriad of values and choices that often were in conflict with the values of parents and the larger community.³ The trauma caused by the dislocations, the choices advanced with secularization of values, the decline of the traditional cultural institutions (family and Church); in addition to

¹Joseph Kett, "Adolescence and Youth in Nineteenth-Century America", Education in American History, edited by Michael Katz, (New York: Praeger Publ., 1973), p.68.

²William E. Bridges, "Family Patterns in American, 1825-1875," Education in American History, edited by Michael Katz, p.64, makes the somewhat questionable claim that the disintegration of family ties is "better understood as training in detachment." It seems to me that this interpretation is an attempt to find a "silver lining" to explain the undermining of family life with the changes in modes of production.

³The familiar criticisms of the declining values among the youth were heard throughout the United States during this period. Both politicians and educators took advantage of the unfamiliarity associated with the rapidly changing society to promote whatever causes that might reflect their own self-interests. Claims of unsupervised children with strange values and customs were held before the populace as being examples of the deterioration of the social fabric. Even the religious community was involved in this type of activity, as they were forced to compete for converts and to curtail the erosion of their own constituency. These perceptions of social deficiencies in moral and spiritual character provide the bedrock for public education. For a more detailed analysis, see Michael Katz's, The Irony of Early School Reform.

the lack of status, security, and alienation associated with the new modes of production, instigated antagonisms and social ferment at all levels of society. The anxiety created by these events was to contribute to the eventual rise of public education in America.

By the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the philosophical foundations of public education had been already advanced by such ardent spokesmen as Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster.¹ For the first several decades, most of the support for public education came from philanthropic sources. Organization such as the Free School Society of the City of New York offered free instruction to the impoverished children of the city. This type of support was the genesis of equating public education with poverty and potential social mobility.²

The support for public education gained strength in the 1820's as the country continued to grow economically and demographically.³ The exuberance of the growing nation was evidenced in the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. With the impetus of populism associated with Jacksonian Democracy, the period 1828-1836 saw a dramatic rise in secularism and subsequent support for public education.⁴ But it was a political

¹Adolphe E. Meyer, An Educational History of the Western World, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p.386. These men were among the first to call for the creation of a national educational system.

²Ibid., p.388.

³In 1827, the public high school movement started in Massachusetts when the legislature passed a law permitting towns to organize public schools that would provide commercial and college preparatory instruction.

⁴The rise of secularism was important to the expansion of support for public education because it allowed education to fill the void left by religious values. Schools were to provide a set of nationalistic goals that were in harmony with the economic sector. Not everyone agrees

democracy that was not without serious contradictions. Historian Samuel Eliot Morrison explains:

Jacksonian Democracy believed in equality for white men; it was far less charitable toward the Indian and Negro than its "aristocratic" opponents. It was not "leveling" in the European sense, having no desire to pull down men of wealth to a common level; but it wanted a fair chance for every man to rise...The common man gained active participation in the government at all but the highest levels, and public education was provided for his children--if they were white and free.¹

It is clear that Jacksonian democracy presented a danger to many in the upper echelons of society. Its populism had eroded their control of both values and politics. Together with the gathering labor unrest, many perceived the potential for rebellion and social reordering. Not surprisingly, in their advocacy and support of school reform, the rising middle and upper classes played heavily on these fears.² To many, education was the institutional mechanism that ordered the potential of social and economic control with the minimum of force and coercion. Bowles and Gintis summarized this mentality.

A stable body politic and smoothly functioning factory alike require citizens and workers who embraced and have taken on

¹Samuel Eliot Morrison, The Oxford History of the American People, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.432.

²In David B. Tyack's, The One Best System, (p.80), he notes the evangelical tone of the reforms when he says that "Since the schools were the panacea for crime, poverty, and vice, to oppose them was to ally with evil." Further, he contends that the tradition of cloaking the public education in virtue was continued by historians as Ellwood Cubberly. (Also see Lawrence Cremin's, The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberly: An Essay on the Historiography of American Education, [New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965].) Radical revisionist Colin Greer, in The Great School Legend, contends that the more recent cultural revisionist historians (such as Bailyn and Cremin) are guilty of the same uncritical writing as their predecessors.

as their own the values and objectives of those in authority. Schools might do better than instill obedience; they might promote social control.¹

Following the Jacksonian period came the rapid ascent of Horace Mann in Massachusetts. Over a period of years starting in 1837, Mann and contemporaries like Henry Barnard developed and expounded the virtues of tax-supported, non-sectarian, and bureaucratically organized public educational systems. Although appealing to the more affluent in society, their high-handed and moralistic proselytizing found little support among the poor and disenfranchised who were suffering through a period of economic hardship.² In fact, their ideas concerning taxation, organization and educational methodologies may never have gained acceptance were it not for a drastic reversal in the economic cycle.³

As the country grew both economically and demographically (westward and urban), each crisis period in business was followed by renewed optimism and economic activity. As Graph 1A (on Pages 17 and 18) indicates, the year that Horace Mann became Secretary of Education in Massachusetts (1837), was the beginning of a severe decline in the economic vitality of the country. In part, this was caused by over-speculation and the over-extension of credit by foreign and domestic banks in financing the new manufacturing processes, the expansion of the transportation sector, and the westward migration. Coupled with the inflation in such

¹Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, p.170.

²Even many of the more wealthy members of the community were reticent about spending money on the development of public education when the economic conditions were in such a state of flux.

³See Graph 1A, pp.17-18.

basic commodities as flour, it led to the beginning of a serious depression that lasted six years.¹ It is little wonder why many of the harbingers of educational reform were held in contempt by immigrants and the disenfranchised populace. To expound the virtues of education with its accompanying increases in cost per pupil expenditure, higher salaries for teachers, better school structures and teacher training facilities, all of which would be tax-supported amidst the economic depression, indicates how desperate and fearful many were of potential conflict.²

But as the economic improvement occurred and business was once again revitalized in the mid-1840's, the economy began a steady rise that eventually led to a plateau of prolonged economic prosperity. These years of prosperity saw the greatest rise in the general support of public education. In conjunction with the sociological and demographic changes and the increasing wages and expectations introduced by this period of prosperity, the common school became more viable to many Americans. Michael Katz explains its sudden popularity and support:

Education to its mid-century enthusiasts became a wonder drug for social infection and a means of direction and regulating social change. And the glory of it all was that it involved no structural changes in society, and the increase in taxes would be more than saved by the safety of property, the reliability of workman, and the lessening of the expense of crime and poverty. Only the manipulation of behavior and personality

¹ Historian Samuel Eliot Morrison in the Oxford History of the American People, speaks of suffering in this first deep depression. "...There was no social security or government assistance of any kind for the desperate other than town and country poorhouse. Cold and hungry people in the cities had to depend on private charity for fuel and food. And a promising labor movement collapsed;..."

² This conflict is a point of contention between revisionist historians. While Katz and others see organization and value clash, Bowles and Gintis argue class conflict.

was required; no alteration of existing social hierarchies, no interference with private property, and vested interest would scar the formation of the new model order.¹

The tremendous gain in support of public education from 1848-1856 was manifested in increased school expenditures (per-pupil cost, teacher salaries, bureaucratic staffing), thereby increasing both the size and number of public schools.² Also legally, it was reflected in the Roberts vs. Boston case (which recognized that Negroes should be educated if in separate schools) and the Compulsory Education Law in Massachusetts (1852).

As the common school became a familiar sight in many northern antebellum communities, there were concurrent changes in the methodological focus within the classrooms. Due to the heavy criticism of authoritarian methods by Mann and others, the newly created normal schools concentrated on a "softer" pedagogical approach. These techniques included the "look-say" method of teaching reading, the use of drawing, and the object teaching method.³ Motivationally, these approaches stressed affection over corporal punishment and student-centered instruction over teacher-centered.

The period was also marked by the personal triumph of two of the educational reformers leading advocates. Horace Mann, who was the first Secretary to the Board of Education in Massachusetts, was elected United

¹Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform, p.49.

²For a detailed statistical analysis of social, economic and educational change in Massachusetts, see Appendix A in Katz's The Irony of Early School Reform.

³Ibid., pp.115-161.

States Representative. Henry Barnard, who had been ousted as Connecticut's first Commissioner of Education in 1843, triumphantly returned to his position in 1851. In both cases, each man would continue his advocacy of public instruction and distinguished service.

In the midst of the economic prosperity, the personal attainments, as well as the fiscal, structural and methodological changes, drastically altered both the nature and the content of public education. These changes were concentrated in the more industrialized areas in the Northeast, but spread with industrialization to cities in the South and West. The geographical perspective, education following industrialization, buttresses the radical economist's view (correspondence principle) that the expansion of capitalist production (accumulation) required changes in social reproduction. That is, the factory system undermined the role of the family as the unit of childrearing (education) requiring a new mechanism for training workers, quelling social unrest (common school).¹

As quickly as its ascendancy occurred, the support and direction of the reforms drastically changed with the economic depression of 1857 and the eventual onset of the Civil War. As the popular support was withdrawn, the reforms took a more conservative bend that reflected the mentality of the recently created bureaucratic structure. For more than a quarter century, without public support or concern, education in

¹Bowles' and Gintis' book, Schooling in Capitalist America, is instructive in relating educational reform to organization and industrial growth. It offers a number of studies comparing urbanization in the South and West to education during the period (pp.176-177). Furthermore, Martin Carnoy, in Education as Cultural Imperialism, compares educational reforms in developing nations to the educational structures in the more industrialized nations.

America deteriorated and in some areas was neglected altogether.¹

Progressive Reform

After the Civil War, the nation's industrial growth once again moved forward with renewed confidence and vigor. From 1867 to 1897, a period of thirty years, the economy showed great diversity and expansion. Profits, however, remained at relatively depressed levels. This was the result of four factors: Rapid technological changes, effects of foreign and domestic competition, lack of skilled workers in many economic sectors, and several panics initiated by overspeculation in the financing of railroads and the westward migration.² The outcome of these conditions was the development of monopolistic business practice through the elimination of competition by "gentlemen's agreement", and by the centralization

¹Michael Katz, in The Irony of School Reform (p.13), documents that the increase in enrollments, the number of schools, and the number of teachers slowed considerably after 1857. While in Class, Bureaucracy and the Schools, he reflects on what happened when lay interest declined in the mid-1850's. Joseph Cronin, in The Control of the Urban Schools, amplifies Katz's remarks with data on fourteen large cities. He concludes that the gradual loss of power by parents and voters led to the control of schools by a minority of owners and college graduates who wanted the schools to preserve and protect their way of life. Lawrence Cremin, in The Transformation of the School (p.17), shows that changes in emphasis in his analysis of the philosophical differences of Horace Mann and William Torrey Harris. He explains that "Mann's common school was to contribute substantially to the fashioning of an emerging social order governed by a new public philosophy; Harris's was merely to play a part in confirming an order that had already come into existence."

²Dowd, The Twisted Dream (p.64). It seems that many of the economic panics in Early America were associated with poor business practice in the banking establishment. This continued until the changes in banking and financial management after World War II. The reforms included deposit insurance, regulation of security trading, guaranteed mortgages and the autonomy of the Federal Reserve Board.

and concentration of economic power.¹ In essence, it marked the beginning of the modern corporation.

During this period, immigration continued to include ever larger numbers of Southern Europeans.² Demographically, most settled and sought employment in urban areas where overcrowding and slum conditions were aggravated. In addition to their labor, the immigrants brought customs, values, and new ideologies that were in conflict with the prevailing socio-economic philosophy. The ethnic solidarity of these immigrants was seen in the rise of unions as once again they asserted themselves through their control of apprenticeship training and periodic strikes. Together, the labor militancy and the social condition surrounding industrialization and urbanization caused a threatened bourgeoisie to seek mediation of the potential conflict through the enlargement of the societal roles of government, social welfare and education.³

In education, the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century had seen the beginnings of many educational reforms.⁴ However, most lacked any

¹Ibid., p.64.

²Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in Beyond the Melting Pot, (Boston: MIT Press, 1963), p.183, found that not all the immigrants found America to their liking, and many returned to their home country. An example is that nearly one-sixth of the Italians who arrived in the late 1880's returned to Italy.

³In his essay "Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change", in Roots of Crisis, Clarence Karier sees these changes as a reflection of changing liberal philosophy; from the old liberalism that embraced competition, private property, laissez-faire government, to the new liberalism that espoused controlled economy, state planning and group thought.

⁴Marvin Lazerson, in the Origins of the Urban School, gives a precise account of the development of educational reforms before the turn of the century. In tracing the development of kindergarten, manual training,

degree of public acceptance, except in isolated areas.¹ The overall educational structure remained relatively unchanged despite the onslaught of immigration, the increase in compulsory education laws, and the existence of methodological alternatives. Without public support of the proper economic climate, the quality of teaching and teacher training, as well as the total resources allocated to education remained quite low. In essence, education in America was allowed to stagnate.

The 1890's, however, saw the beginning of a deluge of social and educational criticism instigated by such journalistic muckrackers as Joseph Mayer Rice and Jacob Riis.² Although protests concerning education had been heard intermittently during the previous quarter century, these new attacks generated great controversy. Eventually, they initiated a re-evaluation of the educational process. This could hardly be seen as sudden insight by the American society into the problems of public education, but rather as had occurred before, a response to a recently evolved set of social and economic parameters.³

vocationalism, and civics, he shows how each was diverted from its original goals and eventually diluted to reflect the schools' traditional mandate of sorting, socializing, and holding.

¹ Perhaps the most famous attempt at reform was in Quincy, Massachusetts under the direction of Col. Francis Parker. The "Quincy System" abandoned a set curriculum and traditional methods of teaching reading and arithmetic. As Lawrence Cremin describes the system in The Transformation of the School, (p.130), the "emphasis was on observing, describing, and understanding."

² Lawrence Cremin, in The Transformation of the Schools, pp.20-21, describes the abhorrent conditions that existed in the schools, which were the target of Rice and Riis.

³ The problems associated with urbanization, industrialization, and labor militancy troubled many citizens. The conditions within urban areas were abysmal, and many cries of dissent began to be heard.

Educational reform, supported by the upper classes and endowed with business and philanthropic support was a corollary to a wider progressivism of the period.¹ Beneath its liberal rhetoric, it endeavored to sustain order and discipline without ultimately changing society to any significant degree.² To be sure, part of the early support for educational change and social reform, however limited, reflected a genuine concern for individuals.³ But within progressive pluralism, the focus of the reform was again lost and eventually its noblest ideals were subverted to reflect the views of the business sector.⁴ Precisely as it had occurred fifty years before, sociological and economic changes had juxtaposed, creating a potential for violence and conflict within the American society. Once again these conditions, combined with a period of sustained economic prosperity, provided the milieu for the consideration of educational reforms. These reforms were a substitute for the deeper consideration of other more drastic alternatives to a more egalitarian society.

The economic record shows that beginning in 1897, there was a

¹Cremin, The Transformation of the School, pp.viii-ix.

²Clarence Karier, in "Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change", maintains that the underlying meaning of the new liberal philosophy of the Progressives was control and order.

³It is hard to imagine as some revisionists have intimated, that the motives of Jane Adams and others who sought to ease the pain of urban life were a front for other beliefs.

⁴For a discussion of the problems of pluralism within the progressive education and the recent alternative school movement, refer to John B. Russo, "Lost Ideals: Past and Present Movements for Educational Change", Edcentric Magazine, March-April, 1975.

sharp increase in and then a prolonged period of economic prosperity lasting until 1907. During this period, education assumed a larger and more functional role in society. With its roots in the past kindergarten, manual training, civics instruction, among others, gained a degree of support.¹ Soon the role of the schools in the lives of individuals became more important, as increasingly they were promoted as isolated enclaves amidst the urban squalor. Ultimately, this humanitarian conception of education, that included viewing school as an equalizer of opportunity and a bastion of democratic ideals, would be lost to its more traditional functions.² This was reflected in both its philosophical and organizational marriage to the business sector.

Like the economic community, the organization of schools became more consolidated and centralized. Under the guise of efficiency in administration and decision making, the role of the superintendent increased while the participation of the School Board declined. This had a drastic effect on the functioning and the control of schools, as Joseph Cronin explains:

These ingredients, a smaller board, a stronger executive, decreased lay participation--but minimal teacher participation--were essentially elitist, conservative and a reaction against immigrant ethnic groups and their interests in

¹Most of the revisionist writers consider this period the most active in terms of concern and support of reform in education. Although many reforms were espoused and initiated during this time span, most would be modified to reflect the more traditional functions of the school.

²Despite information to the contrary, schools continue to be idealized and asked to perform tasks that should be done in the wider society. Present day busing is a prime example of how education, in promotion of democratic ideals, must discharge responsibilities that are more appropriately the domain of the socio-economic system.

getting control of the schools to maximize the economic mobility of their people.¹

The move toward administrative efficiency was part of a wider "Scientific Management" movement initiated by the writings of Fredrick Winslow Taylor. Although a systematic approach to industrial management through an analysis of the factors of production, it produced many educational corollaries due to the suggested parallels between schooling and the production process. Reforms such as the junior and senior high schools, vocationalism and the testing movement reflected this association and provided training (skills) and ethics (respect for authority, punctuality, discipline, cleanliness) appropriate to the workplace.² Through the use of an elaborate testing mechanism, schools sorted students behaviorally and intellectually: then counseled students into varied occupational strata which reflected a minimum amount of social and fiscal mobility.³ The resilience of this type of reform to outlast the periods of

¹Cronin, The Control of the Urban Schools, p.103.

²Raymond Callahan, in Education and the Cult of Efficiency, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), considers this an "American Tragedy" in education. His reasons are fourfold: First, educational questions were subordinated to business considerations; second, administrators were produced that were not educators; third, a scientific label was put on some very unscientific and dubious methods and practices; lastly, it contributed to an anti-intellectual climate in American society. But Joseph Cronin defends the administrative acceptance of the efficiency movement by indicating that it was not tied to economics so much as a desire to gain more information about the effectiveness of programs, (The Control of the Urban School, p.109).

³Perhaps the best analysis of the testing movement is given in Clarence Karier's Shaping the American Educational State, p.143. He contends that "Repeatedly, throughout the twentieth century the tester tested and measured the consequences of social conditioning and social repression, and insisted they had accurately measured natural talent and virtue."

prosperity, is an example of what David Cohen and Marvin Lazerson describe as "issues of distributive social justice" being "translated into matters of individual ability and efforts in the school and marketplace."¹

Modern Reform

As prosperity ended and the United State's entrance into WWI seemed imminent, those educational reforms such as kindergarten and manual training advanced as having a humanitarian focus, had suffered a humiliating metamorphosis. The kindergarten, whose advocates had hoped to soften the impact of urban life on the young, had become by WWI the preparation for the grade school. Manual training, once touted as a democratic ideal in which everyone should participate, became vocational training that channeled the lower classes into economic and social niches. What remained of the reforms initiated in the years of prosperity were those which valued discipline and order, and that emphasized the custodial function of education.² The comprehensive high school, junior high school, vocational guidance, and meritocracy, the legacy of this reform period, are the most obvious examples of the continuing commitment of these principles.

After the depression of 1907, the economy began to recover with the anticipation of WWI. It is the feeling of many economists that the

¹Cohen and Lazerson, "Education and the Corporate Order", in Education in American History, edited by Michael Katz, p.324.

²Spring and Gumbert, in Superstate and Superschool, feel that the custodial function was intensified because of the antiurbanism and rural bias that sought to protect children from the urban climate and the growing recognition that youth was without a meaningful and functional social and economic role.

nation's productivity had reached a plateau given the state of technological advancement.¹ Underproducing and with unemployment on the rise, the war provided the external stimulus that motivated technological change, decreased unemployment, and caused the conciliation between many conflicting interests in the American society. The "outside threat" had effectively released the economy and pulled the country together.

Following the wartime prosperity, the economy showed considerable variability despite the necessity of replacing shortages in goods and services caused by the war. Even as 1929 approached, economic enthusiasm remained high, with many believing in a period of endless growth and prosperity. The extent of the Great Depression is hard to imagine. The psychic and personal damage alone caused by unemployment and the loss of personal assets is incalculable. Economically, the country was shattered. Industrial production was cut in half causing private investment to be curtailed as prices fell. Subsequently, the decline in prices and capital value had the drastic effect of undermining the solvency and faith in the banking establishment.

Despite the emergence of government action in the form of public works projects and revised fiscal and monetary policy, the recovery was slow and painful. In fact, the actual recovery was not assured, had it not been for the economic stimulus provided by WWII. Again, war provided a degree of prosperity,² if at a tragic cost in human suffering.

¹Dowd, The Twisted Dream, p.87.

²Robert Aaron Gordon, Economic Instability and Growth: The American Record, (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p.64. In a revealing comment about employment during the 1930's, Gordon intimates that at no time was there a goal of full employment ever mentioned. Business only wanted

From the end of the war to 1961, the economy grew with only mild and temporary interruptions. Although the period was marked by sustained and rapid technological development, to understand the reason for the growth it is necessary to mention the structural changes in the economic system. Those changes include the changing position of the United States in the world economy; the growth of governmental and military expenditures; the impact of social security, unemployment compensation, welfare payments and the use of monetary and fiscal policies to provide a floor for purchasing power; the relocation of the population with its impact on the building industry; and the status of occupational changes (from agriculture and industrial procedures toward services and professions).¹ These structural changes had as large a sociological and demographic impact as they had in the past.

The demographic corollaries to the economic changes were reflected in three ways. First, the decline in agriculture caused many rural inhabitants to seek employment in the urban areas. In demographic terms, this meant a large influx of Negroes and poor whites from the southern states to northern cities. Secondly, reacting to this migration and to the demands of urban life, many chose to resettle in the suburbs. Thirdly, in response to changes in organizational philosophy in the business sector, city-to-city migrations came to be seen as appropriate and

parity with the output of the late 1920's. "If surplus labor still existed at this level of total output, it would have to be dealt with in other ways, including (at least in part) reducing labor supply through, for example, longer schooling, shorter hours, and earlier retirement, and so on."

¹Dowd, The Twisted Dream, p.107.

necessary for advancement.¹ This demographic response of course had its sociological consequences.

The family structure, already weakened in the traditional sense was to bear the brunt of much of the disorientation caused by economic and demographic changes. The frequent movement caused by job displacement or migration accentuated the isolation of the nuclear family, as lasting friendships became more difficult to initiate and maintain. In addition, the sense of community that was often associated with ethnic enclaves did not transfer to the suburbs where relationships tended to be superficial.

The family further changed as women pressed increasingly for equal rights and men were asked to share a larger role in domestic activity. As children became increasingly aware of the dynamics and contradictions of modern life, there developed a "youth culture" that both rebelled against schools and parents, while often seeking relief in the form of drugs.² It seems clear that a satisfactory family life became more difficult to maintain given the changing cultural relations.

So also did the workplace continue to decline as an outlet where

¹As many have indicated, the demographic changes contributed substantially to aimlessness modern man is feeling. Uprooted and alienated, it is little wonder that so many seek a nostalgic and rural solution to the ennui of modern living.

²Spring and Gumbert, in Superstate and Superschool, explain the reason for the rebellion in this way: "The combination of extended dependency, consumer exploitation and the sharing of a common social life helped to create the youth culture...As a social group free of concern about working, it could define its social importance in terms of humanitarian concern...Much of the turmoil in high schools and colleges in the industrial countries of the world during the 1960's was the result of a conflict between youth's newly defined social function and the older societal role of the school."

one could engage in satisfactory social relations. The limitations and routine of most jobs, in addition to the automation and bureaucratic hierarchies, made it increasingly difficult to take pride in labor.¹

Studs Terkel's book Working and the government study Work in America are a testimony to the alienation and isolation that modern man is feeling. Amidst these difficulties, American society once again turned to social welfare and education for their salvation.²

Despite the acute criticism of such men as John Dewey, George Counts, and Upton Sinclair, schools had remained essentially the same in terms of organization, methodology, and curriculum since WWI. In 1957, the launching of Sputnik caused a re-examination of the current educational practice. In addition, the printing of Slums and the Suburbs by the noted educator James Conant (1961), expanded the critique by arguing that the disparity in resources between city and suburbs was creating "social dynamite to accumulate in our large cities."³ Thus education, serving as a scapegoat for falling behind in the space race, and as the

¹This is not only true for the business and industrial sector, but also for the state sector which has grown the largest over the last fifty years.

²The Kennedy and Johnson presidential years were filled with a plethora of new social welfare and educational programs. Most attempted to alter the environmental impact on urban children. The "Head Start" Program is an example of this type of reform in education. (See Spring, The Sorting Maching.)

³The relationship between the nature of this book and the focus of the muckrackers (Riis and Rice) in the 1890's is by no means circumstantial. In his concluding chapter, Conant feels compelled to review the work of Cremin's Transformation of the School, especially in regards to Quincy, Massachusetts and Col. Francis Parker. Like many an early reformer, he calls for equality of educational opportunity, while never seeing the contradiction between equality of education and equality of opportunity in this society. (See Fienberg, Reason and Rhetoric.)

cause of the continued failure of minorities in social and economic mobility, became the focus and the panacea for societal ills.¹ That is, school as the most common and accessible of all modern institutions, was once again to become a social ameliorative agency. Soon, a familiar pattern began to unfold as the economy entered another period of prolonged prosperity.²

For the next seven years (1962-1969), criticisms and reforms were initiated from various sectors of society, but not surprisingly, many came from the corporate sector.³ As had occurred before, foundations and philanthropic agencies through their fiscal and media domination, controlled both discussion and direction of educational reform.⁴ In addition to the ideological bias, some firms sought in their support of the educational reform movement to capitalize on the sizeable economic market in educational hard and software.⁵

The reforms offered during this period were most often either

¹Due to its commonality, education tends to be the first line of defense against a sharper more hostile critique of the equity of the socio-economic order.

²See Graph 1A, pp.17-18.

³For a methodological study of the relationship between education and corporate policy, see Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). In it he shows how and why education is the preparation for control by anonymous authority and how each institution compliments the other.

⁴Many of the major works that offered alternatives to the traditional educational structures were completed in cooperation and with the aid of philanthropic support. An example is Crisis in the Classroom by Charles Silberman. This book became a primer for educational reformers with the support of the Carnegie Foundation.

⁵What further contributed to this avarice was the substantial amounts of governmental funds appropriated to education.

humanistic or rationalistic. The humanistic reforms, offered as an antidote to the increasing ennui and violence of urban life, attempted to alter the social relations within the classroom. Low structure learning environments, individualized instruction, rural free schools, and value clarification among others, similar to the highest ideals of the kindergarten movement, were highly individualistic and represented a largely nostalgic and anti-urban solution to the serious social problems caused by technology, urbanization, and cultural change.¹ Other more rationalistic reforms urged changes in the educational process that favored behavioristic and technocratic approaches. Individualized programs, learning systems theory, and behaviorial objectives, although seemingly more systematic and efficient, did little to change or overcome educational outcomes. More often than not, they merely reaffirmed the faith in the tenets of competition and control.² Most remarkably, they resembled both in philosophy and content the scientific managers of the turn of the century, seeking more efficient and effective methods of performing the traditional functions of education, that of sorting, holding, and socializing.³

¹This is not to say that these reforms are inherently compromising, but rather that they are poor substitutes for more substantial changes in the total environment. They often act to divert the focus of the reform, causing the irrationality of the system to be misconstrued as individual problems.

²To be sure, many of the rationalistic reforms hold promise for improving public education, but as long as competitive achievement tests and socialization that stresses external rewards occurs within our schools, their effect is marginal.

³Not all rationalistic reforms have been successful in improving instruction. For example, the reading program advanced by Westinghouse in Indianapolis seems to have failed to improve reading skills.

As prosperity declined in the late 1960's and early 1970's as a result of the war and its raging inflation, so also did the educational reforms. Educational conservatism, as evidenced by the rhetoric of the "Back to Basics" movement, regained popularity amidst the declining test scores and the results of Coleman and Jenks.¹ Those reforms that have lasted (individualized instruction, competency-based instruction, among others), are those that are meritocratic and that do not seem to alter the basic formula for educational success.²

Thus, this most recent reform period reveals the unmistakable pattern of interesting ideas and cursory change in the service of the status quo. Bowles and Gintis have seen the ideological implications of these historical lessons in their summary of the progressive era:

The legacy of this urban reform movement bespeaks both of its commitment to social control as the overriding objective of schooling. Special amelioration, open education, equalization of opportunity, democratic forms that could all be pursued only insofar as they contributed to, or at least did not contradict, the role of the school in reproducing the class system and extending the capitalist mode of production.³

From this interpretive historical framework of the radical scholars, the following assumptions can be generated concerning school reform:

1. School reform has been a response to major demographic changes in the United States.

¹Although the declining scores in basic skills tests have all been used as apparent evidence of the shallowness of the recent educational reform, it should be remembered that the results are indicative of even the most traditional learning environments.

²In addition, they continue to legitimate the tracking of individuals into unequal economic and sociological positions.

³Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, Chapter 9, p.9.

2. School reform represents a liberal response to a threatened social order.

3. School reform has been the result of a discontinuity between social relations in the workplace (production) and the social relations in the school (social reproduction).

4. The corporate sector played a decisive role in determining the direction of school reform.

5. The most lasting reforms reflect a more efficient mechanism for performing the traditional school's functions of holding, sorting, and socializing.

CHAPTER I I
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF ROCHESTER, NEW YORK 1950-1970

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the demographic and economic conditions that existed in Rochester immediately preceding and during the 1960's. This will be performed in two sections: Demographics and Economics. The demographic section will deal with general characteristics of the population, including descriptions of size, age, ethnic identification, and migratory patterns. The bulk of the information cited in this section was obtained from United States Census data, as well as information provided in local population studies completed by the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research. The economic section will survey the general economic conditions by studying the characteristics of the labor force, the relationship between management and labor, the types of business and commercial concerns located in the area, and a review of the economic climate of the 1960's. This demographic and economic orientation is vital because it provides an index to the character and general soundness of city life. Further, it provides an objective framework for comparative study in which wider generalizations can be obtained.

Demographics

By the beginning of the 1960's, certain demographic changes typical of those in other major northern cities began to manifest themselves in Rochester. Between 1950 and 1960, Rochester's population declined

from an all-time high of 332,488 to 318,611, a drop of 4.2% (see Table 2A on Page 45).¹ However, despite the decrease in the city's population, the remainder of Monroe County (where Rochester is situated) increased from 155,144 to 267,776.² This 72% increase in the population of Monroe County represented a massive migration to the town and suburbs surrounding Rochester. The character of which is seen in Table 2B on Page 46.³

Although births had exceeded deaths by 35,866 between 1950 and 1960, the total population of the city of Rochester had declined by 13,887. This indicated a net migration of 48,743 from the city. Concurrently, this population shift had distinct racial implications.

As Table 2C shows,⁴ the white population which in 1950 was 324,643 had decreased by 1960 to 294,388 or 9.3%. Meanwhile, the non-white population had increased from 7,845 to 24,228--a remarkable 204% in the same decade. In other words, the non-white population which in 1950 represented two percent of the population had increased to over seven percent in just ten years.

The age distribution of the population shift adds another dimension to the demographic changes (see Table 2D).⁵ Between 1950 and 1960, the percentage of the total population between 0-19 years of age had increased by 5.6%, while those between 20-65 had decreased by 8.9%.

¹City of Rochester Population Study, Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research, Inc., June, 1963, Table 1.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., Table 3.

⁴Ibid., Table 4.

⁵Ibid., Table 5.

TABLE 2A
POPULATION TRENDS
CITY OF ROCHESTER AND REMAINDER OF MONROE COUNTY 1900-1960

Census	City		Rest of County	
	Population	Change from Previous Census Number Percent	Population	Change from Previous Census Number Percent
1900	162,608		55,246	
1910	218,149	55,541 34.2	65,063	9,817 17.8
1920	295,750	77,601 35.6	56,284	-8,779* -13.5*
1930	328,132	32,382 10.9	95,749	39,465 70.1
1940	324,975	-3,157 -1.0	113,255	17,506 18.3
1950	332,488	7,513 2.3	155,144	41,889 37.0
1960	318,611	-13,877 -4.2	267,776	112,632 72.6

*Decline due to annexation of vast areas by the city.

Source: U. S. Censuses of Population.

TABLE 2B
PATTERN OF POPULATION CHANGE 1930-1960
CITY OF ROCHESTER

	Population	Components of Change		
		Births	Deaths	Net Change
1930 - 1940	328,132 (1930) 324,975 (1940)	44,229	35,469	-11,917
1940 - 1950	324,975 (1940) 332,488 (1950)	61,491	38,228	-15,750
1950 - 1960	332,488 (1950) 318,611 (1960)	74,801	39,935	-48,743
				-13,877
Sources: 1. N.Y. State Department of Health, Annual Reports 1930 - 1960				
2. U.S. Censuses of Population				

TABLE 2C

POPULATION BY RACE, 1930-1960
CITY OF ROCHESTER

	<u>1930</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>
Total Population	328,132	324,975	332,488	318,611
White Population	325,294	321,553	324,643	294,383
Non-white Population	2,838	3,421	7,845	24,228

POPULATION CHANGES BY RACE, 1930-1960
CITY OF ROCHESTER

	<u>Total Population</u>	<u>White Population</u>	<u>Non-white Population</u>
1930-1940	-3,157	-3,740	583
1940-1950	7,513	3,089	4,424
1950-1960	-13,877	-30,260	16,383
1930-1960	-9,521	-30,911	21,390

Source: U. S. Censuses of Population

TABLE 2D
AGE DISTRIBUTION BY RACE, 1930-1960
CITY OF ROCHESTER

	<u>1930</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>
<u>Total Population</u>				
0 - 19	32.7%	27.1%	26.5%	32.1%
20 - 64	61.2	64.7	62.6	53.9
65 and over	<u>6.1</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>14.0</u>
* Total	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>White Population</u>				
0 - 19	32.7%	27.1%	26.3%	31.0%
20 - 64	61.1	64.7	62.5	54.2
65 and over	<u>6.1</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>14.9</u>
Total	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
<u>Non-white Population</u>				
0 - 19	27.8%	29.7%	31.9%	46.8%
20 - 64	68.9	65.8	64.3	50.3
65 and over	<u>3.3</u>	<u>4.5</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>2.9</u>
Total	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
Note: Due to rounding, items do not necessarily add to totals.				
Source: U. S. Censuses of Population				

However, in terms of the white and non-white populations, the change was even more pronounced. In the 1950's, the 0-19 age group in the non-white population had increased by 14.6% and those between 20 and 65 years of age decreased by 14%. More specifically, the reason for this shift was the influx of young non-white population that was between 0-39 years of age (see Table 2E on Page 50).¹

Meanwhile in the white population, there was a distinct change in nearly all age brackets. Especially significant was the high degree of migration of those between 20 and 40 years of age (see Table 2F on Page 51).² The net result of the population shift was the the city of Rochester was at once becoming both very young (non-white) and very old (white).

The beneficiaries of the population shifts were the suburban areas that surrounded Rochester. In suburban areas like Henrietta, Brighton, and Greece, the population rise was meteoric. So rapid was the shift that some towns like Irondequoit began to experience overcrowding due to the factor that they had reached saturation levels. These suburban areas had white populations. In fact, most had fewer than 25 non-white residents.³ With urban planners suggesting that the white population would continue to decline by almost 30,000 in the next decade while projecting that the non-white population would again double,⁴ the exodus

¹Ibid., Table 6A.

²Ibid., Table 6B.

³Population Study: Rochester-Monroe County Metropolitan Area, 1960-1980, Monroe County Planning Council, June, 1962, p.95.

⁴Op. cit., City of Rochester Population Study, Table 8.

TABLE 2E
1950-1960 NON-WHITE POPULATION
BY AGE GROUPS AND COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE
CITY OF ROCHESTER

1950		1960		Analysis of 1950 - 1960 Change			
Age Group	Number	Age Group	Number	Births	Deaths	Migration	Net Change
--	--	Under 5	4,639	4,326	104	417	4,639
--	--	5 - 9	3,132	2,268	61	925	3,132
Under 5	926	10 - 14	2,097	--	8	1,179	1,171
5 - 9	582	15 - 19	1,458	--	3	879	876
10 - 14	508	20 - 24	2,001	--	3	1,496	1,493
15 - 19	486	25 - 29	2,204	--	4	1,722	1,718
20 - 24	789	30 - 34	2,066	--	8	1,285	1,277
25 - 29	885	35 - 39	1,747	--	14	876	862
30 - 34	780	40 - 44	1,302	--	20	542	522
35 - 39	679	45 - 49	1,086	--	26	433	407
40 - 44	565	50 - 54	733	--	35	203	168
45 - 49	516	55 - 59	618	--	49	151	102
50 - 54	418	60 - 64	437	--	60	79	19
55 - 59	236	65 - 69	327	--	49	140	91
60 - 64	173	70 - 74	197	--	51	75	24
65 - 69	121	75 - 79	102	--	50	31	-19
70 - 74	96	80 - 84	55	--	53	12	-41
75 and over	85	85 and over	27	--	58	0	-58
All Age Groups	7,845		24,228	6,594	656	10,445	16,383

TABLE 2F

1950-1960 WHITE POPULATION
BY AGE GROUPS AND COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE
CITY OF ROCHESTER

1950		1960		Analysis of 1950 - 1960 Change			
Age Group	Number	Age Group	Number	Births	Deaths	Migration	Net Change
--	--	Under 5	27,400	34,058	818	-5,840	+27,400
--	--	5 - 9	22,970	34,149	940	-10,239	+22,970
Under 5	29,672	10 - 14	21,768	--	281	-7,623	-7,904
5 - 9	21,161	15 - 19	18,979	--	112	-2,070	-2,182
10 - 14	16,497	20 - 24	18,695	--	97	+2,295	+2,198
15 - 19	18,204	25 - 29	17,358	--	135	-711	-846
20 - 24	23,885	30 - 34	16,875	--	271	-6,739	-7,010
25 - 29	27,472	35 - 39	17,964	--	440	-9,068	-9,508
30 - 34	26,056	40 - 44	18,942	--	654	-6,460	-7,114
35 - 39	23,622	45 - 49	18,702	--	921	-3,999	-4,920
40 - 44	21,355	50 - 54	17,440	--	1,309	-2,606	-3,915
45 - 49	20,252	55 - 59	16,809	--	1,912	-1,531	-3,443
50 - 54	21,397	60 - 64	16,737	--	3,053	-1,607	-4,660
55 - 59	20,443	65 - 69	15,511	--	4,275	-657	-4,932
60 - 64	18,470	70 - 74	12,879	--	5,460	-131	-5,591
65 - 69	14,955	75 - 79	8,379	--	6,157	-419	-4,576
70 - 74	10,048	80 - 84	4,400	--	5,558	-90	-5,648
75 and over	11,154	85 and over	2,575	--	8,579	0	-8,579
All Age Groups	324,643		294,383	68,207	40,972	-57,495	-30,260

was assured to continue. In fact, the migration continued at a rate unequalled by any other metropolitan district in the Northeast.¹

Economics

Rochester was fortunate to have a stable economic environment relative to other metropolitan areas in the Northeast during the study period. The major factors contributing to this equilibrium were favorable labor market characteristics and the general strength of the manufacturing sector.

Labor Force

Most major firms in Rochester were involved in technological, electrical, or mechanical fields. They required a labor force that was highly skilled with a research and technical orientation. Most of the new employment generated between 1950-1960 reflected this trend (see Table 2G on Page 53).² Professional, technical, sales, service, and clerical occupations increased numerically and as a total percentage of the work force. By 1960, 75% of the labor force in Monroe County was either skilled or semi-skilled. In such great demand were these employees that many business analysts believed that the major limiting factor for further economic development in Rochester was an insufficient market in skilled labor.³ This fact was to create a strange anomaly during the

¹Blake McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee: The Growth of a City, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p.241.

²Committee on Economic Research, Basic Economic Information on Rochester, New York, Rochester Chamber of Commerce, Nov., 1964, p.12.

³Genesee Finger Lakes Regional Planning Board, Regional Economic and Demographic Analysis, Report One Basic Study Series, Oct., 9, 1969, p.14-8.

TABLE 26

LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
MAJOR OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN 1960 AND 1950
MONROE COUNTY

Major Occupational Group	Total	Male	Female	Percent Distrib.		
				Total	M	F
<u>1960</u>						
Employed	231,201	149,420	81,781	100	100	100
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	33,351	21,973	11,378	14	15	14
Managers, officials, and proprietors, inc. farm	17,658	15,581	2,077	8	10	3
Clerical, kindred wrkrs	38,703	11,686	27,017	17	8	33
Sales workers	17,680	11,955	5,725	8	8	7
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	36,728	34,482	2,246	16	23	3
Operatives, kindred wrkrs	47,549	30,738	16,811	21	20	20
Private household wrkrs	3,023	123	2,900	1	-	3
Service workers, except private household	17,198	8,521	8,677	7	6	11
Laborers	7,380	7,011	369	3	5	-
Occupation not reported	11,931	7,350	4,581	5	5	6
<u>1950</u>						
Employed	202,197	136,456	65,741	100	100	100
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	22,364	14,360	8,004	11	10	12
Managers, officials, and proprietors, inc. farm	19,540	17,487	2,053	10	13	3
Clerical, kindred wrkrs	30,861	10,374	20,487	15	8	31
Sales workers	14,982	9,961	5,021	8	7	8
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	36,413	33,836	2,577	18	25	4
Operatives, kindred wrkrs	50,113	32,253	17,860	25	24	27
Private household wrkrs	2,358	144	2,214	1	-	3
Service workers, except private household	14,628	8,539	6,089	7	6	9
Laborers	8,471	7,989	482	4	6	1
Occupation not reported	2,467	1,513	954	1	1	2

Source: United States Bureau of Census

mid-1960's where at once there existed a chronic need for highly trained labor and vast reserve of unskilled and uneducated individuals demanding to be trained.

Another remarkable feature of the labor force in Rochester was its stability. As Table 2H indicates,¹ Rochester was virtually free from labor unrest and work stoppages for many years. Despite its status as the third largest city in the New York State, Rochester's labor force rarely exceeded 2.3% of the total man-days idle for the total State. In part, this was due to the generally favorable working conditions and the lack of unionization in the city's largest businesses. In these businesses (a key example being Eastman Kodak), management provided extensive fringe benefits such as salary bonuses, free dental and medical assistance, and recreational activities to their employees, in order to counter any thrust toward unionization. So congenial were labor relations in Rochester that in 1960 the labor turnover (separation and quits) fell far below that of the remainder of the country (see Graph 2A on Page 56).² This meant that once an individual was trained and hired, they would likely stay within the same organization.

The harmonious relationship between labor and management coupled with the need to retain skilled and semi-skilled workers in the tightening labor market was reflected in terms of weekly earnings, hourly wages, average hours worked, and unemployment in Rochester (see Table 2I).³

¹Committee on Economic Research, Basic Economic Information on Rochester, New York, p.18.

²Ibid., p.15.

³Ibid., p.19.

TABLE 2H

WORK STOPPAGES IN THE UNITED STATES, NEW YORK STATE,
AND THE ROCHESTER LABOR MARKET AREA, 1959 THROUGH 1963

United States	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
Stoppages	3,708	3,333	3,367	3,612	3,552
Workers involved	1,860,000	1,320,000	1,450,000	1,230,000	941,000
Man-days idle	69,000,000	19,100,000	16,300,000	18,600,000	16,100,000
Non-agricultural employees*	--	--	--	--	57,174,000
New York State					
Stoppages	470	427	421	464	437
Workers involved	158,000	191,000	180,000	214,000	130,000
% of U.S. total	8.4	14.5	12.4	17.4	13.8
Man-days idle	4,520,000	2,720,000	1,860,000	2,410,000	2,600,000
% of U.S. total	6.6	14.2	11.4	13.0	16.1
Non-agricultural employees*	--	--	--	--	6,270,600
% of U.S. total	--	--	--	--	11.0
Rochester					
Stoppages	15	16	22	17	16
Workers involved	1,860	3,310	5,040	1,870	3,040
% of N.Y.S. total	1.2	1.7	2.8	0.9	2.3
Man-days idle	6,600	20,200	98,500	20,600	33,500
% of N.Y.S. total	0.1	0.7	5.3	0.9	1.3
Non-agricultural employees*	--	--	--	--	240,000
% of N.Y.S. total	--	--	--	--	3.8
* Annual average for 1963	Source: New York State Department of Labor				

GRAPH 2A

LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

Labor Turnover: Separations and Quits

Labor turnover has been traditionally low in Rochester. This is a reflection of the basic stability of the work force and generally desirable working conditions.

The table gives comparisons of the monthly separation rates and quit rates for the United States as a whole. The quit rates indicate voluntary separations, whereas total separations include people leaving their places of employment for all reasons. The chart below shows the quit rate comparisons in graphic form. September quits include students returning to school.

Monthly Quit Rate (per 100 employees)




TABLE 21
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, HOURLY EARNINGS, AND WEEKLY HOURS OF MANUFACTURING
PRODUCTION WORKERS: UNITED STATES, NEW YORK STATE, AND ROCHESTER

Year	Avg. Weekly Earnings		Avg. Hourly Earnings		Avg. Hours Worked	
	U.S.	N.Y.S.	U.S.	N.Y.S.	U.S.	N.Y.S.
1929	\$25.03	\$28.41	\$27.22	\$1.02	44.2	*
1933	16.73	20.68	20.00	1.50	38.1	*
1937	24.05	25.74	27.03	1.52	38.6	
1941	29.58	31.68	33.51	1.63	40.6	
1945	44.39	47.99	46.34	1.70	43.4	
1949	54.92	57.47	57.45	1.84	39.2	
1950	59.33	59.55	62.00	1.79	39.7	
1951	64.71	64.90	69.43	1.91	40.5	
1952	67.97	67.77	72.61	1.99	40.7	
1953	71.69	71.12	76.54	2.10	39.8	
1954	71.86	71.50	76.51	2.29	39.7	
1955	76.52	75.17	81.00	2.31	38.8	
1956	79.99	78.96	85.67	2.39	39.5	
1957	82.39	81.57	87.64	2.48	40.4	
1958	82.71	83.07	90.28	2.56	39.6	
1959	88.26	87.71	96.28	2.66	39.2	
1960	89.72	89.61	100.88	2.76	38.5	
1961	92.47	92.21	103.37	2.85	39.3	
1962	96.56	96.02	109.31	3.85	39.3	
1963	99.38	98.78	113.71	2.60	38.8	
1964 July	102.72	102.44	119.13	2.53	40.4	
					39.2	
					40.6	
					41.2	
					41.8	

*Comparable data not available prior to 1943

Source: New York State Department of Labor

Historically, the weekly earnings of production workers in Rochester had been significantly higher than their New York State counterparts. During the late 1950's and early 1960's that trend (differential in weekly and hourly earnings) continued to grow at a higher rate. As a result, in 1963, the "effective buying power per household" in Rochester amounted to \$9,015, while comparative figures showed New York State to be \$8,279 and nationally \$7,130.¹ In addition to the high wages, the unemployment rate in Rochester was remarkably low, usually between two and three percent. In fact, in 1966, it fell to an incredible 1.1% of the labor force.² Few communities in the nation regardless of size could even approach these figures in unemployment and income.

A final characteristic of the labor force that often is neglected concerns the degree of participation by the business sector in community affairs. Perhaps more than any major city in the nation, Rochester has been known for its community involvement, especially by its managerial class. Corporation and businesses have encouraged (in a sense mandated it for professional advancement) that their middle and upper level employees become involved in the city's recreational, civic, religious, and social organizations. So intense has been this commitment that often business and corporate leaders have been "loaned" to the public sector at the business's expense. This was especially important during periods of intense crisis within the community.

¹ Sales Management Inc., "Survey of Buying Power", June 10, 1964.

² McKelvy, Rochester on the Genesee, p.243.

Business Sector

The stimulating force behind the upsurge in employment and income that occurred in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the expansion and growth in Rochester's manufacturing sector. This growth was the result of major technological advancements and market expansions. In turn, these innovations provided substantial capital expenditures for new constructions and subsequently spurred the development of Rochester's retail and financial sectors.

The corporation making the greatest contribution to the economic expansion in Rochester was Eastman Kodak. Employing over 40,000 people, it saw unparalleled growth. Based on many technological advancements (i.e., development of the Instamatic camera), it found an ever-growing market for its goods and services during the affluent years of the 1960's. Investing heavily in research and capital construction, Kodak continued to expand its markets and further contribute to Rochester's economic well-being.¹

Another firm which experienced remarkable growth during this period was the Xerox Corporation. Second only to Kodak in employment, Xerox continued to make large gains in the relatively new photo-copy field. Similar to Kodak, it reinvested heavily in research. In fact, in 1964, 10% of its gross return was reinvested. Furthermore, Xerox chose to expand its productions facilities, tripling both the size of its local plant facilities and its total employment between 1961-1964.²

¹ McKelvy, Rochester on the Genesee, p.224.

² Ibid., p.246.

Behind these two major industrial giants, other firms made more modest improvements. General Dynamics, whose two divisions Electronics and Stromberg-Carlson employed over 10,000 individuals, expanded their electronic, telephone, and control system markets. Another leader in its field (optical instruments), Bausch and Lomb continued to make substantial gains with its development of hard and soft contact lenses. Meanwhile, smaller economic development occurred within the Sybron Corporation (hospital, medical, dental, and control data equipment) and the General Motors Products Division (carburetors and electrical motors).¹

Subsequently, the surge in the manufacturing sector affected the retail trade in Rochester. Although the central business district had declined, many new retail outlets located in the suburbs and towns enjoyed remarkable success as both retail sales and employment rose sharply in the late 1950's through the mid-1960's. Eventually, this stimulated the construction industry as many new retailing firms sought to establish stores in new shopping centers located in the affluent suburban areas.

The construction industry, already burgeoning from capital construction occurring in the manufacturing and business sectors, experienced further growth through a tremendous increase in housing starts. This housing boom was centered primarily in the suburban areas where increasing number of former city residents had decided to resettle. The actual number of new housing permits requested between 1961 and 1965 increased from 3,187 to 5,451 per year.² Meanwhile, construction in the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p.247.

central city continued to decline. The imbalance between the demolition caused by urban renewal and highway construction and the shortage of new housing starts in the central city created overcrowding in houses that were forced to serve as multiple dwellings in the city's low income areas.

Rochester's financial institutions also benefited from the gains in the manufacturing and retail sectors. During the 1960's, they mounted a massive construction campaign which resulted in the rebuilding and expansions of office and banking facilities in the downtown area. Further, they found the need to construct smaller branch offices in Rochester's expanding suburban areas. In addition to the banks already established in the area, this period saw the influx of many new financial institutions. So affluent and seemingly stable was the financial and social climate that even several of the conservative New York banking institutions opened branch offices in Rochester.

Another firm that enjoyed relative economic prosperity during this period and that played a substantial role in community life was the Gannett Press. Known as one of the nation's most conservative newspaper chains and headquartered in Rochester, it expanded through the acquisition of several smaller newspapers located in the Eastern United States. In Rochester itself, it maintained a virtual monopoly by controlling both the major morning and evening papers. With a wide circulation, its conservative outlook became a powerful communications force in molding community opinion.¹

¹Ibid.

In summary, the favorable labor market characteristics and strength of the manufacturing sector caused Rochester to enjoy remarkable prosperity. The nine county region that surrounds the city in the early 1960's displayed the highest income levels, the highest proportion of the labor force in manufacturing (38.4%), the most skilled workers, and the highest agricultural income in the upper New York State area.¹ With an unemployment rate that was among the lowest in the nation and with personal income far above the state and local averages,² it seemingly offered an individual unlimited potential for stability and socio-economic advancement. As the local newspaper told a shocked city on July 25, 1964, it seemed "hardly a place for a riot".

¹Genesee/Finger Lakes Regional Planning Board, Regional, Economic, and Demographic Analysis, p.M-12.

²New York State Department of Commerce News, Albany, New York, May 12, 1964.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL UNREST IN ROCHESTER:

JULY, 1964--THE RIOTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

Introduction

From its early beginnings as a small mill town along the route of the Erie Canal, Rochester has shown a propensity to adapt to the changing character of its social and economic conditions. Whether it was the large influx of immigrants at the turn of the century or the transference from a small mill town to an industrial city, each transformation has been completed with relatively little difficulty and discontent.¹ Yet, despite its past, Rochester was unprepared for the conflict that plagued it and other American cities during the 1960's. In Rochester, demographic changes and years of inequality in the distribution of goods and services culminated in inner-city riots and mass action. These events severely tested the city's basic social and educational institutions as never before. At stake was the control of those very institutions themselves.

Preconditions

Despite the apparent affluence within the region (Chapter II),

¹I am indebted to former Rochester historian Blake McKelvey in Rochester on the Genesee and Gannett reporter Dan Lovely in his three-part series, "Decade of Decision", (July, 1974), whose works were invaluable in constructing an historical outline on events during the study period. Although I do not necessarily agree with their interpretive framework, their efforts made it possible to quickly gain access to many historical documents.

many contradictions existed in Rochester in both material conditions and the treatment of its citizens. In order to gain an understanding of these contradictions, it is necessary to examine the social and economic conditions preceding the riots of 1964. These preconditions can best be studied using census data from the areas where most rioting occurred (see Map 3A, Page 65; Table 3A, Page 66; and Map 3B, Page 67. Also see Appendix A.)¹

The bulk of the disturbances of July, 1964 occurred in census tracts 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 64, 65, and 90. All but two (13 and 90) had decreased in total population since 1950. In some instances the decline was over 50%.² However, despite this overall migration, most of these tracts had seen phenomenal growth in the non-white population. There are two basic reasons for this increase. First, these areas offered a source of inexpensive housing for many new immigrants from the Southern states looking for job opportunities in the area. Second, these areas received many migrants from other sectors of the city. This occurred when families were displaced by urban renewal and highway construction in the central city and, subsequently, where additional housing had not been forthcoming.

Housing in these census tracts were all below average in the percentage of deterioration and delapidation. The two tracts where rioting was most severe (tracts 11 and 12) ranked first and second with 91% and

¹Map 3A, Table 3A, and Map 3B have been taken from a Population Study of Rochester completed by the Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research in 1963. Additional information from this three-volume work have been placed in Appendix III and related to demographic information concern the census tracts in which rioting occurred in July, 1964.

²Ibid.

City of Rochester

INDEX AND LOCATOR MAP

1960 CENSUS TRACTS




TABLE 3A
CRITICAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RIOT AREA

	Census Tracts: 1 2 3 4 11 12 13 64 65 90									
I. Highest percentage of population loss between 1950 and 1960 (% change)	-17.9	-45	-37.4	-5.2	-57.5	-47.8	+2.5	-1.4	-4.4	+1.9
II. Highest degree of deterioration and dilapidation of housing units (rank)	42	10	15	18	1	2	8	23	32	30
III. Highest pervailence of renter occupied housing units (rank)	5	15	9	7	6	12	10	42	38	1
IV. Highest degree of population mobility 1955-1960 (rank)	1	67	3	2	10	6	7	24	26	4
V. Highest number of persons per multi-person household (rank)	68	6	20	55	2	4	3	13	9	89
VI. Highest percentage of non-white population	20	35	3	6	1	2	4	9	7	34
VII. Highest percentage of adults with eight years or less education	11	22	15	30	1	4	7	55	45	41
VIII. Highest percentage of employed people in labor and service occupations	3	35	6	4	1	2	7	13	11	29
IX. Median income of families (rank)	NA	NA	80	83	NA	85	79	47	45	NA
X. Highest rate of unemployment (rank)	4	40	3	10	NA	1	7	31	8	42

(rank) = (1) Highest; (89/90) Lowest

The table is a compilation of ten demographic variables taken from the 1960 census data and found in the Population Study of Rochester, New York completed by Rochester Bureau of Municipal Research. (See Appendix B.)


City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

Composite Map - Frequency of
Ten Characteristics

Number of Characteristics

0 - 2
3 - 4
5 - 6
7 - 8
9 - 10



er-Monroe County Airport

Tract #

70% respectively considered delapidated.¹ To further exacerbate the living conditions, most of these tracts showed a high degree of overcrowding: Census tracts 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, 64, and 65 ranking the highest in the number of persons per multi-person household (see Table 3A on Page 66).²

In terms of age, the residents in the riot tracts were both very young and very old. Tracts 2, 11, 12, 13, 64 and 65 ranked within the top fifteen of all city census tracts in terms of the percentage of individuals under 18 years of age, while the other riot tracts, such as 1, 3, 4, and 90 ranked among the highest in percentage of individuals between 19 and 65 years of age (see Appendix A).³

Educational attainment in the riot areas was somewhat ambiguous. Some tracts were among the highest in the number of individuals with less than an eighth grade education. However, tracts 4, 64, 65, and 90 were located in the middle third of those with less than eight years of education.⁴ Perhaps a better indication of the educational situation comes from the fact that although the city had median school age of 11.2 years, non-whites in Rochester had a median school age of 8.8 years.⁵

¹Desmond Stone, "Rochester Riots--Scar? or Spur?", (four-part series), Rochester Times-Union, Part Two, August 20, 1964, p.1.

²For further demographic data on housing in Rochester, see Appendix III.

³For additional demographic data on age distribution in Rochester, see Appendix III.

⁴For additional demographic information on educational levels in Rochester, see Appendix III.

⁵Stone, "Rochester Riots", Part III, August 21, 1964.

In economic terms, the census data indicates that the riot areas were among the very lowest in terms of median family incomes.¹ In 1960, the median family income for the city was \$6,361, yet the median family income in the riot tracts was far below this figure (in some instances more than \$2,000 less).² Taken separately (white/non-white), the desparateness of the situation for non-white can be seen more clearly. The median income for a non-white individual in 1960 was \$2,364, while his white counterpart averaged \$3,647, a difference of almost \$1,300. This figure represented an increase of 49.8% among the white community since 1950, but only a 43% increase for non-whites (see Table 3B below).³ Put

TABLE 3B
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL COMPARATIVE INCOME DATA FOR WHITES AND NON-WHITES

	1950 median income	1960 median income	1950-1960 median income % increase
<u>United States</u>			
White	\$2,053	\$3,024	47.3
Non-white	973	1,502	54.4
<u>New York State</u>			
White	2,401	3,543	47.6
Non-white	1,689	2,613	54.7
<u>Monroe County</u>			
White	2,441	3,657	49.8
Non-white	1,649	2,364	43.4

¹For additional demographic information on income levels in Rochester, see Appendix A.

²Ibid.

³Stone, "Rochester Riots", Part III, August 21, 1964.

another way, not only were the economic conditions for the non-white population bad, unlike the popular notion, they were becoming worse.

Despite the claims of affluence and mobility by community leaders, the fact remains that Rochester was one of two major cities in New York State in which the non-white population had not made economic gains in comparison with the white population income. More specifically, Rochester had the lowest non-white median income in the State.¹

In the area of unemployment, the situation was equally bleak for the non-white community. While in New York State unemployment had decreased between 1950 and 1960 from 10.2% to 7.4% among non-whites, in Rochester it had climbed from 13.8% to 14.1% during the same period.² This was reflected in the riot census tracts where unemployment was among the highest in the city.³ To make conditions even worse was the fact that when work was available, it was primarily in marginal occupations such as domestics or as unskilled labor.⁴

Despite these deteriorating conditions (in housing, education, income and unemployment), few citizens were seemingly aware of the plight of the non-white community in the city. Even as the civil rights movement was calling attention to the problems encountered by non-whites during the late 1960's and early 1970's, only limited action was taken by community leaders to investigate the seriousness of local conditions.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³For additional demographic data on the levels of unemployment in the census tracts, see Appendix A.

⁴For additional demographic information on the employment characteristics of those in the riot areas, see Appendix A.

Usually this amounted to the appointment of several commissions (the most notable were the Commission on Race and Religion and the Human Relations Commission) which had little power and functioned primarily as community sounding boards. When the acknowledgement of a problem did occur, it resulted in a small handout from agencies like the Community Chest.

Overall, in the early 1960's the Rochester community remained confident that the city was somehow spared the problems that plagued other major urban areas. As Laplois Ashford, the first director of Rochester's Human Relations Commission would later say, there existed in Rochester a certain "smugness that says that we are so much better than others, so why raise hell here."¹ Not only did this smug attitude exist latently, but it was actively encouraged by members of the white community. For example, two members of the NAACP (the only formal non-white organization that seriously questioned conditions in Rochester) resigned due to alleged pressure from the white community on those active in the civil rights movement.²

The non-white community in Rochester was forced to endure other indignities in the early 1960's. Several prominent incidents that increased racial tensions serve to make the point: In August of 1962, the police arrested a black gas station attendant as he closed the station. The police alleged that the attendant had refused to identify himself. During the arrest and subsequent trip to the police headquarters, the attendant received numerous injuries including two fractured vertebrae.

¹Dan Lovely, "Decade of Decision," Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Part I of a three-part series, July 7, 1974, p.1A.

²Ibid., p.14A.

Since this had not been the first incident of alleged police brutality, some 350 individuals launched a protest. Under the name the United Action Committee, and with the support of the NAACP and the Human Relations Commission, this group organized a legal defense fund and sought a full-scale investigation of this and other incidents of suspected police brutality. Under intense pressure, City Hall capitulated to their demands for an investigation and called for increased training for the police in the areas of community relations and civil rights.¹

While this case of the gas station attendant was still under judicial review, two similar incidents occurred to further increase tensions. The first involved the Black Muslim leader Malcom X. The police, reflecting the values of the business and community leaders, as in the case of the NAACP resignations, had become increasingly suspicious of any organized activity within the non-white community. At that time, the Muslim community in Rochester had invited Malcom X to speak at a religious gathering. Acting on a report that a man with firearms had been seen in the general vicinity of the church headquarters, the police launched a full-scale raid on the services. The Muslims resolutely refused to permit the police entry, and in the struggle that ensued, 15 Muslims were arrested,² although no firearms were found.

The second incident of police brutality that occurred during this period involved a black who was arrested for drunken driving. After being stopped by the police, the intoxicated man was taken to police headquarters for questioning. A short time after his arrival, he was suddenly

¹Ibid.

²McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.249.

rushed to a local hospital with assorted injuries that included a broken arm and hand.

As a result of the two incidents, the United Action Committee gained new followers. Immediately, a protest vigil was organized at City Hall. Subsequently, the United Action Committee insisted that the Rochester City Council appoint a civilian review board to hear complaints concerning police brutality. Amidst the uproar, the police chief suspended the arresting officers. Then, almost immediately, he reinstated the officers under pressure from the Patrolman's Association and City Hall. This series of incidents served to enrage the non-white community. In March of 1963, as a result of continued community pressure, the City Council created a Police Advisory Board.¹

This seemingly small concession was the catalyst for the inspection of other basic institutions in Rochester. Soon schools, social agencies, labor and business organizations came under close scrutiny of community leaders from non-white and lower-class white areas. Sensitized by this pressure, these organizations began to re-examine their policies toward the poor and non-white elements in the community. For example, school officials attempted to desegregate a predominantly non-white school by busing non-white children to an all-white school.² Social agencies established informal counseling services and training facilities in non-white areas of the city.³ City planners called for the demolition of

¹Lovely, "Decade of Decision," p.14A.

²Ibid.

³McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.250.

one of Rochester's worst slum areas and sought to replace it with a new school and playground.¹ The local media (Gannett Press) began to give more attention to affairs in the non-white community, providing more news concerning activities in the non-white community and featuring articles about successful non-white business leaders.² However, despite the general review and nominal alterations, serious policy modifications did not occur, and those small changes that did occur functioned as only minor adjustments to the city's overall neglect of its disenfranchised. By the summer of 1964, the conditions in Rochester's non-white and lower class areas had only become worse.

The Riot

On the evening of Friday, July 24, 1965, the Northeastern Mothers Improvement Committee planned a barbecue and dance for inner-city residents in order to raise money to buy a merry-go-round for a neighborhood playground. Since the dance was to be held in a vacant lot, an authorization had been secured from the local police. In addition, the Police Department assigned two patrolmen to the dance area to supervise the proceedings. The evening progressed satisfactorily without a hint of trouble and with more than two hundred residents in attendance.³ At about eleven-thirty, a party sponsor asked the patrolmen to remove a

¹Stone, "Rochester Riots", Part II.

²Before the riots, the Rochester press had neglected to write about events in the non-white community. Still following the riots, the articles appearing in the paper rarely addressed the desperate conditions in the non-white sectors.

³Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.

youth who had arrived intoxicated. During the arrest, a small group gathered and began heckling the officers. Reinforcements were requested and suddenly 35 officers with dogs arrived to assist in the arrest. The crowd enraged by this obvious show of force grew quickly in size and became restless. Suddenly, years of frustration and resentment were released as rocks and bottles were thrown and local businesses looted. The rioting continued to grow throughout the early morning hours despite conciliatory gestures by the local police chief.¹ A state of emergency was called and soon State and County police units arrived to help quell the disturbance. However, despite the massive police entourage, the fires and pillage continued until the pre-dawn hours.

When morning came, the extent of the devastation was apparent. The morning paper published the banner headline, "Negro Mob Riots Here". Further, the paper went on to suggest possible communist involvement and its editorials demanded that the authorities "do whatever necessary to restore order."²

The mayor, city manager, local and county law enforcement officials began to plan a strategy for the remainder of the weekend. Roadblocks were established to prevent sightseers and vigilantes from coming into the riot areas. A curfew was imposed prohibiting traffic and group activities as well as liquor and gasoline sales in the riot area for the remainder of the weekend.³ However, these preparations were of little

¹ Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A; McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.253.

² Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, July 25, 1964.

³ McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.253.

avail, as periodic incidents continued Saturday.

The second evening of rioting was even more devastating than the first. The fires and looting spread across the town to include other lower socio-economic and racially mixed areas. That night, four people died and over 350 people were injured. The property damage soared into the millions. As the evening progressed, it became obvious to city officials that Governor Nelson Rockefeller had to be informed and urged to send the National Guard, despite the large contingent of local, county, and State law enforcement officers.¹

By early morning, the first company of Guardsmen appeared on the streets of Rochester. Soon, over 1,500 of their colleagues arrived and prepared camps throughout the city. For the remainder of the weekend and into the early part of the following week, the National Guard troops patrolled the riot areas. After several days of calm, Governor Rockefeller flew to Rochester to survey the damage and to declare the "situation here is well in hand."²

The results of the rioting were extensive; more than 975 individuals arrested: 792 blacks, 153 whites, and 35 Puerto Ricans. Most of these individuals were employed and between the ages of 25-29. Only 166 teenagers were incarcerated and they composed the bulk of the 243 arrested who were unemployed. Most of those arrested had lived in Rochester for over 10 years with only 18% newly arrived (within two years).³ These

¹McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, pp.254-255; Lovely, "Decade of Decision," p.14A.

²Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.

³McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.255.

figures quickly dispelled the impression within the community and furthered by the local newspaper accounts that the rioters were a "Negro Mob" composed of unsupervised teenagers and unemployed hooligans. In addition to the human losses, the property damage was equally extensive. Property claims ran into the millions with more than 200 stores looted, damaged, or destroyed.¹

There was another type of casualty over and above the human and property losses. The self-serving myth of Rochester as the "most unlikely place" for a riot was shattered with shocking suddenness. Despite newspaper attempts to buoy its tarnished image with calls of non-white betrayals,² the psychic damage and guilt on the part of many Rochestarians was immeasurable. It would remain for years and would be a contributing force in the attempts at local educational and social reform.

Aftermath

Immediately, public officials attempted to absolve the community and fix the blame for the riots within the non-white community. City Hall issued a progress report attesting to its many achievements and programs serving the lower class areas. Government leaders claimed that, in fact, no other city had "done as much for race relations."³ The local newspaper denied that the city had been delinquent in its treatment of the non-white community. Their editorial stated, "A great libel is being

¹Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.

²Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, July 25 and 26, 1964; Rochester Times Union, July 25 and 26, 1964.

³Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.

applicated to this city by some of its own citizens and by visitors brought here by the riot. It is that this has been a complacent city, refusing to recognize that it has been sitting on a powder keg."¹ Further, they affixed the cause of the riots to "Hoodlumism" within the non-white community. Mrs. Harper Sibley, Chairman of the Committee on Race and Religion and one of the wealthiest individuals in the area, said that despite the injustices the rioting was "absolutely intolerable and inexcusable."² Finally, the city manager blamed the rioting on the failure of the "Negro Leadership" to inform him of the impending disaster, claiming in a paternalistic tone that "it will be necessary for us, with other responsible people in the community to help develop a competent Negro Leadership."³

Within weeks of the riot, a myriad of committees, organizations and commissions, attempted to analyze the conditions in Rochester leading to the riots. Some, like the Human Relations Commission, tripled requests for funding for inner-city projects. Others, like the Voter Registration Committee, launched an effort to register non-white voters. Still others, like ABC (Action for a Better Community), started a variety of job training programs headed by Operation Outreach that recruited young adults for jobs as machinists, welders, typists, and sales workers. Some less ambitious committees merely issues reports.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.256.

But the most important action came from within Rochester's religious community. The Board of Urban Ministries (structured and financed by local Protestant denominations) and the Rochester Area Council of Churches (member congregations) had become concerned with the lack of leadership and organization within the non-white community. At first they tried to enlist the aid of the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC) headed by Martin Luther King, to help organize the non-white community. Although the SCLC did send several members to Rochester immediately following the riots, Dr. King declined further involvement on the grounds of priorities in the South. At that time, the Board of Urban Ministries began consideration of requesting Saul Alinsky and his Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) to organize the non-white community.¹

Saul Alinsky was the most controversial and prominent community organizer in the United States. His work in organizing Chicago's Woodlawn Association and the Mexican-American communities in California had drawn praise from many sectors. Yet, his abrasive style caused him to have many detractors especially from within the traditional power structures of government and business. This was particularly evident when the Council of Churches and the Board of Urban Ministries asked Alinsky to come to Rochester.

I advised the church council of the cost and said that my organization was available. The council agreed to the cost and "invited" us to come in and organize. I replied, then, that the churches had a right to invite us in to organize their people in their neighborhoods, but that they had no right to speak for, let alone invite anyone into, the black community. I emphasized that we were not a colonial power like churches who sent their

¹ Rochester Times Union, February 5, 1965.

missionaries everywhere whether they were invited or not. The black community had been silent--but at that point panic gripped the white establishment. The Rochester Press, in front page stories and editorials, raised the cry that if I came to Rochester it would mean the end of good fellowship, of Brotherhood Week, or Christian understanding between black and white! It meant that I would say to the blacks, "The only way you can get your legitimate rights is to organize, get the power and tell the white establishment ' either come around or else!'" The blacks read and heard and agreed.¹

Despite the unreasonable reaction from the professional, governmental, and media leaders, nearly every church and organization in the ghetto area (together with thousands of signed petitions by inner-city residents) enthusiastically supported inviting Alinsky to organize Rochester's non-white community. A short time later in the Spring of 1965, Saul Alinsky and his Industrial Areas Foundation accepted the invitation.

The reaction was swift on the part of the media and corporate leaders of Rochester. Radio station WHAM indicated that the Council of Churches would no longer receive free air time for church service broadcasts. "I would not like to feel that WHAM is contributing in any way to the support of Mr. Alinsky," said station manager William F. Rust, Jr. "I feel the church should not descend to this type of indirect political of mass agitation."² Newspaper and televised editorials flooded the communications media with condemnations of Alinsky and urged the Council to reconsider its action. Although many of these amounted to personal attacks on Alinsky and his IAF, most carried a more paternalistic tone.

¹Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, (New York: Vantage Books, 1971), p.102.

²Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.

This is exemplified by William S. Vaughan, former Board Chairman of Eastman Kodak, who upon reminiscing about the Alinsky invitation said:

Why didn't [they] bring some of the rest of us in. Whenever a community undertaking of this kind is planned it's sort of a tradition in Rochester to get everyone involved. We'd like to have been involved...I was a little irritated, frankly, at the fact that they'd done it without consulting us when obviously from their description of the way Alinsky operated it was going to affect all of us...¹

Part of the "state of hysteria and fear" that became apparent at the mention of Alinsky's name in Rochester, was due to his community organizing tactics of which conflict was the most basic. By conflict, (used in traditional trade union sense, a skill gained from his mentor and close friend, John L. Lewis), he meant that community organizations should band together and develop enough political power to force concessions from the controlling power structure.² His strategy is well articulated by Charles Silberman in his book, Crisis in Black and White:

The essential difference between Alinsky and his enemies is that Alinsky really believes in democracy: he really believes that the helpless, the poor, the badly educated can solve their own problems if given the chance and the means; he really believes that the poor and uneducated no less than the rich and the educated have the right to decide how their lives should be run and what services should be offered to them, instead of being ministered to like children.³

If conflict is what Alinsky thrived upon, he could not have found a more advantageous battleground than Rochester. Having little experience with labor tactics and with a penchant for paternalism, local leaders easily

¹Ibid.

²Alinsky, Rules for Radicals.

³Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White, (New York: Vintage, 1964), p.323.

played into his organizing strategy. No sooner had he arrived than the conflict began.

Met by a cadre of eager reporters on one of his early visits to Rochester, he was asked what he thought of Rochester and he replied: "Rochester more than any Northern city reeks of antiquated paternalism. It is like a southern plantation transplanted North."¹ He was then asked why he was meddling in the black ghetto after "everything" that Eastman Kodak had done for blacks; Alinsky responded caustically, "as far as I know the only thing Eastman Kodak has done about the race issue in America has been to introduce color film."² Finally, he was asked about a personal denunciation of him by W. Allen Wallis, the President of the University of Rochester who had also been an antagonist in the Woodlawn controversy in Chicago; he said, "Wallis? Which one are you talking about? Wallace of Alabama or Wallis of Rochester--but I guess it doesn't make any difference."³ In the space of ten minutes, he had sent shockwaves throughout the entire community. In challenging the city's basic institutions and image of itself and by raising irrational anger and fear, he hoped to show the non-white community the vulnerability of the power structure. John L. Lewis, his former teacher in reference to his own organizing efforts in Rochester "affectionately" said that "I resent the fact that you are more hated in Rochester than I was."⁴

¹Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.

²Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, p.137.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p.136.

Since the non-white community had never "seen the power structure quake" as it had since Alinsky's arrival, the community redoubled its commitment to him and his tactics and began a strenuous organizing campaign. There wasn't an organization in the inner-city that was not contacted by Alinsky's organizers. But the organizational battle was made difficult by the community power structure. It was not uncommon for a community organization or program to support Alinsky, then to have its local funding removed. An example was the Baden Street Settlement House. Located in part of Rochester's worst ghetto area, it was supported with the aid of the local Community Chest Agency. After it announced its decision to join Alinsky's FIGHT¹ organization, the Community Chest decided that it would no longer fund an organization that sided with Alinsky. With its economic survival at stake, the settlement was forced to reconsider and ultimately renounce its intention to join FIGHT.² However, despite threats as this and other protestations by local leaders and the media, the organization drive was a success and culminated in the FIGHT organization's first convention in Rochester with 1,500 delegates representing a widely diverse group of community organizations and programs located in the central city. Its goal was to "unify the Negro people of Rochester in order that they may assume their rightful role in solving the problems and determining the courses of action that affect their lives in this city."³ To those in the community who had attempted to

¹FIGHT was the name chosen by Alinsky and his followers for their organization. It stood for Freedom, Integration, God, Honesty and Trust.

²Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A.

³McKelvey, Rochester on Genesee, p.258.

prevent the development of the FIGHT organization and its convention, the first FIGHT President Rev. Franklin Florence sounded an ominous warning in his acceptance speech before the convention delegates. He said, "For those who fear the people, the convention is rightly a cause of fear and trembling. Because for those who fear the people prefer paternalism to democracy."¹

Within the next year, the FIGHT organization secured positions and representation on many local boards and community agencies that reviewed the housing conditions, education, employment, and urban renewal in the inner city. Placed under close review was the Rochester Board of Education who had a long history of condoning the defacto segregation that existed in the city. In addition to securing representation in community government and organization, FIGHT actively used its pressure tactics to seek change. This included the picketing of suburban homes of inner-city slumlords and the pressuring for better services within the ghetto (houseing code enforcement, garbage pick-ups, police involvement).² Further, it fought to have FIGHT representation on all urban renewal projects. This was done to assure that the control of construction, labor, and financing would remain within the inner-city.³ By the time the second convention convened in June of 1966, the FIGHT organization had achieved an enviable record in community affairs and success was marked by the inclusion of 105 member organizations. Still, its biggest battles lay ahead.

¹ Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.14A

² Ibid.

³ McKelvey, Rochester on Genesee, pp.258-259.

The Kodak-FIGHT Controversy

Basic to the FIGHT organizations was a concerted effort to have more inner-city residents hired into both skilled and semi-skilled positions in the manufacturing sector. Alinsky and FIGHT felt the key to this process was to have Rochester's largest employer, Eastman Kodak, accept FIGHT organization "as the bargaining agent for the black ghetto of Rochester."¹ If this goal was achieved, FIGHT felt that other local firms would begin to follow suit.

It should be remembered that during the 1960's, many firms in Rochester had experienced tight labor markets in which job vacancies far exceeded the labor supply. In 1966, the total unemployment in Rochester was 1.5%, though within non-white areas it was considerably higher. It would seem that given the labor market conditions and the prosperity in Rochester that most firms would have been willing to train the untapped potential of inner-city residents. In fact, this did occur as some firms like Xerox, Pfaudler (Sybron Corporation) began training programs.

In September of 1966, the FIGHT organization made an initial proposal that Kodak train and hire 500 blacks into skilled jobs. FIGHT would help in this matter by taking the responsibility to recruit and counsel the trainees. However, Kodak balked at such a plan because it smacked of unionism; that is, the plan would require that FIGHT be recognized as a bargaining agent. Instead, Kodak offered to review its training policies and "to discuss how FIGHT might cooperate in the implementation" of plans that the corporation might develop.² Given its staunchly

¹Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, p.170.

²McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.259.

anti-union practices, this position was not unexpected by FIGHT and their supporters. After further discussions had not appreciably changed the position of either party, the FIGHT organization temporarily withdrew from further negotiations. During its absence, the public rhetoric became fierce and quite vitriolic with both sides making claims and counter claims concerning the bad faith of the other. On October 22, 1966, Kodak, in an obvious public relations move announced that it was beginning a training program for 100 new trainees, in hopes of preparing them for new jobs. Unfortunately for Kodak, however, it soon became apparent that most of these positions were already filled by present employees or those hired especially for the program. FIGHT's President Rev. Franklin Florence denounced the offer as being a "fraud" that Kodak was attempting to perpetrate on the non-white community.¹

Embarrassed by the community's recognition of this half-truth, Kodak accepted an offer by its Vice President John Mulder to seek a re-opening of negotiations with the FIGHT organization. In order to do this, Kodak President William Vaughn was forced to recall Kodak's Office of Industrial Relations staff and to appoint Mr. Mulder as chief negotiator of a new bargaining team. Within a week, the new negotiating team had reached an agreement with FIGHT and signed what has been called the "most controversial piece of paper in Rochester's history."²

In addition to the furor within the industrial giant caused by the formation of the new negotiating team, Kodak was undergoing routine

¹Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.6A.

²Ibid.

change in its upper echelons of management. William Vaughn, who had served as the corporation's president and who had appointed Mr. Mulder, was replacing Dr. Albert Chapman as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Eastman Kodak. Subsequently, Dr. Louis Eilers was to assume Mr. Vaughn's role as President. As President Elect, Dr. Eilers had already assumed most of the responsibility for his office, and there remained only a pro forma transition. Yet, the FIGHT controversy had created some ambiguity over control within the ranks of management. Several days before he was to formally assume the position of President, Dr. Eilers learned of the Mulder agreement with FIGHT. The agreement indicated that FIGHT and Kodak had agreed to join in the recruitment and counseling of 600 unemployed people over a 24 month period and that Kodak was to absorb the training cost. Dr. Eilers was enraged and immediately repudiated the agreement.¹

On the day that Dr. Eilers officially was to assume office, the Board of Directors of Eastman Kodak, bowing to the arguments of Dr. Eilers and those of Board member W. Allan Wallis, concurred in the repudiation. A simple public statement was issued that read that Mr. Mulder had no authority to sign such an agreement and that "the company regrets any misunderstanding which may have been created with the community."²

The following day, the FIGHT leaders met with Dr. Eilers in an attempt to avoid further embarrassment for both parties. FIGHT asked the

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

Kodak President to reconsider his actions or merely to state that he would work together with FIGHT to get more jobs for non-whites. Taking a hard line, Dr. Eilers refused and told Rev. Florence that it would be in the best interest of the community if they were to accept Kodak's original job training proposal.¹ Seeing that all attempts had failed and that its conciliatory gesture had been rebuffed in a paternalistic manner, the FIGHT organization began the preparation for a battle that would eventually humble this industrial giant both locally and nationally.

Keep Your Sermons, Give Us Your Proxies

With the battle lines drawn, both FIGHT and Kodak began an all-out attempt at discrediting each other. Kodak officials claimed that FIGHT was not truly interested in employment but rather was more concerned with the polarizing of the community. Supported by the business community and especially the Gannett Press whose articles were consistently slanted in Kodak's favor, Kodak sought to undermine FIGHT's community and liberal support. On the other hand, FIGHT, with the help of the Council of Churches, began to place full-page advertisements that were reprints of the signed compact between Kodak and FIGHT. Of course, this was made readily available to other media sources as well as national news services. This type of publicity put Kodak's management on the defense and tarnished its carefully nurtured public relations image. Soon the situation became more ugly, with both sides claiming the other had participated in so-called "dirty tricks" (phone calls, sugar in gas tanks, etc.). Finally, in February of 1967, Kodak halted any further

¹Ibid.

communications with the FIGHT organization.¹

The battle had been costly to the FIGHT organization in terms of time, energy and money. Lacking the staying power of Kodak and with the community growing weary of the divisiveness, the struggle had reached a crisis state for FIGHT. Alinsky explained:

Now necessity moved in. As the lines were drawn for battle it became clear that the usual strategy of demonstrations and confrontation would be unavailing. While Kodak's buildings and administration were in Rochester, its real life was throughout its American and overseas markets. Demonstrations might be embarrassing and inconvenient, but they would not be the tactic to force an agreement. It wasn't Rochester that Eastman Kodak was concerned about. Their image in that community could always be sustained by sheer financial power.² Their vulnerability was throughout the nation and overseas.

Since the use of traditional tactics would have little overall impact on Kodak (economic boycott--"asking people to stop taking pictures"), the search for new tactics came under consideration. What evolved from tactical discussion among FIGHT members was the "Proxy for the People". Simply stated, the FIGHT organization, in order to gain entrance and speaking privileges at Kodak's annual stockholders meeting, would ask current stockholders to sign their stock proxies over to FIGHT. The organization itself immediately bought several shares of Kodak stock. Within weeks, Alinsky and FIGHT leaders had crossed the country speaking at churches, conventions, and universities seeking stock proxies.

Many politicians observed organizations releasing proxies and foresaw that the same process could be used to achieve votes. "Proxies were now seen as proof of political intent if they came from large

¹Ibid.

²Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, p.171.

membership organizations."¹ Subsequently, political intent meant votes, and votes attracted politicians. The implications were clear. "Sympathetic" politicians might request a senate sub-committee hearing in which a number of practices could be considered as violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Another implication would be a full-scale investigation by the Attorney General's office. (Alinsky contends that Robert Kennedy was outraged himself by the conditions in Rochester and was ready to move whenever Alinsky was ready.)² Further, the possibilities of applying pressure were enormous as the "Proxies for the People" movement sent "shockwaves throughout the corporate world." Clearly, the prospect of using proxies for social and political purposes "seriously threatened the existing power structure," for it meant the development of organizational methodology that could include representation of the poor and middle class. As Alinsky clearly understood, "People power is the real objective; and proxies are simply a means to that end."³

On April 25, 1967, FIGHT President Rev. Franklin Florence, armed with his proxies, entered the annual Kodak convention in Flemington, New Jersey. Once inside, Florence and others sympathetic to FIGHT's cause began to question management about Kodak's hiring practices. In the end, the stockholder's meeting was reduced to a shouting match between management and its supporters and those who supported FIGHT. After the convention, the final blow was delivered to the industrial giant. Before a

¹ Ibid., p.173.

² Ibid.

³ Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.6A.

myriad of national reporters, Rev. Florence announced that a candlelight pilgrimage to Kodak headquarters was being organized. It would be held on July 24, 1967 and would mark the third anniversary of the riots in Rochester.¹ With the memory of the chaos of 1964 still fresh, the anticipation of a hot summer filled with racial disturbances was too much to handle. After a series of face-saving denunciations in the midst of local and national scorn, Kodak management hastily sought the reopening of negotiations with FIGHT.

At the same time that the Kodak-FIGHT controversy was raging, a series of discussions had been organized at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School between community and business leaders. From these discussions, a program called Rochester Jobs Incorporated had been established. Its goal was to coordinate a community program which would be beneficial in the training and hiring of the hard-core unemployed. A plan had been developed so that 40 local businesses would hire 1,500 unemployed individuals over an 18 month period. These unemployed would be recruited by FIGHT and other social agencies.² Most jobs available were either unskilled or semi-skilled in nature.

The initiation of Rochester Jobs Incorporated coincided with the FIGHT ultimatum for a candlelight protest march to Kodak. At this point, another nationally known figure entered the contest: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then coordinator of the War on Poverty. His entrance was supposedly at the request of his close personal friend Leonard Zartman who

¹ Ibid.

² McKelvey, Rochester on the Genesee, p.260.

served as Kodak's corporation counsel. However, it was rumored that President Lyndon Johnson had originally suggested the Moynihan mediate the dispute and that the President wanted the candlelight march halted at any cost. In June, Moynihan organized a secret meeting in which an agreement was worked out in which Kodak was forced to formally recognize the FIGHT organization. In a telegram to Rev. Florence, Kodak President Eilers stated that Kodak recognized that FIGHT was a broad-based community organization speaking on behalf of the basic needs and aspirations of the Negro poor in Rochester. Further, the telegram pledged that Kodak would send employment interviewers into the inner-city in cooperation with FIGHT and Rochester Jobs Incorporated. However, no quotas were set.¹

The FIGHT organization saw the agreement as a total victory. After all, it had gained the recognition, recruitment, and counseling privileges that it had demanded. Only the quotas had been denied them in the formal agreement, but this was mitigated by the fact that Rochester Jobs Incorporated would provide additional jobs to the number requested and from a variety of local firms. It had been a tremendous victory and now FIGHT began to concentrate on other areas in need of reform. The first stop in this struggle would be the City School District of Rochester.

¹Lovely, "Decade of Decision", p.6A.

CHAPTER IV
DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN
ROCHESTER 1961-1972

Introduction

Any historical accounting of the recent movement for school reform in Rochester is necessarily linked to the story of racial struggle in that city. The dynamic changes in Rochester's demographic and economic conditions had created a large, highly segregated educational system which provided civil rights leaders with evidence of social and economic discrimination, as well as a focus for their politics of reform. The previous chapter has described the social conditions which facilitated and followed upon the riots of 1964. This chapter attempts, rather, to delineate the progress of the various proposals for school reform and desegregation against a background of power struggle in the city from 1960-1972.¹

Although most major plans for desegregation and reorganization of schools occurred later in the decade, the civil rights movement recognized the need to organize for educational change by at least 1961 when the local chapter of the NAACP met with the Superintendent of Schools, Robert L. Springer, to discuss desegregation. These preliminary meetings produced no change in school policy but record the fact that school

¹Most of the information contained in this chapter has been compiled from newspaper accounts in Rochester's daily papers, the Democrat and Chronicle, and the Times-Union.

officials were formally alerted to the developing problem. More significantly, on May 28, 1962, the NAACP initiated the nation's first multi-racial law suit against desegregation. The defendants, twenty-two children from ten families (white and non-white), charged the Board of Education with having violated their constitutional right to due process and equal protection by enacting "rules and regulations establishing and operating certain racially segregated schools..."¹ The suit petitioned the court to grant a temporary injunction to close the segregated schools and, further, asked that the Board of Education be required to initiate a plan for the desegregation of Rochester schools. Perhaps the most important question being put before the legal system was whether School Boards could be held responsible for the practices resulting from de facto segregation in their districts. The School Board, in this instance, argued that it was the responsibility of parents in racially homogeneous neighborhoods rather than School Boards to effect such changes. The injunction was denied, although the case remained active in the courts, thereby drawing attention to the conditions in the schools.

Dr. James E. Allen, known as a progressive Commissioner of Education in New York State, brought the pressure of authority to bear on school officials in 1963 when he publicly reported that sociological and psychological research had proved that segregated schools can seriously damage motivation and other aspects of personality development. He instructed school officials to submit a statement to the State Board of Regents: (1) on the status of the problem in their districts, (2) on the

¹Democrat and Chronicle, May 28, 1962.

policy of the district concerning racial balance, and (3) in districts where segregation existed, on plans to eliminate it. To emphasize his own commitment, he instructed his staff to review the State's laws and regulations to discover their possible application to the State effort to eliminate segregation in schools.

Reorganization Plan One

Responding to the Commissioner's directive, the Board of Education developed Rochester's first School Reorganization Plan. At that time, ten out of the forty-four elementary schools exceeded Dr. Allen's quota of no more than 50% non-white enrollment. The plan to correct the racial imbalance contained four proposals: First, an open enrollment policy so that students in racially imbalanced schools might be transferred for balance. Second, a proposal referred to as the "Princeton Plan" which merged elementary schools in adjacent schools to create a racially balanced enrollment in newly created zones. The primary grades (1-3) would be assigned to one school while the intermediate grades (4-6) would attend another. Third, a proposal which anticipated the modification of the school structure by 1965 (to separate junior and senior high schools) and considered gerrymandering elementary school feeder patterns to produce racially balanced secondary schools. Fourth, the proposal to change curriculum to include more Negro history and culture and to provide in-service training of teachers so that they might be more sensitive to the problems of human relations which these changes involved.¹

There were objections to this plan from both those who actively

¹Democrat and Chronicle, August 27, 1963.

supported desegregation and from more conservative elements who opposed it. Those who supported rapid desegregation felt that it mistakenly favored the concept of neighborhood schools by avoiding any involuntary bussing of white children. Also, where racial imbalance was most severe school boundaries remained relatively fixed (except for mergers under Proposal Two which concerned only selected schools). These critics also pointed out that loopholes were available in the open enrollment proposal.¹ Those who opposed the reorganization formed school associations to voice their disapproval. For the most part, these organizations represented poor or middle-income whites whose children attended schools who were to receive non-white students under open enrollment. It should be emphasized that this opposition was weak, partly because white children were rarely bussed at that time.

Not even the school officials who drafted the proposals found this plan entirely satisfactory. Open enrollment, by bussing only non-white students, corrected racial imbalance only in the receiving school. Also, as whites continued to leave the city and blacks came in, the problem was exacerbated. Under increasing social and legal pressure, the Board of Education expanded their own voluntary transfer program merging three continuous school zones into an extended "home" zone. Referred to as the "Triad Plan", parents in the three areas could choose one of three schools for their children. The intent of this option was to honor

¹Open enrollment would be determined by space available, and school officials had the prerogative to veto transfers if they determined that it would be detrimental to the child (if for instance, a disadvantaged student would not be able to keep up with his classmates).

the concept of neighborhood schools while promoting integration. The three extended home zones that were actually created were located in economically marginal areas.¹

The NAACP and the Monroe County branch of the New York State Liberal Party were not satisfied. In 1965, they pushed for stronger action and the NAACP, in particular, dropped their law suit and petitioned Commissioner Allen directly to redress their grievances. Dr. Allen had recently ordered the Long Island School District (Malverne Case) to desegregate, and there was reason for optimism. The Liberal Party lobbied for a compulsory bussing program by petitioning and picketing the Board of Education. The Board responded by again expanding the open enrollment policy and initiating a suburban transfer program. School officials saw this as a demonstration of good intention in eliminating even suburban segregation, although an integrated metropolitan school district was not suggested as a solution since it was not desired by the suburban population.

In 1966, a voluntary transfer program was initiated in the secondary schools with Madison High (predominantly non-white) as the focus of attention. Like the transfer program at the elementary school level, non-whites were encouraged to transfer while whites were counseled to remain in their schools. This program was quite unsuccessful as very few students chose to participate.

On balance, the voluntary enrollment policy was not successful. In June of 1966, the total program effected less than two percent of the

¹ Democrat and Chronicle, June, 1965.

school age population and that was largely non-whites who were bussed from the central city. For those who advocated desegregation in the public schools, a new offensive seemed appropriate. This time, a new political element was added to their efforts in the presence of the FIGHT organization.¹

In May 1966, the NAACP, the Liberal Party, FIGHT, and its auxiliary in the white community--Friends of FIGHT--demanded an end to racial imbalance in schools before school opened the following September. John McCrory, an attorney who had helped the Board of Education organize the open-enrollment program, publicly declared that the program had fallen behind the mandates issued by Commissioner Allen. His comments were particularly notable because he was the Chairman of the Board of Urban Ministries and had joined the Friends of FIGHT organization. His remarks echoed, in fact, the resolution made at the spring convention of that organization.

The coalition petitioned Dr. Allen with the signatures of parents in the city's elementary school, asking him to significantly reduce racial imbalance through any means he deemed appropriate. In presenting the petition to the Board of Education, FIGHT spokesman Rev. Herbert Shankle, registered the group's outrage:

Nothing has been done, only more public relations gimmicks, more double talk and everything but positive action...The facts are that segregation grows and our inner city schools get worse as you sit idly by and do nothing to improve conditions...Your utter lack of action to date must bring us to the conclusion

¹At that time, FIGHT was still predominantly concerned with economic issues. But with its success in that area it had begun to investigate other institutions.

that you have neither the desire nor the will to end racial imbalance.¹

His remarks elicited an immediate reaction from the establishment sources (such as the Chamber of Commerce) in the community. Local newspaper editorials labeled the claims "insultingly ridiculous" and its proponents "publicity seeking".² The differences between the two sides were further publicized in public hearings before the U. S. Civil Rights Commission.

From this crisis, several important developments emerged: First, the ineffectiveness of the previous attempt to achieve desegregation became obvious to State and local authorities. This realization was quite embarrassing given the inflated statements that had been issued concerning Rochester's involvement in the integration effort.³ Second, with the non-white community no longer willing to assume the major responsibility for integration, it was up to school officials (under close watch by State and judicial authorities) to reinstitute the effort to reform the school system. Under these pressures, the Superintendent of Schools presented the Board of Education with the long-awaited plans for desegregation of the elementary schools in Rochester.

¹Democrat and Chronicle, August 5, 1966.

²Democrat and Chronicle, September 17, 1966.

³Boosterism in Rochester was by no means confined to the economic sector. Superintendent Goldberg and Commissioner Allen, as well as the local press, were often guilty of making inflated comments about how well educational reform was progressing.

First Major Attempts at Reform

On February 1, 1967, Superintendent Herman Goldberg outlined four possible alternatives which could be used to end racial imbalance and effect general educational reform:

The first plan was called the "Rochester Natural Park Plan". It divided the elementary schools into seven areas. In each area there was to be an educational complex (park) that would hold a primary, an intermediate, and a special facilities center. The plan would have made existing schools obsolete and have required extensive bussing. The approximate cost of the plan was \$47,000,000.

The second plan, called the "Rochester Plan", would have had elementary schools divided into ten areas, each containing three to six schools. The existing schools located in the outer perimeter of the city would be the primary schools, while the inner-city schools would serve as intermediate schools. This plan required 37% of the school children to be bussed and would have required seven new schools. The total cost was estimated at \$13,000,000.

The third alternative, called the "Combination Plan", merged aspects of the first and second plans. New intermediate schools were to be built in educational parks with primary grades housed in existing inner-city schools. The inner-city program would feature a maximum class size of 15 and several "enriched" programs. While construction on the new schools was being completed, the intermediate grades were to be held in outer-city schools with inner-city children attending on a space-available basis.

The fourth alternative plan, called the "Home Base Plan", would

have divided the elementary schools into seven areas with each area divided into the inner and outer area city schools. Each school would have subject matter specialists and act as a "home base" for students. Students attending these schools would be bussed to specialized areas and integrated settings at different times during the day, returning to their home school at the end of the day.¹

The presentation of these alternative plans met with great controversy in the community. Conservative elements (particularly the Citizens Tax League and the Taxpayer Education Committee) organized a very effective campaign in opposition to all four plans. It was reported that most of the mail received by the Board members was against the plans and much of it was insulting or defamatory in nature. The local papers, however, urged the adoption of the Combination Plan which it labeled a "progressive yet moderate" alternative since it was relatively low in cost and concentrated on bussing non-white inner-city children out of town to the outer-city schools on a space available basis.²

After six weeks of discussion, the Board of Education rejected all four alternative plans, and on March 16, 1967, it announced a new fifteen point proposal that featured a limited two-way open enrollment program. The proposal included the following points:

1. Use selected features of the Combination Plan.

¹Times Union, February 1, 1967.

²Democrat and Chronicle, March 12, 1967 and the Times Union, March 10, 1967. The Times Union article in fact saw potential harm in "reverse bussing" of white children to inner-city schools.

2. Reduce class size in No. 3 School (non-white) with a school aide assigned to each classroom.
3. Assign a Reading Specialist to each inner-city school.
4. Voluntarily transfer children in Grades 4-6 in School No. 3 to periphery receiving schools.
5. Transfer advanced placement programs to School No. 2.
6. Implement a voluntary reverse open enrollment program to inner-city Schools No. 2 and 6.
7. Implement a reverse enrollment program to be accompanied by similar program in Catholic schools.
8. Implement of the World of Inquiry School (alternative school similar to British primary school).
9. Continue expansions of urban-suburban transfer program.
10. Continue integrated pre-kindergarten demonstration program at School No. 26.
11. Encourage the development of a voluntary cooperative federation of school districts in region to plan ways of reducing racial isolation in Monroe County.
12. Continue to encourage additional participation in open enrollment and TRIAD Program.
13. Cooperate with community agencies whose programs seek to remove the basic causes of racial isolation.
14. Work with Model Cities program to upgrade city schools through new educational facilities.
15. Request the Board of Regents and Commissioner of Education to send a report on the progress made toward elimination of legal and financial barriers to reducing isolation in the schools.¹

With the exception of limited two-way bussing, most of the fifteen points did little in achieving racial balance. In an effort to have the plan withdrawn, civil rights groups petitioned Commissioner Allen to direct the Board to implement a total desegregation plan in its place.

¹ Democrat and Chronicle, March 17, 1967.

The Board, in turn, sought to defend their action by hiring recruiters to gather non-white support in order to administer the plan. In an affidavit presented to Commissioner Allen, the Board projected 3,000 full-time transfers though the number involved never actually approached such an estimate.¹

By Fall of 1967, it was clear enough that the plan had failed in both the white and non-white communities. Black parents in School No. 2 Association, whose children were to be bussed to other parts of the city, had originally opposed the plan fearing that their children would be leaving an enriched educational program for an inferior experience at the receiving school. In fact, only 271 of the projected 600 non-whites actually volunteered to leave School No. 2 and its special programs designed to attract white transfer students.

During the 1967-68 school year, the effects of the structural and academic reforms were studied in an atmosphere of relative calm. Outside dignitaries such as the U. S. Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe, II, praised the city for its desegregation efforts, as did State Commissioner Allen.² At the end of the school year, in August of 1968, the school district released the results of a study comparing pupils at School No. 2 (integrated) with students in School No. 3 (predominantly non-white): Non-white students in the integrated program had achieved more than those in segregated schools. White children did as well as they did in

¹In attempts to draw support to the plan, Superintendent Goldberg was continuously over-optimistic when gaging potential support. However, when the figures were actually counted, his over-zealousness was always apparent.

²Democrat and Chronicle, January 18, 1968 and Times Union, February 14, 1968.

predominantly white schools. (Undoubtedly this was due in part to the fact that the superior program at School No. 2 had attracted many of the best students, white and non-white, in the city.)

The school district report was followed immediately by the release of a study of parental participation by the Committee for Expanded School Integration. This report found that white in the professions (doctors, lawyers, and engineers) had responded most positively to the move towards integration in School No. 2. In contrast, whites in the outer-city with a marginal economic base showed more reluctance to volunteer their children for the inner-city schools. However, this identification of professionalism with integration did not increase participation in the transfer program. In the Fall, a report was issued that suggested strongly that non-whites had been poorly received by principals and teachers when they transferred to new schools. Reecey Davis, the President of the United Federation of Inner-city Parents, (a non-white group supporting integration), demanded an investigation of the staff. With denials from school officials and the Teachers Association, antagonism grew mirroring the conflict in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville area of New York City occurring one month earlier.

By this time, the non-white community was nearly united against the integration efforts. The FIGHT organization, which had been only marginally involved in the reorganization plan in the schools, began to actively work against it. Soon, even the moderate element in the non-white community began to withdraw its support of integrated educational programs in Rochester. Richard D. Harrison, the black Vice-President of the Rochester PTA Council, resigned and joined the Federation of

Inner-City Parents charging that the PTA had neglected the pressing needs of inner-city children, particularly in their failure to protest overcrowded schools and bad principals.

It was not only the non-white community that had second thoughts about the effect of the reforms. Legal pressures from Albany were exerted. In February, 1968, the Board of Regents had issued guidelines for the racial composition of schools, stipulating quotas for white and non-white students which corresponded to the composition of the school district as a whole with the additional charge to eliminate boundaries which created segregation. Nearly a year had passed since this directive had been formulated, and Rochester had clearly failed to comply with State policy. Once again, with the threat of the collapse of its transfer program and subsequent legal action by the State, the Board of Education was forced to propose another plan for reorganization and desegregation of its public schools.

Second Attempt at Educational Reform In Rochester

In what was termed a "sweeping proposal to integrate and reorganize high schools on the city's westside", the central office administration proposed that two secondary junior-senior high schools be turned into junior high schools. The remaining junior-senior high schools on the city's westside would become exclusively senior high schools. In addition, the administration suggested several major changes in the feeder pattern of these schools to insure proper racial balance.¹ Hearings were held throughout the city to explain the proposed reorganization plan to

¹Times Union, February 27, 1969.

the general public. In these meetings, the discussions centered on the plan's potential for increased integration, the possible effects of busing, and the advisability of having separate junior and senior high schools. Overall, the plan received a cool reception by the white parents on the city's westside (predominantly middle and lower economic classes). They objected both to the plan's cost and to having their children bussed to the inner city.

While the plan was under discussion, the Elementary Principals Association proposed an alternative plan that would have included the total integration of the city's elementary schools, and not merely those secondary schools located on the westside. The introduction of this new plan by the principals received little support from School Board members who kept both proposals under review for the remainder of the school year and into the summer.

In a sense, the Board's indecision was not unpredictable given that three members had decided to run for City Counsel offices in the upcoming Fall election. Obviously, they saw a potential danger in taking a position on such a volatile issue. In late July, however, Laplois Ashford, Board member and former Urban League President, disassociated himself from his colleagues on the Board. Recognizing their political motivation, he presented a motion before the Board urging again total integration of the public schools. This proposal was deemed too costly by other Board members and was immediately voted down. In turn, this triggered action among several inner-city parents organizations to begin plans for a boycott of the September school openings in Rochester. In an attempt to increase pressure on school officials, Reecy Davis, President

of the Inner-City Parents Federation, urged that all members of the school community (parents, teachers, and children) join the boycott. Meanwhile, other inner-city groups sent letters to federal agencies requesting them to end payments of the Title I and Title II funds earmarked for integration purposes in Rochester.

Soon many parents and teachers began to respond to the organizational efforts of the inner-city parents. The two major professional organizations, the Rochester Teachers Association and the Elementary Principals Association, pledged their support of the plan for total integration, and to show their sincerity, the organizations took an active role in publicizing the boycott by distributing leaflets urging school integration. Finally, immersed in conflict of their own making, the Board of Education attempted to defuse the impending boycott and directed the Superintendent to make:

1. A detailed description of desegregation measures that have been put into effect since 1963.
2. Plans to reduce racial imbalance (partial integration).
3. Plans for a complete reorganization and desegregation if ordered by the courts.¹

When this directive was announced at the Board meeting, it drew jeers and laughter from the audience. Board member Ashford commented that the motion sidestepped the issues, and that most Board members already knew most of the information requested. The newly elected FIGHT President Bernard Giffort interjected a more ominous tone to the proceedings when he stated:

¹ Democrat and Chronicle, August 22, 1969.

This board has never been responsive to the needs of black community. Community control which would allow parents and neighborhood residents to set on Boards of Education for their particular school would be an excellent idea to remove the schools from politicians. Parents are not going to sit back another year. We are prepared to lock out teachers and administrators who are not responsive to the needs of black children in ghetto schools.¹

As the school opening neared, elaborate preparations were made by inner-city parents for the establishment of "freedom schools" for children who needed daytime care while their parents worked. Staffed by students from local universities, these schools were located in various community centers, churches, and libraries. Despite warnings from the Superintendent and local editorials decrying such "intolerable interference", and last-minute resolutions reaffirming the existing Board's integration policy, a strike began on September 3, 1969.²

The strike lasted three days and included about one-third of the students going to the city's elementary schools. Then, after lengthy discussions, Superintendent Goldberg, Reecy Davis, and Richard Harrison of the United Federation of Inner-City Parents reached an agreement to end the boycott. This agreement resulted in the Board of Education organizing a city-wide Advisory Council for Quality Integrated Education. This Council, composed of various community interests, was directed to plan an integrated educational program that included bussing to achieve integration. Further, the agreement provided for an upgrading of the reading program, the extension of the hot lunch program, and the expansion

¹ Ibid.

² Democrat and Chronicle, September 3, 1969.

of library facilities in all inner-city schools.¹ Although falling short of gaining a total commitment to integration by school officials, the agreement did achieve most of the educational and participatory aims of the inner-city parents.

The reaction on the part of the conservative community was predictable. Witnessing the emerging power of non-whites in the inner-city, many parents feared that the Board of Education might be forced to adopt a compulsory bussing program. The Rochester Neighborhood School Association (RNSAC) immediately began efforts to organize this opposition among members of the white community. During September of 1969, this organization filled the Board meetings with speakers and presented petitions with almost 6,000 signatures. At these meetings, James R. Sims, RNSAC President, threatened that the recent boycott would be a "Sunday School picnic compared with what you'll [Board of Education] get if you approve a compulsory bussing program."²

It was during this reactionary phase that a division developed within the non-white community. The focal point of the conflict was the agreement between the United Federation of Inner-City Parents and the Board of Education. After studying the agreement, FIGHT President Bernard Gifford charged that the Federation's agreement with the Board had amounted to a "sellout" of the black community. To the FIGHT organization, the non-white community had made attempts at integrated education before, and each time it resulted in their carrying the burdens of

¹Times Union, September 6, 1969.

²Times Union, September 19, 1969.

integration. What FIGHT wanted was community control.

For a while during the Fall of 1969, it appeared as if the moderate conciliatory approval taken by the United Federation of Inner-City Parents was successful. The Advisory Council mandated in the agreement was organized and began deliberations, strengthened by President Nixon's vow to enforce desegregation measures as well as the School Board's defeat of a motion to ban compulsory bussing, the Advisory Council consisting of members from various community organizations worked to evaluate existing programs and to develop a plan to integrate the schools of Rochester.

All had seemed to be moving smoothly until December when, without prior notice, the Board of Education passed a resolution banning compulsory bussing for the purpose of integration. It was the final political act of four of the five Board members who had decided to resign or run for other offices. It marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle for desegregation and school reform.

The resolution was a serious blow to the United Federation of Inner-City Parents and to the liberal community in Rochester who had supported the concept of integrated education. Richard Harrison, in registering his disbelief over the duplicity shown by the Board in approving the anti-bussing resolution, conceded that "the federation has made an honest and sincere effort but we're not in limbo anymore. We know that integration won't work here so we're concentrating our efforts in the black community."¹

¹Democrat and Chronicle, December 20, 1969.

In an impassioned statement before the Board of Education, he reiterated this reformulation of his organization's policy: "After a move like this I have no alternative but to give up the fight for integration. But I'm not going to say we worked in vain. We've helped show black people like myself that no matter how hard we work, white people don't want integration."¹

In spite of the Board's action, five days later the Advisory Council for Quality Integrated Education convened to make its results known. It reported that the voluntary desegregation measures and compensatory programs initiated by the Board of Education in the last ten years were a "failure". Furthermore, racial and ethnic isolation had actually increased. The statement concluded the despite the Board's resolution, the Council was fully prepared to present its reorganization and desegregation plan.²

On December 29, 1969, Superintendent Goldberg released the desegregation and reorganization plan for the Rochester Public Schools. Known as the Goldberg Plan, the aim of the lengthy document was to achieve racial balance and improved instruction in the city's public schools. This would have required a quota system of 25% to 40% non-white enrollment in each school. In addition, it recommended a total reorganization of Rochester schools into five senior high schools, four junior high schools, 11 intermediate elementary schools, and 33 primary elementary schools. (At that time, most secondary schools were Grades 7-12,

¹Democrat and Chronicle, December 19, 1969.

²Democrat and Chronicle, December 24, 1969.

while the elementary schools were Kindergarten through sixth.) The cost of the implementation of such a plan was estimated between 2.5 and 4.3 million dollars.¹

In a show of support, the Rochester liberal community embarked in a massive effort within the community to publicize the merits of the Goldberg Plan. Groups supporting the plan included the Rochester Teachers Association, the Central Office Administration (school management), Metro Act (a liberal white auxiliary formerly known as the Friends of FIGHT), the Monroe County and Jewish Human Relations Committees, the Liberal Party of Monroe County, the Voters for Peace, the Board of Urban Ministries, as well as various social agencies, school committees, and church and women's groups.² These groups crossed the city speaking to business and community groups (such as the City Council, Chamber of Commerce, and neighborhood associations) in an effort to apply pressure on the newly elected School Board. Their efforts were doubled in January of 1970, when Senator John Stennis of Mississippi announced that Rochester was a shining example of the "neglected and uncorrected school segregation in the North."³ These remarks embarrassed and outraged the community which was highly aware of its national image. A major effort was made to gain the support of the non-white community for the integration plan.

¹Herman Goldberg, Grade Reorganization and Desegregation Plan of The Rochester Public Schools: A Report to the Board of Education, December 29, 1969.

²Times Union, January 16, 1970.

³Times Union, January 6, 1970.

Knowing that the newly elected School Board would be unable to enact the plan without the help of the non-white community, the FIGHT organization (now with full support of the Inner-City Federation of Parents), escalated its demands. FIGHT President Bernard Gifford stated that before his organization would even consider the desegregation plan workable, certain "non-negotiable" demands had to be met. These included staffing the nine elementary schools that would remain predominantly non-white under the Goldberg Plan with experienced and successful teachers. Also, these schools were to have smaller-than-average class sizes. Finally, a "mobilization year in reading" would be called in all schools where more than half of the children were reading below grade level.¹

Although major blocks of the city supported the plan, opposition remained strong, especially in the predominantly lower and middle class white areas. Working through RNSAC organization, opposition to the plan centered around declining property values and the resulting threat of white exodus from the city. More importantly, those opposing the plan objected to the cost and the self-righteous attempts by the liberal and non-white community to influence the Board's decision. Dr. Louis Cerulli, a former Board member, summarized this position:

This bussing progra he [Superintendent Goldberg] advocates will cost you people \$2.5 million to \$4 million dollars. But who does he [Goldberg] try to sell it to? He sells it to the Chamber of Commerce, the City Council and various other groups. But he does not try to sell it to the normal people who furnish the children for the schools.²

To add emphasis, the opposition gathered many getitions and threatened a

¹Times Union, January 29, 1970.

²Times Union, February 5, 1970.

boycott of the schools if the plan was enacted.

At the same time, the Board of Education began discussions with the FIGHT organization over their objections to the reorganization and desegregation plan. The Board of Education agreed to FIGHT's demands for reading mobilization year, reduced class size, and the upgrading of the professional staffs in those inner-city elementary schools that were to remain predominantly non-white. Given these concessions, the FIGHT organization dropped their criticism to the plan, though no formal written commitment was made by either party.

In February of 1970, the plan became a political football involving both city and county legislatures, with intense political pressure being placed on the local community leaders. Eventually, this pressure led to claims of political tampering and opportunism, especially from Republican County Chairman Richard Rosenbloom. Late in February, the Board met as a group in order to come to a final decision. In that meeting, the Board seemingly resolved their differences and internal conflict and decided to approve the plan. However, when it came time for the public vote, the plan was rejected along party lines (3 Republicans and 2 Democrats). The Democratic Board members immediately called foul, insisting that Republican County Chairman Rosenbloom had overridden the Republican Board members' acceptance of the plan. Given the local GOP's fall election platform rejecting compulsory bussing, as well as the pressure placed on Republic County legislators, the charges made by the Democrats seem credible.¹ In place of the Goldberg Plan, the Republican

¹Times Union, February 26, 1970.

Board members voted for a modified proposal in which the school district's open-enrollment plan would again be expanded. It also projected two new junior and senior high schools to be built in the next few years.

Having expected a more progressive plan, the liberal white community was taken by surprise when the Board made its decision. But while the white community registered moral indignation, the poor and non-white community began to organize another protest. This time with FIGHT in the lead, such groups as the United Federation of Inner-City Parents, Ibero-American League, and local welfare rights groups, vowed their support in an all-out drive for community control. Speaking for the group, FIGHT President Bernard Gifford stated that "What the Board of Education did Wednesday was something we could never do before. They unified us. They unified all the oppressed."¹ Federation President Reecy Davis was more blunt when he said that "Community Control and better city schools have been a long time coming. We've been praying for it, and wishing for it and hoping for it--and now we're going to take it."²

This was not the first time that these groups had reacted with fervor after having their hopes for reform destroyed. But in this case, with the incorporation of FIGHT, they had gained a tactical expertise. Together, this new coalition of socially and economically disadvantaged citizens organized a boycott by students and teachers of all inner-city schools. One school, the World of Inquiry School, became the special focus of the boycott. This alternative school, which had been hailed as

¹Democrat and Chronicle, February 27, 1970.

²Times Union, February 27, 1970.

the model of integrated education, came to symbolize the end of the non-white community's support for desegregation. All parents and teachers in this model school were contacted and urged to join the boycott.

Symbolic as the boycott was, FIGHT organizers knew that real power for reform was located elsewhere. In keeping with the Alinsky tradition that the only power the disadvantaged have is themselves, FIGHT began to organize what it called "Black Easter". "Black Easter" referred to an economic boycott of the commercial and business sectors. What this entailed was not only the boycotting of the downtown business districts, but also informational picketing of commercial establishments throughout the usually profitable Easter season.

Soon additional groups began to join FIGHT in calling for this educational and economic boycott. Such traditionally pro-integration forces as the Urban League headed this group. Even the teaching professionals, represented by the Rochester Teachers Association, pledged their support. Association President Wilber Gerst asked the Superintendent of Schools to close all schools in order to assure school safety. When the Superintendent acceded to this request, the Association used the school closing to hold a mass rally and begin plans for the boycotts and picketing. As a result of the meeting, all teachers were requested (whether or not they supported the boycott) to refrain from crossing the picket line encountered at the city's public schools. The following day, despite the threat of the New York State Taylor Law being invoked, one-third of the Rochester's teachers, mostly from the inner-city schools, refused to cross the picket lines and joined the march to City Hall. The following day, the Reverend Daniel Brent, Superintendent of the city's parochial schools,

joined the public school teachers by closing the schools under his jurisdiction in sympathy with the "frustration of minority groups seeking quality integrated education."¹

Further pressure was added when a lawsuit was introduced into Federal District Court charging the Board of Education with maintaining racially imbalanced schools. Once again, this attracted State and national attention to the racial strife in Rochester and in conjunction with the economic and political pressure caused school officials and politicians to reappraise their action.

This reappraisal began with the City Manager attempting to help the Board of Education to save face by stating he was unsure of the intentions meant by their actions. He called for them to deliver a "firm and final decision" on the reorganization and desegregation plan. More direct criticism of the Board's action came from the ranks of the Republican leadership who were overwhelmed by the community pressure. City Councilman Robert Wood vigorously attacked the Board's decision saying that it had "polarized this community and increased the bitterness between black and white, rich and poor, and Puerto Rican and whites."¹ Following Councilman Wood's lead, Mayor Stephen May bluntly told the Board to put together another reorganization and desegregation plan.

With few choices or allies remaining, the Board of Education hastily called another meeting to reconsider its decision. Within several days, a partial plan for desegregation and reorganization of the Rochester

¹Times Union, March 3, 1970.

²Ibid.

schools was approved. The plan called for the reorganization of elementary grades in two areas of the city into primary and intermediate schools. Although this would have reduced the racial isolation in several schools, an imbalance remained in the city's elementary schools. In fact, in some cases, this plan required the return of non-whites that had been formerly voluntarily bussed under the open-enrollment policy to segregated neighborhood schools.

Most significant to the inner-city organization was the development by the Board of Education of parental advisory committees or "community councils" in the largely non-white areas of the city. In its resolution, the Board stated that "the President of this Board will in consultation with community (specifically this meant FIGHT's Coalition of Concern) immediately establish community advisory councils for Schools 2, 3, 4, and 19 on the city's westside and Schools 6, 9, 14 and 20 on the eastside."¹ This meant that FIGHT's organization could choose the committee that would eventually determine the two community councils. The Coalition of Concern interpreted the establishment of the councils as a clear mandate for community control. FIGHT's President Bernard Gifford, in commenting on the Board's President's statement that "the committee will define areas of authority and responsibility", added "that was exactly what FIGHT intended to do."² As a result of apparently winning a degree of community control, the Coalition of Concern decided to accept the revised plan and called off the remainder of the economic and school

¹ Democrat and Chronicle, March 7, 1970.

² Ibid.

boycott.

The conservative community reacted immediately to the decision to implement a desegregation plan in two of the city's eleven elementary zones and especially to authorizing FIGHT to develop community councils. Following the Board's decision, RNSAC organized another school boycott of their own, in which an estimated 17,000 of the city's 46,600 children stayed home. (This number is somewhat deceiving because it included open-enrollment and other students who were asked to return to their inner-city schools.) However, no schools were closed. In consultation, Board members and RNSAC leaders agreed to hold meetings in the areas of reorganization to give parents an opportunity to express their views. The RNSAC leadership decided that if parents in those areas were still not convinced of the worthiness of the reorganization and desegregation, it would continue the boycott at a later date.

In the intervening months, while the membership and guidelines for the community councils were being developed, and as informational meetings were held in the reorganized zones, the major contestants continued to pressure school officials. However, RNSAC began to have difficulty generating interest with only several minor boycotts occurring in the reorganized zones. Meanwhile, the advocates for desegregation altered their lawsuit in United States District Court converting it into a class action suit for all students attending racially segregated schools.

It is interesting to note the media's response during this period. To journalists outside the area, the reaction to the desegregation plan represented an example of the double standard that existed between southern and northern cities. Even the international press and

media were especially hard on Rochester. The BBC did an hour program on Rochester and its schools, concluding that indeed "there is a great deal of hypocrisy."¹ Yet, more striking was the tone of the local press. Acknowledging that the proposal for reorganization and desegregation was a "modest one", (it basically effected lower class whites and non-whites and provided for community guidance rather than control), editorials called for a moratorium on any form of mass action be it social or economic.²

In June, 1970, the Community Council's guidelines were presented to the community and the Board of Education: Each council consisted of at least four members from community agencies (FIGHT, Ibero-American League, Puerto Rican Parents Association, and United Federation of Inner-City Parents); one parent member from each school; one teacher representative; an ex-officio member from the Rochester Teachers Association; and finally, a member of the Elementary School Principals Association. The guidelines stated that the Community Council would provide a meaningful voice in curriculum and textbook selection, the development and operation of Federal Title I funds, the planning of new and remodeling of old schools in the Council areas, and recommendation of items to be included in the school budget. The plans were accepted with surprisingly little resistance from the conservative forces. The reason for this was tactical, that is, the battleground was now the political arena in the form of the School Board elections in the Fall.

¹Times Union, March 13, 1970.

²Democrat and Chronicle, May 20, 1970.

The period preceding the Fall election was marked by relative calm, especially in the conservative community. In part, this was the result of RNSAC President's James Sims' candidacy for the School Board. Sims made an obvious attempt to appear more reasonable and less strident during this period. However, this was interpreted as playing politics by more ideological pure RNSAC members, and this eventually caused factionalism. Seven RNSAC school presidents resigned in protest of Mr. Sims' action. With the addition of RNSAC members, and other conservative elements, these presidents formed an ultra-conservative faction led by former School Board member Dr. Louis Cerulli. This schism was enough to split the usually solid conservative community and permit the election of a liberal school board.

Two seats on the Board of Education were to be filled in the Fall election. Of the candidates, the Democrats had nominated two pro-integrationists (David Branch and Wyoma Best), while the Republicans had nominated two conservative and anti-bussing candidates, one of which was James Sims. Meanwhile, Dr. Cerulli ran as an independent conservative. In the Fall election, the normally conservative vote was divided among the conservative candidates, which caused the liberals to achieve a narrow victory. Together, with liberal Board member Thomas Frey, who had not been up for re-election, they constituted a new majority (3 liberal Democrats and 2 conservative Republicans), whose aim was to totally reorganize and desegregate Rochester's public schools. Stating that the election victory represented a "clear cut mandate for progressive action," liberal leaders along with the newly elected Board members immediately began to initiate plans for yet another reorganization and desegregation

of the city's junior and senior high schools.¹

Reorganization and Desegregation Plan of 1971

In January, 1971, the newly elected School Board put forward its plan for the reorganization and desegregation of the Rochester schools. The plan called for the modification of the city's eight secondary schools (junior-senior) into four separate junior and four senior high schools. In addition, the Board called for a gerrymandering of the feeder patterns which composed these secondary schools and for the establishment of two new alternative schools within the district. Although it was hoped that these changes would have educational benefits, the major purpose was to desegregate the public schools through the elimination of the neighborhood secondary school and the alteration of feeder-patterns.

The plan received much criticism from the conservative community. Having been divided in the unsuccessful Fall election, RNSAC and the United Parents Association once again joined together in deploring the Board's action. There was another source of criticism, however, and that came from the inner city. Both the newly formed eastside and the westside community councils objected to the school plans on the grounds that it would erode the small foothold they had gained as far as community control was concerned. FIGHT President Bernarad Gifford said:

We're not looking to build a separate black world for our children. All we're saying is that we're sick and tired of black children being used as pawns. Some people in this room [School Board meeting] have pushed for integration well over 10 years. In this period a whole generation of black children have gone through schools miseducated, misinformed and crippled for life.²

¹Democrat and Chronicle, January 23, 1971.

²Democrat and Chronicle, February 5, 1971.

Reecy Davis, President of the United Federation of Inner-City Parents and former advocate of integration, said in speaking about the potential loss of community school councils that...

...right now you [non-white community] have a good possibility of having control of your children's education. I'll vote against any elementary school reorganization for integration because I don't think we need it now...Something good is happening in our schools (under auspices of community councils) and we're not going along uprooting it.¹

Despite objections, the Board moved forward once again. Not only did it pass its proposal to reorganize the city's secondary schools, but in addition, the Board presented a timetable for the reorganization of the city's elementary schools. Implicit in its decision was the bussing of elementary school children. Further, it called for methodological and curricular changes that included non-graded classes, individualized instruction, and ethnic studies.

As on other occasions, an enormous reaction followed the new directives. But conservative forces neither had the votes on the present Board nor upcoming Board elections to prevent the inauguration of the reorganization and desegregation plan. Clearly, another avenue had to be explored. Eventually, RNSAC and others began to concentrate their efforts on local and county legislatures. The conservative factions knew that the initiation of the plan would involve substantial funding (though much of the bussing cost would be reimbursed by the State) and that the school budget had to pass the City Council. The City Council itself could not override the Board policy, but neither could it lower the amounts appropriated, hence, making it nearly impossible to implement the

¹Times Union, February 4, 1971.

reorganization plan. This effort proved effective.

In late March, 1970, in a move that can only be described as politically expedient, the Republican City Council enacted a bill which called for new School Board elections--non-partisan elections with a seven-member slate to be elected. Given the change in political climate and the consolidation of the conservative vote, this move most certainly compromised the liberal School Board and seriously obstructed their plans for reorganization and desegregation since they now faced a very strong chance of defeat in the new elections.

This was not the only setback for the Board and its program. In the following months, State and Federal funds for ending racial segregation were unexpectedly withdrawn. The City Council balked at any capital construction or renovation needed to implement the reorganization plan. In the face of adversity, the Board of Education became more determined to complete the implementation phase before the Fall election. Finally, in the face of strong disputation by the Board members, the City Council did approve a school budget, though drastically reduced. For the time being, the plans for reorganization continued at a reduced fiscal level.

In September, 1971, Rochester became one of the first cities in the nation to move on its own to voluntarily end the racial imbalance in its schools. The school opening, though, marred by minor clashes, proceeded smoothly with the aid of school officials and the religious community. The Genesee Ecumenical Ministries stationed teams of clergymen at the schools involved in the reorganization. Despite the initiation of "block schools" (neighborhood schools temporarily set up to avoid bussing), school attendance was high.

While the school reorganization and desegregation took place with relatively few disruptions, the political battles over the School Board election grew fierce. Running for the first time without party labels, a conservative faction consisting of five candidates campaigned against reorganization and desegregation. Their platform included planks that called for fiscal conservatism, against sex education, and severe disciplinary procedures for the schools. Their political battlecry was indicative of their sophistication: "Vote Right This Time". The community did just that, and they were overwhelmingly elected despite the release of information by school administrators giving preliminary evidence that students were progressing faster in their new setting. The day after the election, Gordon Dehbond, the new president elect of the School Board, visited acting Superintendent Dr. John Franco's office and directed him to develop plans for the dismantling of reorganization and desegregation in Rochester.

By January, 1972, those plans were completed and the new Board of Education rescinded the reorganization plan. The decision to roll back the plan included the return of junior-senior secondary schools and the return of the elementary school feeder patterns to their pre-reorganization status. Once again, non-whites were asked to shoulder the burden of integration under voluntary open-enrollment programs. Since under the new plan schools in non-white areas swelled in population, it virtually assured that only non-whites would be bussed and that there would be only limited space available for reverse bussing (whites to non-white areas). Possibly more devastating for the non-white community was the fact that the Board backed off on its commitment to the eastside and westside.

community councils. Despite campaign claims to the contrary, the Board immediately reasserted its power by emphasizing the council's advisory capacity. Clearly, the community control was dead. The only reforms that survived were the two alternative schools, though they were eventually modified.

An article titled "Giving up on Integration" appeared in the New Republic and announced the fate of school reorganization and desegregation in Rochester to the nation's liberal community. Reading like an obituary, the article complained that the School Board was now "controlled by mean-spirited 'anti's' determined to return to the old days when Rochester's 'happy blacks' kept their problems and their children to themselves."¹ By now, disheartened and with its passion and its leaders exhausted, Rochester's non-white and liberal community turned inward. Accurately described in the New Republic article, "a mood of acceptance... settle on the city, as if an era had passed."²

¹Jerome Zukusky, "Giving up on Integration", New Republic, October 14, 1972, pp.19-21.

²Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE SCHOOL IN ROCHESTER

Introduction

In studying educational reform, many historians largely consider the struggle for school change at the national or city-wide level. Most often, much of their historical data concerning educational reform is of a general nature and is complicated by the political and social confrontations that surround educational institution. When historians have gone beyond this general analysis and studied reform at the individual school level, disparities have frequently been found between the rhetoric of reform (city-wide or nation) and its implementation at a specific school; that is, it becomes difficult to ascertain what is reform and what is, for instance, propaganda or political opportunism by reform leaders. Moreover, while studying individual school structures, historians often have identified or clarified reform influences that are only vaguely apparent in their larger perspective.

This chapter will study the development and structure of an alternative school in Rochester: the Interim Junior High School.¹ This school was started in 1971 as part of Rochester's Reorganization and

¹In constructing the history of the Interim Junior High School, the author has relied on four basic sources: minutes, video tapes, interviews, and personal recollection. The author realizes that the latter can often be detrimental in attempting an objective analysis. However, throughout this chapter, every attempt has been made to provide primary source documentation when available for those areas where subjective judgements are required.

Desegregation Plan and has continued in operation despite the repeal of the Plan itself. Of particular interest to the dissertation are the school changes in support, population, methodologies, social relations, and organization that have enabled it to survive. In a later chapter, these changes will be analyzed to determine how they are compatible with corporate liberal philosophy and the changes in the social relations of the workplace.

Planning and Organization

The impetus for the development of an alternative junior high school in Rochester came from the liberal educational establishment, the liberal community, and the corporate sector. Within the establishment, many teachers and administrators had encouraged the separation of Rochester's junior-senior high schools. In 1969, a committee consisting of supervisory personnel reported to the Superintendent of Schools that the 7th through 12th grade secondary schools were outdated and should be divided into separate junior and senior high schools. In providing rationale for such a separation, the committee cited recent evidence that junior highs: (1) developed self-worth and understanding of others; (2) developed self-discipline in work, study, and the use of leisure time; (3) contributed to the understanding of physical and sexual development in their lives; (4) strengthened the ability to think intuitively and analytically; (5) promoted emotional and economic independence; (6) developed a set of moral and ethical values; and (7) advanced intellectual skills and concepts necessary for civic and socially responsible behavior.

¹The Junior High School Committee Report to the Superintendent of Schools, The Junior High School, Rochester, New York, March, 1970.

As a result of the committee's report and the continuing community pressure for school reorganization, several of the secondary schools within the district began to change their instructional program. These secondary schools organized "cluster" programs (integrated curriculum) in which students in the 7th and 8th grades were given limited freedom in choosing areas of concentration as well as resources both internal and external to the schools. This type of instruction took place in a relaxed and informal environment where teachers began to use individualized instructional methods. Although falling short of the physical separation called for by the committee and thus destroying the neighborhood school concept, these programs provided the methodological basis for later reforms. Both in rationale and in practice they mirrored the ideology of the advocates of alternative schools in Rochester.

At the same time, within the community, a group of prominent women from Rochester's fashionable liberal southeast sector, joined in the support of separate junior and senior high schools.¹ Calling themselves the Planning Committee for an Innovative Junior High School (PCIJH), they organized discussion groups at several schools in the Fall of 1970. They wanted a junior high school which was needed on the city's eastside in order to provide a more stable environment for their children. These parents were concerned that the junior-senior high school which their children were scheduled to attend had become vastly overcrowded. If such a school was forthcoming, it was the consensus that it

¹The group was composed of the wives of professional men; that is, doctors, university personnel, and businessmen. Of the original founding parents, most eventually sent their children to the city's private schools.

should be structured in a flexible and open manner and incorporate the methodological reforms that had become popular in the 1960's (i.e., open education).¹

Additionally, another group that was interested in educational reform in Rochester was the Eastman Kodak Learning Systems Laboratory (EKLSL). During the late 1960's, EKLSL had concerned itself with the development of educational systems that could be used in industry. However, after the uproar with FIGHT, EKLSL sent several prominent scientists into the community to study how its materials and staff might better be utilized through the city. In a sense, while trying to polish a somewhat tarnished community image, they discovered a potential market in educational softwares that was closely tied to the needs for educational reform. EKLSL hired several individuals with educational backgrounds to form a consulting department that provided assistance in developing of alternative educational programs. Despite their limited overall experience in the area, the EKLSL staff began consulting in school districts throughout the nation.²

In the Fall of 1970, the issue of reorganization had figured prominently in the School Board election. Many of the parents involved in the PCIJH were helpful in the organization and election of a liberal

¹This information was gained from video taped conversation with PCIJH President Janice Dowd and School Board member Thomas Frey. These video tapes were part of an unpublished Master's thesis at the State University of New York at Brockport by Dan Dramich.

²This information was gained in conversations with Dr. David Youst, who was the first program administrator of the Interim Junior High School (May-June, 1976). Prior to his directorship, Dr. Youst was on the staff of EKLSL.

Board of Education.¹ Immediately following their election victory, these parents began to lobby in earnest for a new alternative school. From their discussion with the newly elected Board and school administration, it became apparent that if an alternative school was to become a reality, wider community support was necessary, especially from members of the non-white and business sectors. After several weeks, the parents organization had solicited the aid of a local black minister and EKLSL. Quite understandably, the inclusion of these two parties gave the planning groups additional educational and political legitimacy. With this new credibility, the rather formidable group turned its lobbying efforts on the State Education officials and the School District bureaucracy; organizing meetings and discussing possible organizational models that would be acceptable to all parties.

By January of 1971, the PCIJH was formally recognized by the School District and began holding weekly meetings. From these meetings developed objectives for an alternative junior high school that would be "innovative" rather than experimental and would feature a "learner-centered" program in which community resources and experiences would be integrated with a variety of methodological and curricular approaches. The organizing principles of the school would include maximum flexibility in scheduling the use of a variety of resource materials, frequent evaluations, and an emphasis on individual student-teacher conferences.²

¹One of the reasons the PCIJH was to have such an immediate impact on the planning of the alternative school stems from the close association this group had with three of the Board of Education members, Thomas Frey, David Branch, and Dorothy Phillips.

²Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, January 18, 1971.

During this same period, the Board of Education publicly announced that it intended to totally reorganize and desegregate the city's secondary schools and that two new alternative schools would be developed: one a junior high school and the other a senior high school. While the city was in an uproar over the intended implementation of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, the PCIJH continued to work in its planning efforts. For examples, decisions were made concerning interviewing procedures for director and the staff. Figuring prominently in this process was EKLSL whose representatives bore the major responsibility for the determination of the school's objectives and who served on the interviewing committee for the program director and staff.¹ At the same time, PCIJH was invited to inspect the latest in educational software and program instruction at Kodak's Marketing Resource Center.²

By March of 1971, the PCIJH began to make other important decisions about the new school. It was determined that although the school would be ungraded, it would have an approximate 50:50 sex and grade (7th and 8th) ratio. In approving a maximum enrollment of 500, PCIJH stated that the school population should reflect the city's racial composition (60-40) and that preference would be given to family units. In addition, since the initial plan was made by parents from a five-school area (Schools #1, #14, #23, #24, #31) on the eastside, PCIJH decided that those schools would be given a disproportionate membership in the student body relative to other elementary schools in the district. Finally, it

¹ Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, January 19 and February 16, 1971.

² Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, March 2, 1971.

was determined that the school population would be decided through a lottery using quotas from each school area.¹

TABLE 5A
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF FOUNDING SCHOOLS

School	1 Average Median Income	2 Median Value Owner Occupied	3 Number of School-Age Children on AFDC	4 Percentage Non-White in 1964	5 Percentage Non-White in 1970
Mean:	9,146	14,312		32.0	40.0
1	13,897	26,300	3.7	5.4	17.8
14	6,481	8,300	38.7	89.0	96.8
23	10,249	20,300	7.7	3.9	11.4
24	10,622	14,400	10.5	3.8	14.6
31	8,131	13,500	32.1	30.7	50.0

All the "founding" schools were located on the city's eastside. As Table 5A above² and Map 5A on the following page indicate, four of the schools were located in the Monroe JHS district and were either in or directly adjacent transitional areas of the city; that is, areas of the city that were extremely desirable (Columns 1, 2, 3) yet where non-white migration had begun to encroach (Columns 4, 5). These areas were generally inhabited by university and professional (upper middle class)

¹Ibid.

²Table 5A has been developed from two sources. Columns 1, 2, 3 are taken from statistical information produced by the Department of Planning and Research of the City School District of Rochester. This data was created by taking 1970 Census data and applying it to two individual schools zones. A summary of this data is provided for in Appendix C. Columns 4, 5 are taken from information provided in the Annual Statistical Report to the Superintendent of Schools in the School Years 1964-65 and 1970-71.

SCHOOL DISTRICT MAP

UNDER REORGANIZATION PLAN

BOARD OF EDUCATION
ROCHESTER, NEW YORK.

MAP 5A



LAKE

ONTARIO

CHARLOTTE
Sr High

CHARLOTTE JHS

John Marshall
Senior High

BELMAIN FRANKLIN

DOUGLASS JHS

EDISON TECH

JEFFERSON

WEST JHS

MONROE JHS

MADISON

WEST

1 MILE
SCALE 1:2000 FT = 1 in.
○ = elementary schools
□ = High Schools

○ = founding school

families that were generally liberal in their philosophical outlook. In addition, under the plan for the city reorganization, many of the children from these areas would be asked to attend Monroe High School for the first time. In recent years, this school had seen a change in the non-white population from 8.6% in 1964 to 32.0% in 1970. In addition, the school had become overcrowded and was physically declining.

In March, the interviewing committee of the PCIJH advertized for a program director.¹ The interviewing committee consisting of two

¹City School District of Rochester, New York. Job Description for Program Administrator of Learner-Centered School at the Junior High Level, March, 1971:

- Provide leadership in the development and the continuous evaluation of the total program of the school and all its personnel, students, staff, teachers, and resource personnel.
- Coordinate the development of policies by staff, students, and community that are consistent with overall policies and desires of the community and the Board of Education.
- Operate the school as a shared responsibility involving students, parents, community, and staff.
- Develop open lines of communication and wholesome working relationships with all those who can help in the education, guidance, and welfare of each child.
- Confer with the Central Office regarding staffing, material, and equipment needs.
- Be responsible for all operations involved in the business management of the school.
- Supervise the preparation of required reports and the maintenance of complete and accurate records of the entire program at the school.
- Develop a staff representing the broad spectrum of backgrounds and interests, recognizing individuality within the staff and the need to nurture that individuality.
- Strive to become highly knowledgeable about: Students (their needs, interests, and goals); Curriculum materials (their variety and effectiveness); Instructional activities (their relationship to student interest and to instructional goals).
- Be responsible for coordinating an on-going program of workshops, in-service meetings, visitations, and other forms of on-the-job training for all staff.
- Coordinate the development and dissemination of new ideas, techniques, materials, and models developed at the school.

parents, two Central Office personnel, and a representative of EKLSL, interviewed many candidates, most of whom were already employed by the School District. In hiring a director, however, the committee decided against the School District personnel and hired Dr. David Youst. Recognized as an intelligent and energetic individual, Dr. Youst had limited experience in the administration of either traditional or "open" educational settings. His expertise lay largely in the area of vocational education. The interviewing committee was impressed by his educational philosophy which was remarkably similar to their own. Central to his philosophy was the belief that education had been delinquent in preparing individuals to function within other work-related institutions: "Schools haven't changed to meet the changing needs of people in this society; we're still teaching the same way. This doesn't make any sense given the way other institutions had changed."¹ In addition to his most agreeable philosophical outlook, Dr. Youst did have another major drawing card: At that time, he was a staff member of EKLSL.

The task before Dr. Youst was enormous. When hired, the school had no teachers or students, or even a budget, building, or supplies. Yet, with little support from a Central Office staff who were primarily concerned with the larger aspects of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, he was expected to have the school operational in five months. Further, just as Dr. Youst was hired, the City Council had moved to hold new non-partisan School Board elections, which most community observers

¹This information was gained from interviews with Dr. Youst in May, 1976. Dr. Youst is currently on the staff of Empire State College in Rochester, New York.

knew would result in the rescinding of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan. Consequently, many School District personnel did not make a philosophical commitment to the type of educational reform the school had hoped to provide. In retrospect, as Dr. Youst has explained, the development of the school was at best a peripheral response by the liberal community who was more concerned with the desegregation program. Consequently, "the school developed not so much out of rational planning but rather out of the political climate of the period."¹

Dr. Youst and a committee of parents shared the task of faculty recruitment with mutual veto power. The first round of interview candidates came from a list provided by the Rochester Teachers Association.² The interviewing process moved quite smoothly except for one problem. In the initial round of interviews, the committee encountered many experienced teachers who wanted no part of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan. These teachers hoped that the alternative program would attract a different type of student (intellectually superior) or would at least avoid some of the difficulties (racial conflict) expected by the detractors of the reorganization plan. In some cases, these teachers were so desperate that they asked for additional (second and third) interviews

¹ Ibid.

² Since the teacher roles would be markedly different at the alternative schools, the Rochester Teachers Association closely followed the school's development and program. In the first several years, they permitted the teachers to change working conditions and evaluation mechanisms without suggesting contract violation. However, after this initial grace period, and with several teacher abuses by the school administration, the RTA began to take a hardline and made the administration adhere to the language of the contract.

with the committee.¹ However, to their credit, the interviewing committee moved judiciously looking for individuals who genuinely manifested an interest in school reform.

The search ended with the hiring of a racially and sexually balanced staff, most of whom had two or more years of teaching experience. Reflecting the frustration of many teachers in traditional urban educational settings, the new staff was interested in providing a humanistic yet substantial educational program within an open environment. However, most had not fully articulated the dissatisfaction into a clearly defined educational philosophy or methodology. Consequently, this would result in a disparity between staff members concerning the expectations for children, parents, and other faculty members in an open educational setting.²

Simultaneous with the personnel decisions, the PCIJH and Dr. Youst began the drive for student enrollment. They spoke before PTA's and educational staff (guidance counsellors). In these meetings, they discussed the general objectives and structures of the new school. Further, to emphasize the commitment to community input, they asked for suggestions that could be embodied in the school's planning and operation.³ However, the recruitment drive had rather ambiguous results.

According to PCIJH guidelines, the city had been divided into four zones that resembled the zones in the reorganization plan (see

¹Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.

²Ibid.

³Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, March 30, 1971.

Map 5A on Page 134). The names of students whose parents had signed letters of intent were organized according to their home school. The students' names whose elementary schools constituted a zone then formed the foundation for a student lottery. Each zone, except the Monroe District, was to contribute roughly the same number of individuals to the new school. The Monroe District which contained the "founding schools" was allotted a disproportionate number of student enrollment positions. Flexibility was built-in to the process to adjust for any racial, sexual or grade anomalies that might develop in the sample pool.

By the time the first drawing occurred, two clear patterns had emerged. Students from the Monroe District had volunteered for the school in disproportionate numbers to those in other school zones. The result was a lengthy and predominantly white upper middle class waiting list from the Monroe District. Considering that at that time there was neither a school structure nor fully articulated educational philosophy for the program, this fact seems to indicate that parents from this area (by no means exclusive of other areas) had enrolled their children in this school as much out of fear of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan as from genuine interest in alternative education.¹

Secondly, enrollment from the non-white sector fell far behind that of the white community. With non-white clearly underrepresented, the PCIJH and Dr. Youst mounted a massive enrollment campaign within the non-white community. But even these efforts were ineffectual, and they were forced to recruit non-white children with very serious disciplinary

¹ Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.

histories. In most cases, the guidance staffs at their schools were only too happy to help this effort. They actively counselled students with a history of disfunction within the traditional school setting into attending the new "alternative school".¹

By mid-summer, the enrollment difficulties had been alleviated. Each of the quotas, racial, sexual, and grade were near the required levels, and there remained a substantial waiting list to draw upon. Remarkably, the school had developed a certain heterogeneity. Composed of students who were genuinely interested in alternative education, students with severe discipline problems, and those who were merely attempting to circumvent the intent of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, the alternative school had achieved one of its primary objectives--a school population that mirrored the city itself.

If the enrollment issues had been perplexing, the logistical problems must have seemed insurmountable. The selection of a building site had been delayed due to disagreements over location and the limitations on renovation costs. Not until June, less than 90 days before the school opening was the determination of a school site made.² The site was located on the city's eastside, across from the local art museum, within walking distance from bus routes, libraries, a planetarium, and the museum of Science and History. Formerly the administrative office of

¹This process of using the alternative school as a "dumping ground" was continued in the initial years of the school's operation. Although often having a difficult time in adjusting to the new environment, most of these students overcame their problems, and it is to the credit of the school staff that they succeeded with these difficult children where the traditional schools had failed.

²Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, June 1, 1971.

a local industrial firm, it required extensive modification to meet all state safety and health standards. Given the time constraints and the demands made by the larger reorganization and desegregation plan, it was impossible for the School District's support staff to complete the needed changes. As a result, the school year would begin without such rudimentary structural items as lockers or fire alarms.¹

The problem of finding education resources (books, lab equipment, etc.) was equally serious. The City Council in June, in an effort to strangle the desegregation plan, drastically reduced the School Board budget. This resulted in budget cuts in all educational areas but were particularly severe for the alternative school. The school required start-up expenditures that were over and above the relative sums required to maintain a program. In order to overcome these financial difficulties, Dr. Youst requested resources from the other schools in the city. But given their own financial difficulties, they were of little assistance. The PCIJH quickly issued an appeal to the school community for any books, supplies, test tubes, or any other resources that might be used within the school. Teachers and students began to rummage through the street garbage looking for motors, old radios, or whatever that might be repaired or helpful in the instructional program. In several cases, industrial concerns and local hospitals were especially helpful in providing old equipment for the school, but despite these efforts, the school began the year with a scarcity of educational resources.

¹Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.

The First Year

With the problems of hiring faculty and enrolling students under control, the planning group and Dr. Youst turned their attention to the training of teachers for their new instructional roles. It was at this point that a serious dichotomy in educational philosophy was to develop between the PCIJH and Dr. Youst. The planning committee held that a summer workshop for teacher development should be organized and taught by the staff of EKLSL. Although having worked for EKLSL, Dr. Youst was very much opposed to the idea. Because of his association with EKLSL, Dr. Youst was well aware of its limited methodological focus and overall inexperience in public education. Dr. Youst opted for a more organic process. He believed that through a more democratic and participatory program, teachers and parents could work collectively to fully design the school program.¹ Despite vigorous opposition from some parents, Dr. Youst prevailed and a participatory workshop was held.

The workshop began in August with sensitivity training conducted by a psychologist from the University of Rochester. Dr. Youst had hoped that the technique involved in sensitivity sessions would promote better communications and reduce the interpersonal anxieties caused by the new setting. In essence, he wanted to build an atmosphere of trust and solidarity between staff, parents, and himself.² However, this did not occur. Cliques soon developed around those who wanted to "get to know" each other better and those who were anxious to begin the programmatic

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

development. As a result, there was a great deal of ambiguity and cynicism about the value and time spent in such sessions.

After several days, the initial sensitivity training was completed, the workshop broke into large discussion groups (parents, staff, and some students) in order to generate a general educational philosophy and methodology that would govern the school's operation. It was at this point that the deep rifts in educational philosophy became apparent. Some staff members and parents opted for systems and behavioral approach suggested by EKLSL. This emphasized specific task, Learning Activity Programs (LAP pakcs), and behaviorial objectives. Other staff members promoted a more humanistic and effective orientation that emphasized individual autonomy, values clarification, and interpersonal relationships. Still others had no clearly defined philosophy. These discussions were often volatile. The names of Maslow, Skinner, Piaget, among others, were used with varying degrees of sophistication and uncertainty to defend or discredit the general positions. In retrospect, to some of the teachers involved, the emotional tone of the discussions was as much the venting of years of frustration with the traditional school structure as it was value clash of differing educational philosophy.¹

After several days, it was apparent that a philosophical consensus was not forthcoming from the discussions. Instead, it was decided in the spirit of compromise that a general philosophy could be adopted that would be marginally acceptable to all parties. Conforming roughly to the British Primary School approach, the instructional program would be based

¹This information was gained in interviews with several staff members of the school who attended the summer workshop.

on the interests of the individual students. The faculty role would concern itself more with promoting individual learning than teaching, and therefore would concern itself more with process rather than the product of instruction. It was believed that this philosophy would promote student independence. Specifically, it meant that teachers would function as planning and resource persons rather than lecturers. For instance, if a student was interested in precious stones, the student and teacher would develop a project that would include library research, experiments in geology, and a visit to a local jeweler or gemologist. Every effort was to be made by the planning teachers to expose the student to many different methods of gaining information while integrating basic reading and mathematical skills into the total project.

The teacher's role in the school was not limited to instruction. In the morning, each teacher helped plan a daily and weekly schedule for 25 permanently assigned students. The teachers reported both academic progress and disciplinary problems directly to the parents of these students. This often meant home visits or telephone contact. This approach freed the school counsellors from their traditional disciplinary roles and permitted them to devote their time to sensitivity training, group counselling, and courses on racism and sexism. Further, this role for teachers assured parental involvement by providing a direct contact.

Once the school's philosophy and teacher roles were defined, attention centered on the physical arrangement of the school. The building contained four large open floors and two smaller floors that were sub-divided into individual rooms. It was decided that the smaller areas would act as the school administrative center and as the location of

"special" activities (music, art, industrial arts, and health). However, there was controversy over how the other areas would be organized. Part of the parents and staff wanted each of the floors to be organized as a resource area, that is, each floor would contain resources for a specific discipline (science, math, language arts, social science). Others opted for a structural arrangement that would have teachers from each of the major disciplines on every floor. According to the advocates of decentralization, this would promote the interdisciplinary nature of most curriculum, while facilitating the initial planning of projects by providing easy access to various disciplines. This latter group prevailed in the discussions but at the tremendous cost of fragmenting the already limited supply of school resources.

As the school year grew near, the faculty and parents began to provide substance to the school structure it had developed. Community resources (business, service, and educational) were contacted for later referrals. Teachers made initial home visits to all of the students in their planning group, discussing with the parents the school's goals and operation. As the school year drew near, the hostilities seemed to subside in favor of guarded confidence and excitement that is associated with solidarity of purpose. It was this solidarity that would hold the school together during the first year in the midst of tremendous internal and external forces.

The First Year

In the Fall of 1971, the Interim Junior High School opened over a three-day period to gradually orient groups of students to the school. In a model of the cooperative social relations which were to be promoted

within the school, each group of students helped with the orientation of the succeeding group. Although this process was successful in avoiding some problems, others emerged.

The first problem centered around the length of the planning process. In the development of the planning process, the staff had more or less assumed that students would come with individual interests and the basic skills. But this often was not the case. There were great disparities in both the articulation of interests and the most rudimentary of basic and research skills among the students. As a result, the planning of projects with students took far longer than expected; and with faculty members pre-occupied with planning, other instructional roles were not fulfilled.

The second difficulty concerned the lack of instructional material and resources. Although aware of the deficiencies before the school year began, the PCIJH and the staff underestimated the gravity of the situation. Projects were started only to be hampered by the lack of particular resources. Although searching for additional mechanisms to complete the projects did have some instructional value, most students became frustrated and confused by the total program.

The lengthy project planning and lack of resources led to disciplinary problems. Many students with little experience or motivation began to cause disturbances that often distracted from those who were working independently. Since disciplinary problems were mainly handled by planning teachers after regular school hours with parents (by telephone or visit), the emotional and physical demands on teachers were particularly harsh.

After several weeks, the faculty and staff met with parents and students to find solutions to the disciplinary and resource problems and to stabilize the program. By consensus of the school community, it was decided to accept a plan suggested by EKLSL where each planning teacher would begin to offer several courses. These courses would emphasize the development of basic skills and research methods that would be necessary for the students to develop their own individual projects.¹ The school community felt confident that this approach would help students with motivational difficulties while not undermining the school's "open" educational philosophy.

The logistical problems were solved by organizing a campaign asking for individual assistance or resources that could be related to school activities. Soon, many professionals (doctors, lawyers, university faculty) and non-professionals (welfare mothers and businessmen), volunteered to serve as work-study coordinators, references for projects, career counsellors, or even as volunteer faculty members. While the campaign attracted many individual contributions (books, radios, chemistry sets, etc.), industrial and institutional concerns (such as Kodak and the University of Rochester) donated new and used equipment to the school. Slide tape viewers, cameras, books, oscilloscopes and other equipment that could be spared were given outright to the school. In addition, these organizations also provided time to certain individuals to work with faculty and students to develop other resources.

After six weeks, the school had gained a relative degree of

¹Minutes of the PCIJH Meeting, September 24, 1971, and October 5, 1971.

stability. The change in structure had helped to diminish some of the ambiguity in roles for teachers and students while increasing the school's accountability. Slowly, the amount of instructional materials and resources began to grow and contributed to the school's efficient operation. Further, despite the complaints of some faculty members, it had not seriously altered the flexibility of the program. Teachers and students began to adjust to their new roles as both became more adept at planning projects.

However, as the instructional problems began to be solved, divisiveness developed at the administrative level. The demands on Dr. Youst's time during the initial weeks were enormous. In addition to the usual amount of administrative business, he was asked to perform instructional, business, and disciplinary roles. This included an almost continuous series of meetings with faculty and parents. In mid October of 1971, Dr. Youst decided to hire an operations manager in order to decrease his administrative burdens. This action angered many parents who saw his unilateral action as a violation of the school's commitment to community involvement in decision making.¹ To prevent any future misunderstandings about the lines of authority, the PCIJH quickly finished a constitution for the school's governing body which was named the Policy-Advisory Council (PAC).

In planning the PAC, the parents had demanded a larger role in the administration of the school; particularly in policy areas. These policy areas included school philosophy, curriculum, staff utilization,

¹Transcription of the PCIJH Meeting, October 19, 1971.

evaluation, and the school budget, among others. On the other hand, as Dr. Youst has said in retrospect, while desiring parental involvement, he wanted the school's professional staff to retain the final decision-making responsibility. Further, Dr. Youst feared that as a group, the parents involved in the PCIJH were acting for themselves and represented only members of the liberal community who had the time and money to participate in school activities. However, the parents overcame Dr. Youst's objections by organizing an effective lobbying effort with the Superintendent and "lame duck" existing liberal Board of Education.¹

The final PAC constitution (see Appendix D)² made the PAC and Dr. Youst jointly accountable to the Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools. Although Dr. Youst was accountable for all educational practice (by State law), the PAC was granted permission to recommend policy to the Superintendent and Board and to review all the educational and governance policy of the school. Included as areas of policy recommendations were: School Philosophy, Student Goals, Curriculum, School (climate), Community and Parental Involvement, Staff Utilization and Improvement, Staffing Procedures, Evaluation, Budget Development, and Cost Effectiveness. If allowed to function properly, this gave parents the most influence in school affairs that was legally possible and was an enviable model for community participation and control.

By February of 1972, the PAC elections had been held and the

¹Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.

²The final draft of the constitution of the Policy-Advisory Council was enacted in December of 1971.

council began to meet regularly. The first issues encountered by the PAC concerned school resources and declining enrollment. With more students remaining within the school itself during the winter months, the deficiencies in resources that had afflicted the school since its inception were again accentuated. Those who had earlier advocated that centralization of subject matter once again urged reorganization within the school to minimize the scarcity. Those who opposed centralization felt that the interdisciplinary nature of many projects would be lost if the reorganization was to occur. In order to resolve the issue, the PAC consulted with EKLSL and recommended that the school be reorganized into subject matter areas to be called "learning centers". In retrospect to many former staff members, this reorganization was a major step away from the school's original curricular goals.

The issue of declining enrollment was also resolved by the PAC. Although the average daily attendance was 92% (second highest in the city), a number of parents had decided to remove their children from the school. These departures may be explained by the parental decisions of two distinct groups. First, some liberal parents who had seen alternative education as fashionable found the school's freedom excessive. Often these parents had difficulty relating to the students' educational experience. Many could not understand how students could operate under such apparently chaotic conditions. Second, another group of parents who had sent their children to the school to circumvent the intent of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, returned their children to the neighborhood schools. They anticipated correctly that the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan would be rescinded by the new Board of Education.

Despite these defections (about 10%), a substantial waiting list remained. The PAC decided to request twenty names from that list and eventually thirteen students, largely from the Monroe district, decided to change schools at mid-semester. The total enrollment remained near 475 for the remainder of the year.¹

By the beginning of the second semester, most parents and students had become acclimated to the new setting. Most parents were satisfied by their child's progress and were particularly impressed with the evaluation mechanism that provided discussions with staff members about their children's academic and emotional development. At the same time, most students had learned to develop projects using a variety of resources and then to work more or less independently.

However, some students, many of them non-whites, did not adjust as well to the school. They planned projects but were without the motivation or the basic skills necessary to complete them. Furthermore, in many cases, these students did not receive the individual attention the school had promised. By March, the situation had become serious enough that a group of black parents and teachers called a meeting with Dr. Youst to voice their concerns. Subsequently, they sent a letter to the PAC asking to have a meeting with the entire faculty. In that letter they stated that many non-white students spent a disproportionate amount of time on non-academic pursuits and requested that teachers provide a better learning atmosphere and monthly evaluations for the students in

¹Minutes of the PAC, February 15, 1972 and February 29, 1972.

each subject matter area.¹ Furthermore, while urging several additional changes, they made it clear that the major concern was not the school philosophy but, rather, Dr. Youst's "poor performance" as an instructional leader. They contended that the school's organization represented a "beautiful plan for extending one's capabilities and opportunities," but that Dr. Youst had performed poorly and displayed an "I don't give a damn attitude toward parents and his responsibilities."²

The black parents found a strong alliance for their demands among the founding parents, since many were still harboring resentment over Dr. Youst's failure to consult them on most administrative matters. In fairness to Dr. Youst, many staff and parents believed that he was a kind of scapegoat for the school's ambiguous instructional consideration to those students with skill and motivational deficiencies.

By March of 1972, the Concerned Black Parents, as they called themselves, met with the entire faculty. In a highly charged atmosphere, parents and faculty discussed the school's instructional program for four hours, both in theory and practice. The parents demanded more evaluations, individual attention, and personal contact with staff concerning their children. The faculty asked for more support from parents in academic and disciplinary terms.

The discussion had two outcomes. First, Dr. Youst was asked to develop a list of "agreements" that specified the responsibilities of

¹Letter from Clarence Perkins, Chairman of the Concerned Black Parents to Mrs. Janice Dowd, President of PAC, March 22, 1972. This letter is included in the minutes of the PAC, March 28, 1972.

²Ibid.

students, parents and staff members in relation to the school.¹ Second, the faculty and black parents found that in spite of the intensity of the debate, both groups aired their concerns adequately and that working together any difficulties might be overcome. Both parents and teachers were aware of the uniqueness of the discussions themselves and seemed to realize that they had no need to fear one another. This was important when, in late April, the Superintendent of Schools announced that he was recommending to the new conservative Board of Education that the city's alternative programs be eliminated.

During this crisis period, the staff, parents and students showed a remarkable resilience and solidarity. Despite the school's difficulties, the school community was proud of the program's uniqueness and participatory nature. This resulted in a sense of community that, in turn, generated tremendous pressure on the Board of Education to keep the program in operation. For six weeks, the school community blitzed the Board of Education meetings with highly organized petitions, media campaigns, and speakers all supporting alternative schools in Rochester. Further, they solicited the assistance of the city's professional and university community as well as State Education officials by recommending that they send letters or speak directly to the Board about the school. The intense pressure created an interesting dilemma for the Board of Education. In the previous Fall election, the Board of Education had run a conservative campaign to rescind the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan as well as to reduce the city's educational expenditures. The

¹Memo to staff, parents, and others interested in the Interim Junior High School from Dr. David Youst, May 18, 1972.

election of all five candidates running on the conservative platform amounted to a mandate for their proposals. However, the pressure from the non-white and liberal sections of the city remained intense for the retention of certain aspects of the reorganization plan. Since its major concern was essentially desegregation, the Board of Education saw a useful mechanism to forestall community discontent and criticism while carrying out its mandate. In May, in what appeared an effort to appease the liberal community, it funded the alternative school at somewhat reduced levels. The day following the Board's decision, Dr. Youst, who had led the fight to save the alternative school, resigned as program administrator for personal reasons.

Upon receiving Dr. Youst's resignation, the PAC began the search for a new program administrator. The PAC recommended that a committee consisting of two Central Office personnel, two staff, two parents, a student and a consultant from EKLSL, interview candidates and through a unanimous vote make a recommendation to the Board of Education. In actuality, this approach was tantamount to granting community control over the hiring of the program director. However, this method of selection was rejected by the Board of Education who proposed a committee of three Central Office personnel, three individuals from the school community, and a consultant from EKLSL, who would interview and rank candidates with the Superintendent making the final recommendation.¹ Although the PAC strenuously objected to the Board's proposal because it sidestepped the initiatives provided in the PAC constitution, it was forced to accede to

¹Memo from Dr. John Franco, Superintendent of Schools to Mrs. Janice Dowd, President of the PAC, May 26, 1972.

the Board's wishes.

The committee developed a job description and interviewed and rated eight candidates. In late June, the Board of Education recommended that the committee's first choice be selected as the new program administrator--Ms. Rachael Lawson. At the time of her hiring, Ms. Lawson was working as an open educational consultant in Broward County, Florida. There she had been trained and worked closely with Dr. Edward Eaton, who was Chief Educational Coordinator for Eastman Kodak's Learning Systems Laboratory.

Summary of First Year

One must exercise some caution in attempting an evaluation of the school's first year of operation due to its unconventional methodology. This methodology does not lend itself to traditional evaluation mechanisms; and there were none attempted. However, Dr. Barbara Braverman, in studying one objective of the school, student resourcefulness, found some rather ambiguous results.¹ Dr. Braverman found that students at the school had made only minor advancements in the use of school resources, community resources, and types of expression (largely written) in the completion of projects. Conversely, she also found substantial improvements in such areas as the use of the communications center (audio-visual, and graphic arts), the development of questioning skills, and extra-curricular involvement with other students. This contradictory evidence as to improvement in student resourcefulness, together with the

¹Barbara Braverman, "The Applicability of Item Sampling to the Monitoring of Resourcefulness", and unpublished doctoral thesis, the University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, 1973.

unavailability of basic skill information, however, preclude any judgment as to overall student progress.

Another indicator of success or failure might be school attendance. In this area, the results are much less ambiguous. In the 1972-1973 school year, the school's attendance figures were the highest in the city, with an average daily attendance of 92%.¹

Parental involvement also was clearly exceptional. Despite the sometimes bitter conflict between staff, parents, and the program administrator, the participation level remained high. Furthermore, the school community showed the propensity to evaluate and change the school. This in itself may be construed as a sign of healthy growth and development; afterall, few schools attempt to make such rapid adjustments.

In considering the many obstacles, it seems quite remarkable that the school opened and survived the first year. The social atmosphere surrounding the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, the motives of those involved with the school, the logistical enrollment problems, among many other factors, all had a tremendous impact on the school's functioning. Perhaps the school's first year is best summarized in retrospect by Dr. Youst, who has said that "If it didn't open then, it never would have. It was a product of the times."²

¹The Annual Statistical Report to the Superintendent of Schools, City School District of Rochester, Rochester, New York, Division of Planning and Research.

²Interview with Dr. Youst, May, 1976.

The Second Year

The new program administrator began work in July of 1972 and was faced with the problem of reorganizing the school. There was strong pressure from the Central Office personnel to make the school pedagogically closer to the city's other educational institutions. Ms. Lawson herself had shared this view since her visit in the Spring prior to being selected as program administrator.¹

The first change that seemed to her to be necessary was in the style of leadership. Although she supported faculty participation in decision making, she felt that the faculty was spending excessive time in committee work at the expense of their instructional role.² Additionally, Ms. Lawson believed that the program needed stabilization. She viewed the changes in the instructional role during the school's initial year of operation as counterproductive to the school's overall functioning and wanted to define specific roles and responsibilities for students and staff. This meant the formalization of requirements, expectations, and standards of conduct.³ Further, it was her observation that the school's instructional program needed to be more directed, with teachers exercising more control over structure and content of student projects. Specifically, this meant more school-oriented or pre-constructed projects

¹Memorandum to Staff, Student Government, and Advisory Council from Rachael B. Lawson, Broward County, Florida, regarding Report of Visitation of Interim Junior High, pp.1-6.

²Ibid., p.3.

³Ibid., pp.4-5.

and the introduction of behaviorial objectives.¹

Ms. Lawson's first administrative lead upon her arrival was in the area of staff development. With the aid of two faculty members and an EKLSL representative, she began preparation for a summer workshop for teachers that would reflect the school's change in instructional emphasis. The workshop was held in August and consisted of teachers' learning techniques for making overhead transparencies, slides, photographs, movies and video and audio-tape presentations. Further, the workshop aimed at developing a familiarity with such community resources as A. B. Dick, Eastman Kodak, Xerox, and Junior Achievement.²


The school year began with the new program administrator bringing the administration of the school under her direct control. The committee apparatus was collapsed into a single steering committee. Decision making became arbitrary and unilateral with faculty or parents having little input. A new leadership model was put forward by Ms. Lawson in which she was the administrative center,³ as seen on the following page. What was explicit in her model was that any decisions coming from the PAC, Student Government, or Steering Committee, would have to meet with the program administrator's approval before being enacted.

The administrative changes were met with little resistance. The faculty itself was split with some members disappointed and openly

¹Ibid., p.5.

²Memorandum Workshop News, John Nicholson and Edith Trybalski, August, 1972.

³Rachael Lawson, Administrative Bulletin #1, Interim Junior High School, September 5, 1972.



charging a betrayal of the school's democratic ideals. Others were grateful to be relieved of their non-instructional roles and protected from dealing directly with the community and Central Office Administration. To the Central Office staff who had been tired of often dealing directly or indirectly with the PAC, her new administrative style represented a strong leadership.¹

Although successful at initiating administrative reforms, Ms. Lawson had difficulty in developing her instructional reforms. Like her predecessor, she found very little time to become involved in instructional matters. This permitted the instructional program to develop more or less at the discretion of the faculty. Building on the previous year's resources and experiences, the learning centers organized a varied instructional program. Within each subject matter area, students had the option of developing individual projects or choosing a more structured

¹Dramich, video-taped conversation with Dr. Eberhard Theme.

approach. This allowed students who were individually motivated to benefit from the freedom and openness, still providing more structure and time for those with basic skill or motivational difficulties.

Students themselves contributed greatly to the school's operation. Many with a year's experience had found it easy to develop individual projects and were less likely to be distracted by the open environment. In addition, the faculty made a concerted effort to have these students help others familiarize themselves with the school. Together the coordination of the instructional program and the experience of students and faculty improved the overall school functioning. However, the initial success in the second year was offset by changes in the school's overall population.

The school population showed two major demographic changes. The rescinding of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan had caused many white students from middle and lower class white areas to return to their predominantly white neighborhood schools. Likewise, many non-whites who were infuriated by the Board's decision decided that they were finished with attempts at integrated education and enrolled their children in their predominantly non-white neighborhood schools. The result was a drastic change in both the racial and social composition of the alternative school. The school population in the second year had an abundance of children from upper and middle class areas where the waiting lists for entrance into the school had remained full. However, lower-middle class and non-white students were clearly underrepresented. The school's

racial composition dropped from 40% non-white to 25%.¹ With the decline in representation, even the most liberal parents lost hope that this school would ever become a showplace for integrated education.

The PAC also began to change in membership, becoming decidedly upper-middle class. With this change in representation, the program administrator whose predisposition toward PAC involvement on the administrative level was not entirely enthusiastic, became even less receptive of their demands for participation. In part, from her perspective, this group had little sensitivity for the concerns of the non-whites who wanted a more structured alternative with a basic skills emphasis.² As a result, the relationship between the program administrator and the PAC became strained throughout the school year. In fact, only the "outside threat" of elimination prevented open conflict.

An example of the decline in the relationship between the PAC and the program administrator was seen in the debate over several teacher terminations. According to the PAC constitution, the Council was to play a substantial role in the evaluation process. Teachers in the school had encouraged this role by waiving their contractual rights in order to jointly find with the administration and parents new evaluation mechanisms. Although many hours of committee time had been spent on the matter, no formal process had been developed by February. At this time, Ms. Lawson announced unilaterally that several teachers would not be rehired

¹Department of Planning and Research, City School District of Rochester, Annual Statistical Report 1971-72 and 1972-73.

²Interview with Ms. Lawson, May, 1976.

at the school for pedagogical and philosophical reasons. These teachers had been part of the school's original staff and had wide support among parents, faculty, and students. Their terminations caused the PAC to draft a new evaluation policy. Since the school had been founded "in spirit and in practice as a community of teachers, students, parents, program administration and Central Office personnel in mutual assistance and participatory management,"¹ the PAC proposed the development of an evaluation review board. In respecting all contractual rights (Rochester Teachers Association), this board would be empowered to review all information available concerning teacher performance and subsequently make a recommendation to the program administrator. Clearly, what was at issue for the PAC was community involvement in the evaluation of teachers.

However, Ms. Lawson was hostile to the idea of the development of any review board. It was her opinion that such a board would undermine her prerogatives concerning evaluation and termination and immediately sought assistance of a sympathetic Central Office staff. In discharging the issue, the Central Office administration held that the program administrator could not delegate her legal authority and allow individuals other than the teacher in question to inspect or obtain a copy of an evaluation. Even if a teacher waived his contractual rights, the district administration believed that a community review board process would be "detrimental to the integrity of the observation and evaluation system as we know it."²

¹PAC, Evaluation Review Policy, June 19, 1973.

²Adam Kaufman (legal counsel), Memorandum to Frank Tota, Assistant Superintendent of Instruction, June 22, 1975.

The decline in the commitment to the community involvement during the second semester coincided with a conservative turn in the instructional program. In finally asserting her instructional prerogatives, Ms. Lawson had the faculty begin to prepare general behavioral objectives for each subject matter area. Although many teachers argued that behavioral objectives were inconsistent with the original principles of the school, most had become hesitant to openly discuss the matter given the recent dismissals. The program administrator's action was bolstered by the action of the Board of Education. As had occurred the previous year, the Board of Education temporarily eliminated the school from the budget, only to return it contingent upon the Superintendent's causing the school to be "restructured somewhat."¹

In June, bowing to the conservative pressure, the school steering committee recommended that behavioral objectives be adopted and used in all subject matter areas. Further, it was announced that the program in the Fall would become "more production oriented", that is, that "activities should focus on actually producing and marketing a product."² The project in most cases would be a predetermined behavioral objective.

In summary, the second year of the school must be considered relatively successful. Although it had become more structured, it did not lose its instructional flexibility and emphasis on the individual learning process and use of community resources. The experience gained in the first year together with changes in the school population

¹Minutes of the PAC, May 15, 1973.

²Minutes of the PAC, June 5, 1973.

contributed to its academic success in which the students demonstrably outperformed their counterparts throughout the city in basic skill growth.¹ In addition, students felt very optimistic about the total program showing gains in affective areas as cohesiveness, diversity of interest and activities, and democratic feelings, while experiencing less apathy, disorganization, and competitiveness.² In turn, this success was reflected in the school's attendance figures (93%) which was the highest in the city.³

However, despite these successes, changes had occurred late in the school year that would drastically affect the school's operation. Contrary to its original ideals, the school had seen a sharp decline in community involvement in the administration of the school, and no longer was the school population representative of the city's racial, socio-economic and philosophical composition. Lastly, the instructional program showed signs of becoming less flexible by becoming more systematized and organized around behavioral objectives.

1973 to Present

The pedagogically conservative trends that appeared during the second year became predominant in the following years. The structural and methodological conservatism was reflected in changes in three general areas: school population, instruction and administration.

¹ John B. Russo, An Evaluation of the Interim Junior High, an unpublished Master's thesis, State University of New York at Brockport, Brockport, NY, September 15, 1973.

² Ibid.

³ Annual Statistical Report, 1972-73.

The school population has seen a drastic change. This can be shown by studying the demographic characteristics of the elementary schools from which the Interim Junior High draws its school population. This information has been tabulated in Table 5B (on Page 166).¹ From this table, the following generalizations can be made:

1. The majority of the students who attend the Interim Junior High School come from the elementary Schools 16, 37, 23, 35, 29, 19, 44, 21, 2, and 8.

2. Of these ten schools, seven are from the Wilson Junior High School feeder pattern (2, 16, 19, 21, 23, 29, 37); two are from the Monroe Junior-Senior High School feeder pattern (23, 35); one school is from the Douglas Junior High feeder pattern (8).

3. Of the seven schools from the Wilson Junior High feeder pattern, the enrollments have remained relatively the same or increased over the last three years.

4. According to Column G and H, (16, 37, 23, 35) the five schools with highest numbers of students attending the Interim Junior High School have a median income of over \$10,000. Yet, four of these five schools have more than 10% of the families receiving AFDC. This seems to indicate areas that are socially and economically transitional.

5. Using Map 5B (on Page 167), the ten schools who contributed to the school's enrollment are in regions of white emigration and non-white immigration.

This information indicates that the majority of students who currently attend the alternative school are presently from middle and upper-middle class areas where children would normally attend Wilson Junior High School. As the table shows, the lower the median income of an elementary school in the Wilson feeder pattern, the less likely a student from this school would be willing to attend the alternative school. Conversely, schools associated with higher median incomes in this feeder pattern

¹The information in Table 5B is taken from three sources: Columns A,B,C,D, Department of Planning and Research; Columns E,F,G, Elementary School feeder pattern information; Columns H,I, BEDS, 1974; see Appendix C.

ROCHESTER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Home School	A # of Students 72-73	B Interim 73-74	C Students Attending Junior High 74-75	D High 75-76	E Enroll- ment Trend	F Grades 9 - 12 School	** G Grades 7 & 8 School	H Median Income	I % on Public Welfare
1	NA*	17	14	6	-	East	East	13,897	1-10
2	NA	14	20	20	+	Madis	Wilson	6,936	51-60
3	NA	2	3	8	+	Madis	Wilson	4,545	61-70
4	NA	8	15	13	o	Madis	Wilson	6,705	31-40
5	NA	2	0	2	o	Jeff	Jeff	7,430	71-80
7	NA	4	6	2	o	Marsh	8th	10,727	11-20
8	NA	16	13	19	o	Frank	F7 D8	9,406	51-60
6-9	NA	9	6	3	-	Frank	Doug	5,936	71-80
13	NA	11	6	11	+	Monroe	Monroe	8,908	31-40
14	NA	6	7	6	o	Monroe	Monroe	6,481	71-80
15	NA	2	3	4	o	Monroe	Monroe	7,072	61-70
16	NA	45	58	53	+	Madis	Wilson	10,117	11-20
17	NA	13	9	9	o	Jeff	Jeff	7,857	31-40
19&10	NA	16	14	22	+	Madis	Wilson	7,782	41-50
20	NA	1	1	1	o	Frank	Doug	7,598	61-70
21	7	16	23	20	+	Madis	Wilson	9,013	31-40
22	8	6	5	7	o	Frank	F7 D8	9,350	51-60
23	45	39	34	31	-	Monroe	Monroe	10,249	1-10
24	22	14	13	12	-	Monroe	Monroe	10,622	1-10
25	2	3	3	6	o	East	Doug	8,972	11-20
27	11	15	10	7	-	Frank	Doug	7,244	41-50
28	6	8	8	5	o	East	East	10,389	
29&58	4	15	27	26	+	Madis	Wilson	8,156	41-50
30	3	2	1	2	o	Jeff	Jeff	9,319	21-30
31	3	4	5	5	o	East	East	8,137	21-40
11-33	7	9	8	13	+	East	Doug	10,270	41-50
34	1	3	3	2	o	Marsh	Marsh	9,742	21-30
35	21	24	30	27	+	Monroe	Monroe	10,267	1-10
36	1	4	9	13	+	Frank	F7 D8	9,510	31-40
37	14	31	30	32	+	Madis	Wilson	10,721	11-20
38	4	2	1	0	o	Charl	Charl	11,236	1-10
39	3	3	2	3	o	Frank	Doug	10,449	31-40
40	0	0	3	3	o	Marsh	Marsh	10,911	1-10
41	0	1	3	4	o	Marsh	Marsh	11,221	11-20
42	4	3	2	3	o	Charl	Charl	11,797	1-10
43	4	5	2	3	o	Jeff	Jeff	10,417	1-10
44	12	25	25	22	+	Madis	Wilson	10,727	11-20
46	19	14	9	5	-	East	East	12,300	1-10
49	4	4	1	1	o	Monroe	Monroe	11,221	31-40
50	4	2	6	5	o	Frank	F7 D8	11,156	21-30
52	9	8	4	2	-	East	East	11,325	1-10

*NA = Not Available

** Madis = Madison; Jeff = Jefferson;
 Marsh = Marshall; Frank = Franklin;
 Charl = Charlotte; Doug = Douglas




SCHOOL DISTRICT MAP

BOARD OF EDUCATION
ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

MAP 5B

NOTE: Center rectangle is
riot area; each
rectangle outside
represents 1/2
mile from 1964
riot area.



1 MILE
SCALE 1,000 FT. = 1 in.
○ = elementary schools
□ = High Schools

● = Highest Attendance
at Interim Jr High

contribute substantially to the alternative school's population. Wilson Junior High School is located on the boarder between a predominantly poor non-white area and a racially mixed middle income area. In 1975, Wilson Junior High School was 87.8% non-white.¹ The evidence indicates that in recent years, the alternative school's popularity on the city's westside may be, in part, based on the desire of middle-income families to avoid sending their children to a predominantly non-white school. Put in another way, with the demise of the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan, most parents whose children attend the city's elementary schools outside the Wilson feeder pattern are more likely to send their children to their neighborhood junior-senior high school.

Instructionally the program is now geared almost entirely to meeting an extensive list of behavioral objectives. This has meant the introduction of both commercial and teacher-developed learning activity programs (LAP packs). This formulaic approach to learning usually includes a prescribed list of activities, materials, and content to be used and mastered and is accompanied by a built-in evaluation mechanism.

This approach to instruction is especially pervasive in the reading and mathematics curriculum. For example, the reading process has been broken down into 1000 specific objectives, most of which are concerned with the development of grammatical skills as opposed to comprehension. Reading for reading's sake which had been the early focus of the reading program, has become of secondary importance. Where once students (both skilled and unskilled in reading) had been encouraged to read the

¹Department of Planning and Research, City School District of Rochester, Annual Statistical Report, 1974-75.

morning paper or Sports Illustrated, they are now asked to select reading materials from the learning packets.

The formalization of the reading and mathematic program has not led to an increase in basic skill proficiency. In terms of the mean growth in basic skills as measured on standardized tests, the school performs no better than its counterparts throughout the city.¹

In some areas, like science, the movement to behavioral objectives has caused a programmatic reversal. Formerly, students were encouraged to develop observational and questioning skills, that is, those skills associated with the scientific method. Today, with the behavioral orientation, the questions are already posited for students and the emphasis is on the improvement of communication skills (writing). The movement away from experimentation and problem solving in teaching and learning has tended to discourage the program's creative aspects and the use of the scientific method as an instructional methodology. Although still functioning using individualized and open-educational techniques, the process emphasis is largely a secondary consideration.

These reforms have many advocates in the school community. To many, these changes are indicative of marked improvement from the seemingly chaotic state that marked the school's formative years. With the objectification of the program, every task has become specific and measureable, marked by words, accountability, and efficiency. While once it was criticized for its supposed lack of structure, it is now the model

¹Department of Planning and Research, City School District of Rochester, Metropolitan Achievement Test Scores for Junior High Schools.

of control and prominent as the only school in the district with behavioral objectives for every instructional program. School and Central Office administrators are encouraging other more traditionally operated schools to adopt the school's instructional methods. At this time, the city's mathematics program has adopted many of the instructional objectives developed at the Interim Junior High.

The commitment to community involvement at the alternative school has also declined in recent years. Where once both professionals and non-professionals were asked to take part in the instructional program, community involvement is no longer actively encouraged. The decline in parental involvement at the instructional level accompanied the decline in relative power of the PAC. Acting more as an informational forum, its participation in administrative and instructional decision making is now limited. When differences develop between the program administrator and the PAC, there is a tendency to fall back on traditional legalistic or contractual imperatives. Nevertheless, the PAC does have the opportunity in most cases to inspect many of the decisions made within the school. Also, the school has maintained its commitment to keep parents informed of all phases of an individual student's program. This has been done by continuing to use the planning teacher concept in which faculty meet regularly with the school parents. Overall, the record concerning parental communication with the staff is enviable by traditional standards, however, the ideal of parent participation in the decision-making process has never been realized.

In summary, in the last several years, the Interim Junior High School has seen major changes in the school's population, instructional

methodology, community involvement that are at odds with the school's original goals. Perhaps it is appropriate that in the beginning of the 1976-1977 school year that the school was relocated. Its new site is the second and third floors of a sparsely attended elementary school. Recently built near a slum clearance area, this school building was to house the students from urban renewal projects that had been promised following the riots. However, those projects were never completed. In a sense, to many, it might seem that the school is like the school building itself--a monument to lost ideals.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The historical material contained in the previous chapters provides the information needed to assess modern school reform in Rochester. This assessment focuses on five questions (Chapter I) suggested by the radical scholars and serves as an interpretive framework:

1. Is modern school reform a response to demographic changes?
2. Is modern school reform a liberal response to a threatened social order?
3. Is modern school reform the result of a discontinuity between the social relations in the workplace and the social relations in the schools?
4. Did the corporate sector play a decisive role in determining the direction of modern school reform?
5. Are the most lasting school reforms those that reflect a more efficient mechanism for performing the traditional school functions?

In the discussion of each question, an attempt will be made to ascertain to what degree the historical evidence supports the inferential claims of the radical scholars and to what extent their insights enhance our understanding of the specific community history of Rochester.

Is Modern School Reform a Response to Demographic Changes?

It is relatively easy to describe the major demographic changes that were occurring in Rochester in the study period. It is also not difficult to ascertain what precipitated these demographic changes. On the

other hand, to gauge to what extent modern school reform in Rochester was the result of demographic changes will require a more sophisticated analysis that will require establishing the centrality of the riots to other historical events.

Between 1950 and 1960, the city of Rochester experienced a 4.2% drop in its total population while its outlying suburban areas increased by 72.0%. Internal to this migration was a 9.3% decline in the white population significantly composed of upper and middle class white families, and a 204.0% increase in a predominantly poor and youthful non-white population. The cause of the non-white migration from especially the southern states was the search for economically rewarding employment in Northern areas (labor mobility). However, despite the displacements, most non-white workers usually found employment only in unskilled and service areas, for which in Rochester there were only limited openings. As a result, positions in these occupations were soon filled and the continued migration caused massive unemployment in already deteriorating non-white areas of the city. This occurred despite the critical shortage of skilled laborers in Rochester's highly technical industrial sector. Meanwhile, much of the white population, fearing the decline of property values and aware of the marginality of their own economic foothold, migrated to suburban areas.

The dual migration altered the composition of many of Rochester's schools. Inner-city schools soon became overcrowded as their racial and ethnic population also changed. However, these migratory effects can only explain modifications in the schools objective conditions that perhaps could have been solved by building additional schools. In other

words, the migratory effects alone do not reflect a cause and effect relationship between demographic characteristics and school reform. Ultimately, demographic changes in Rochester can only be related to school reform through their inter-relationship to the riots of 1964 and their aftermath.

Demographic changes in Rochester were characterized by many socio-economic disparities. These contradictions centered around racism and the unequal distribution of wealth and social services. In turn, racism and distributive injustice were reflected in poverty, unemployment, sub-standard housing, inadequate health care, police brutality, and deteriorating educational conditions within inner-city schools. Consequently, these disparities served as the preconditions that eventually caused the riots of 1964 and eventually provoked a re-evaluation of the city's basic institutions. This re-examination lead to proposals for such school reforms as embodied in the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan. What emerges from this analysis is the centrality of the riots. The significance of the riot can be shown by determining its magnitude, general characteristics, and support within the community. This can best be done using statistical techniques developed by political scientist Robert M. Fogolson and Robert B. Hill, in which they determined a "riot ratio"¹ (see Table 6A on Page 175). This ratio which was found to be 5:1 reflects the number of individuals arrested to the number that were actually involved in the rioting. Using this ratio, the following information can

¹Robert M. Fogolson and Robert B. Hill, "Who Riots?", Community Politics, edited by Charles M. Bonjean, Terry H. Clark, and Robert L. Lineberry, (New York: Free Press, 1971) pp.136-149.

be gained concerning the riot participation in Rochester.

TABLE 6A

Riot Ratio*	Total # of Non-Whites Arrested**	Total Number of Non-White Rioters***	Total Number of Potential Non-White Rioters†	% of Riot Area Residents who Rioted††
5:1	823	4115	16,136	25.5

* The riot ratio was derived by dividing the number of non-white residents within a particular category by the number of non-whites arrested within the same category in three cities in which extensive riot data has been generated (Detroit, Los Angeles, and Newark). The average of the ratios was then calculated and determined to be 5:1.

** This number was calculated by adding the number of Blacks (792) and Puerto Ricans (31) arrested in the July, 1964 riots.

***The total number of non-white rioters was determined by multiplying the total number of non-whites rioting by the riot ratio.

† This figure represents the total number of potential rioters and it is determined by subtracting the non-white populations between 0-9 years of age and those over 59 years of age from the total population of non-whites.

†† This percent of residents who rioted is determined by dividing the total number of non-white rioters by the total non-white residents of the riot area between 10 and 59 years of age.

Although these participatory estimates may seem high, in fact, they represent a conservative appraisal given that they are based on 1960 census information and that the non-white population was rapidly growing between 1960 and 1964. Further, the magnitude of the participation is given additional credibility when it is remembered that local authorities called 1500 National Guardsmen over and above the contingent of 500 State, County, and local law enforcement officers that had already been involved.

A second consideration in determining the significance of the

riots is the general characteristics of the rioters. In terms of age, most rioters arrested (975) were between the ages of 20 and 39; with the largest contingent between the ages of 25 and 29. Of the 166 teenagers arrested, most comprised the bulk of the 243 individuals that were unemployed. Put in another way, most of those participating in the riots were employed and had been for some time. *These facts seem to indicate that those who participated in the riots were a relatively stable group who were rebelling against the unequal and inhumane conditions that they had been forced to endure.*

Lastly, it is important to ascertain the overall community sentiment among non-whites in Rochester at the time of the riots. This is difficult since there is little research available concerning community support immediately following the riots. However, in a conjectural sense using data gained by pollster Louis Harris in his 1966 survey of non-whites in the riot-torn Watts district of Los Angeles, some comparative information can be gained.¹ In this study, Mr. Harris found that 39% of the non-whites in the study area would have or were uncertain about their participation (potential rioters) in the Watts riot. Further, similar to Rochester, Mr. Harris found that of the 39%, most were from lower-middle, middle, and upper-middle income levels (employed individuals) who were 34 years old or younger. When generalized to Rochester, these figures seem to support a contention that the riots of the 1960's were representative as much of class conflict as it was racial and that the riots had potentially wide support.

¹Ibid, p.148.

Overall, the data concerning riot participation, general characteristics of rioters, and degree of community support, is highly speculative. However, when it is combined with the historical documentation concerning the size and types of community responses, the centrality of the riots to other historical and demographic events begins to emerge and permits the following generalization. From historical and statistical evidence, the demographic changes in Rochester necessitated by lower class labor mobility and fueled by the contradictions in material life and racism, acted as a catalyst for the riot and eventually at attempts at economic and institutional reform in Rochester.

Is Modern School Reform a Liberal Response to a Threatened Social Order?

Currently, there are many philosophical and ideological discussions concerning the precise definition and role of liberalism in relation to social and educational reform. Revisionist Clarence Karier believes that liberalism plays a substantial role as an "ideological vehicle" for maintaining the economic system; that is, that liberalism's claims to controlled economy, state planning, and managed change are, in fact, mechanism for effective and efficient social control of the lower social and middle classes.¹ However, radical economists Bowles and Gintis see liberalism's rationalistic and humanitarian emphasis as largely benevolent. It is their contention that liberal themes have been subverted by the often contradictory social relations of production which

¹Clarence Karier, "The Odd Couple: Radical Economists and Liberal Historians", Educational Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1976, p.187.

exercise a disproportionate influence over everyday life.¹ The resolution of such intellectual questions are important but lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. What is needed for the purposes of this discussion is a functional definition of modern liberalism.

Modern liberalism (as opposed to the 19th Century laissez-faire liberalism) has two basic components, rationalistic and humanitarian. The rationalistic component has an ideology that includes the use of state power, efficient and technologically controlled economic system, and a general reliance on experts to solve both human and technical problems. Its humanitarian emphasis stresses the need for community and the use of science (psychology) to prevent and eliminate unjust conditions and social conflict. In both the rationalistic and humanitarian components, the major thrusts are in the areas of organization, unified values, and what revisionist Walter Feinberg has characterized as a "science of management".² Given this orientation of modern liberalism, a determination can be made concerning its relation to social and educational reform in Rochester during the study period.

The riots represented a mass action by a powerless segment of the Rochester community. (By "powerless" it is meant those with the inability

¹Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, pp.224-241.

²Walter Feinberg, Rhetoric and Reason. The impact of corporate liberalism on all phases of life is accurately described by John Kenneth Gailbraith's discussion in The New Industrial State, (New York: Signet Books, 1967), p.172, of what he has termed the technostucture of society and industrial organization. "Much of what is believed to be socially important is in fact, the adaptation of social attitudes of the goal system of the technostucture, are believed to have original social purpose. Accordingly, members of the corporation in general and the technostucture in particular are able to identify themselves with the corporation on the assumption that it is serving social goals, when, in fact, it is serving their own."

to mobilize institutional resources to achieve a goal.) Composed of citizens who lacked both money and status, this group gained a sense of solidarity from their participation in the riot. In turn, this participation had the effect of breeding further opposition and antagonism, and eventually lead to organization and activism. The new organizational forms such as FIGHT and other community groups represented an emerging force that was willing to function outside "traditional channels". For an example, the attempts at voter registration following the riots which in essence was an attempt to channel discontent into traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution was met with little enthusiasm. Rather, the non-white community opted for community organization.

While the non-white community sought alternative mechanisms for alleviating the inequality in social and economic conditions, others in the community made a more predictable and liberal response. After a series of obligatory disclaimers the community and business leaders formed a number of committees or commissions who consulted with a variety of experts in the areas of race relations, minority employment, and poverty and ultimately filed a myriad of reports. Most of the reports substantiated the inequalities but sought administrative solutions (more education or job training facilities). None seriously questioned the basic structure and assumptions that served as the preconditions of the riots. This formulaic response is typical of corporate liberal and bureaucratic functioning that tends to seek technical solutions rather than structural reforms.

Saul Alinsky and the FIGHT organization were well aware of the differences between problem-solving and real political power. Despite

the tremendous pressure exerted from such powerful conformity-inducing institutions was the Community Chest and the local media, FIGHT understood that only through gaining and exercising real political and economic power could the non-white community begin to adequately deal with the substantive problems of poverty, unemployment, and education. Consequently, the dispute between Kodak and the FIGHT organization represented a conflict over the right of the poor to exercise their own power rather than having it executed in their own behalf.

The movement for educational reform in Rochester also seems to reflect liberal characteristics. At first, many individuals both white and non-white saw the contradictions in the economic and social conditions as anomalies that could be eliminated by changes within the educational structure; namely, the reorganization and desegregation of Rochester's public schools. Reorganization meant more specialization in terms of grades and curriculum and a humane instructional methodology that was more individualized. Desegregation while having merit in attempting to attack racism by equalizing educational conditions nevertheless was an attempt to see the problems of reform in an institutional way while failing to address the structural deficiencies. Together, specialization, humanistic emphasis, and predilection for institutional reform over structural redefinition embodied in proposals for reorganization and desegregation seem to reflect the liberal mind.

Even at the alternative school level the influence of liberal thought is highly visible. The demand for and use of Eastman Kodak's Learning Systems Laboratory by the founding parents, the emphasis on conflict resolution techniques as group therapy and value clarification, and

ultimately the initiation of cybernetic approaches and behavioral objectives to the instructional program seem to reflect the liberal reliance on the expert and commitment to the use of psychology to reduce conflict and improve instruction within the schools.

In summary, the data seems to indicate that social and educational reform in Rochester does reflect liberal philosophy. This is not to say that these characteristics are malevolent but, rather, that they shaped and limited both the perceptions of and solutions to the contradictions of the material and social conditions. Historically, as revisionists have shown, the use of social and educational reforms to solve problems of poverty and inequality have the tendency to cause reformer to overlook the abject conditions that initially precipitated the problems.¹ This seems to be the case in Rochester, where a troubled social order made liberal responses that were both humanitarian and rationalistic. These reforms offered a temporary mechanism that did "buy time" to diffuse social energy and human potential for reform without seriously altering the social outcomes. After many years of struggle and with minimal amount of change, most reforms (reorganization and desegregation) and reform organizations (FIGHT) have lost their impetus for serious social, economic, and educational change.

¹Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, p.165.

Is Modern School Reform the Result of a Discontinuity
Between the Social Relations in the Workplace
and the Social Relations in the Schools?

The correspondence principle which was originated in the writings of Karl Marx and applied by Bowles and Gintis in Schooling in Capitalist America, states that individuals are integrated into the economic order through the structural correspondence between the social relation of production (workplace) and the social relations in the reproductive sectors (schools, political and legal structures, and the family).¹ In educational terms, this means that schools attempt to reproduce the types of discipline, personal characteristics, and social class identifications and skills found in the workplace. Using this paradigm, veritcal authority structures, teacher-dominated curriculum, grades, and destructive competition are attempts to reconstruct the hierarchical relations, alienated labor, external motivation, and fragmentation associated with work experiences. Similarly, individual differences between schools financing and social relations correspond to variations in economic means and social relationships at various strata in the organization of production. Economically speaking, the values inculcated within the educational establishment are those necessary for reproducing labor characteristics and markets so important for the accumulation of capital by an elite class.

The correspondence principle becomes particularly important in its application to periods of educational reform. It is the contention of radical economists that despite the parallel relationship between economic

¹Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America, p.132.

and educational systems both have distinct and separate internal dynamics of reproduction and development; that is, the economic system being in a state of dynamic transformation evolves more rapidly than the slower changing educational system. Eventually, the discontinuity in the rates of change cause a subsequent anomaly between the social relations in productive and reproductive sectors. This discrepancy is to Bowles and Gintis the essential catalyst for educational change. In other words, "educational reform is the more or less automatic reorientation of educational perspectives in the fact of a changing economic reality."¹

Recent educational historians have found the outline represented by the correspondence principle to be generally accurate; i.e., schools have more or less reflected the larger economic environment with periods of school reform following major transformations in the productive sector. This, Bowles and Gintis believe, "establishes a strong prima facie case for the causal importance of economic structure as a major determinant of educational structure."² Some historians, however, (including some revisionists) dispute Bowles' and Gintis' causal claims. Clarence Karier argues that for "production to have preceeded educational change is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for making the causal claims that they [Bowles and Gintis] make."³ Consequently, Karier believes that their critique requires more primary source material rather than correlational material to support their causal claims. This distinction between correlation and causality is important in attempting to apply the

¹Ibid., p.237.

²Ibid., p.224.

³Karier, The Odd Couple, pp.185-186.

correspondence principle to the analysis of the historical events in Rochester.

As we have seen in the 1950's and early 1960's, the Rochester economy experienced a continual expansion in the corporate sector in technical, electrical, and mechanical areas. Subsequently, this required substantial changes in the labor force. Using data contained in Table 2G the changes emerge as follows:

Percent Change of Total Occupation Between 1950 and 1960

% increase

professional and technical
clerical workers

% the same

workers
household workers
service workers

% decrease

managers, officials and proprietors including farmers
craftsmen and foremen
operatives
laborers

Several conclusions can be drawn from this summary data. The labor market in Rochester was becoming increasingly specialized, white-collared service, and lower supervisory. No longer were foremen, blue-collar, and operatives central to the production process. So great was the demand for skilled, technical, and semi-skilled workers that many believed that the tight labor market in these occupations would be the "limiting factor" for future economic growth in the area. In turn, this created several problems for industrial concerns. Since continued technological advancement was essential for capital accumulation, new mechanisms were needed to train and integrate highly skilled and white-collar workers into the

production and wage-labor system. This was difficult because the new technology often required individual judgement and specialized skills formerly not required in the production process. In addition, the tight labor market in skilled and semi-skilled occupations gave workers in these areas power to exercise demands for higher wages and benefits, as well as better working conditions.

These managerial problems were overcome in several ways. On one hand, yielding to worker demands and on the other, fearing unionization, business executives adopted "soft-management techniques" for use in the production process. Managers and administrators gave substantial consideration to employee morale, job satisfaction and improving working conditions, while offering extensive fringe benefits such as salary bonuses, free dental and medical assistance, and company-sponsored recreational programs. These programs acted to smooth labor relations and reduce labor separations. However, the overall production process remained intact and continued to be highly task-oriented, fragmented and specialized, with limited worker participation in the decision-making process. It is against these changes in the economic conditions and the social relations of production that the validity of the correspondence principle became apparent in its application to school reform in Rochester.

At the city-wide level, the plan for the reorganization and desegregation of public schools seems to be related to alterations in the economic sector. The desegregation plan was aimed not only at achieving equality of educational opportunity but also economic opportunity. The non-white population in Rochester represented a largely untapped pool of labor. In demanding access to better and higher quality education through

community organization, they entered in a critical struggle for economic survival with lower-middle and lower-class white workers. Although many of these white workers had gained a skill or technical proficiency, their economic foothold remained highly tenuous. As many social critics have noticed, many middle class families are only one step from poverty.¹ Given this limited grasp on economic security, this surely played into the fears of lower and middle income families and contributed to their resistance to the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan. This is not to say that racism did not play a role in the conflict over the reform plan, but rather than integration and increased schooling for non-whites was in part class struggle for educational training and economic survival.

The by-product of this struggle was the resolution of the tight labor markets. The undertrained and underemployed non-white community represented a reserve of individuals seeking employment while making only limited economic demands on employers. Under the aegis of hiring and training non-whites for the betterment of community relations, the labor market problems quickly eased. This is helpful in understanding why many firms (other than Kodak which rightly saw the actions of community organizations as representing a labor movement) easily entertained the idea of hiring minorities. Clearly, civic-mindedness was enlightened self-interest.

The reorganization section of the total plan is related to changes occurring in the social relation of production in Rochester's economic sector. For example, the rationale given for the reorganization

¹Richard Parker, The Myth of the Middle Class: Notes on Affluence and Equality, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

of the city's secondary schools into separate junior and senior high schools is correlated to the skills necessary in highly technical corporate industries. The rationale was that the reform would facilitate the development of self-worth and understanding of others, improve self-discipline in work and study, strengthen cognitive and analytical skills, develop moral and ethical values, and advance the concepts and intellectual skills necessary for civic and socially responsible behavior. This emphasis on the self and social conformity are extremely important if white collar workers are to be absorbed into the modern production process. Furthermore, its ideological implications given the riots and their aftermath are that poverty and economic problems are solved through the enhancement of individual skill attainment and adherence to community norms.

More directly, the statements made by the program administrator of the alternative school supports the correspondence principle. "Schools haven't changed very much to meet the changing needs of people in this society; we're still teaching in the same way. This doesn't make sense the way other institutions have changed." Clearly, Dr. Youst and the founding parents wanted to adopt the types of social relations involved in the new organizational structures of production. Those structures in the alternative school included differentiation (individualization, specialization) and conservative socialization (vocational guidance and group counseling). Those structures correspond directly with the needs of the economic order.

In short, the historical evidence of the Rochester study indicates that school reforms followed production transformations, eased

tight labor markets, and attempted to reproduce the types of social relations embodied in the dynamic changes in the workplace, both at the correlative and causal levels.

Did the Corporate Sector Play a Decisive
Role in Determining the Direction of Modern School Reform?

The political environment is often a measure of how corporations can circumvent the democratic process and exert tremendous economic and social power within a community. In Rochester, the political climate was highly non-partisan. For example, neither the mayor or the city manager was directly elected by the citizens, rather, they were appointed by the City Council. As a result, most political parties were relatively weak and only exerted themselves in relation to issues already established by various community groups, that is, the political process in Rochester became the interaction of conservative, liberal, civic, ethnic, bureaucratic, and business forces with political parties playing an inconsequential role. In such an environment, political scientists have found that corporate and media leaders exert a tremendous force in inducing conformity within all segments of the community.¹ In Rochester, this was reflected in its paternalism and limited understanding of what was meant by "community".

This type of political environment often excludes the participation of members of the disenfranchised lower classes. This occurs for several reasons. First, the poor lack the time and energy to participate

¹Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," Community Politics, pp.701-702.

in political affairs. Given the emotional and physical strain involved in most middle and lower class occupations, there is little doubt why such studies as Work in America and Working found such alienation and apathy among most Americans. Secondly, political scientists have found that participation is strongly related to social and structural variables such as social memberships, education, income levels, and status hierarchies. Access to these variables are difficult to attain or denied to most working class citizens.¹ Finally, the continuous subjugation to the rationalizations and the decisions of others, together with the need to constantly make emotional adjustments to make conditions bearable, causes the poor to develop a negative sense of dependency, helplessness and lack of self-worth. The overall effect of these conditions is that the poor have few political resources other than mass action to sanction their economic and social demands. This is precisely what happened in Rochester.

The contradiction in the material and social conditions had existed for some time prior to the riots of 1964. Up to that historical moment little attention let alone more outrage and indignation had been registered with the Rochester community. Largely responsible for this passivity was the paternalistic attitude fostered by the close association between the public and private sectors. Civic voluntarism as practiced in Rochester was a form of the enlightened self-interest necessary for social mobility among middle and upper levels of management. In

¹Warner Bloomberg, Jr., and Florence Rosenstock, "Who Can Activate the Poor?", one assessment of maximum feasible participation in Community Politics, edited by Bonjean, et al., pp.150-158.

turn, this acted as a mechanism whereby corporate and entrepreneurial elites could and did exercise a disproportionate hegemony over public and private affairs in Rochester, with little or no influence exercised by the lower classes.

Like the other violent clashes of the 1960's, the Rochester riots were a call for popular control and political reconstruction by the lower-middle and lower classes. In Rochester, these groups moved outside traditional political channels where they had been ignored so long and developed organizations and mass actions that circumvented the public-private network, and sought the resolution of their grievances directly in the corporate office. Advocating traditional labor tactics, FIGHT and Saul Alinsky made the battleground for social reform the economic sector. As the Kodak-FIGHT controversy represents, this approach seriously questioned the legitimacy of the economic system itself, that is, the primacy of ownership, hierarchy, and hegemony of production.

The circumvention of traditional legal, social, welfare, political, and educational institutions created serious problems for corporate and public leaders. With the legitimacy of the economic system and their control at stake, the most basic problem was to return equilibrium to the system by channeling the criticism to the institutional level. As the many community reports issued following the riots verify, the economic system was considered basically sound but its institutions were no longer sensitive to problems and segments of Rochester society. Accordingly, what needed changing were the institutions and not the system. Subsequently, community reports called for a massive re-examination and reform of Rochester's basic institutions.

Specifically, the Reorganization and Desegregation Plan was an attempt to alter the unequal conditions in the educational sector while diverting attention from the economic sources. In this area, concessions and reform were accomplished without jeopardizing basic economic and social phenomenon. Moreover, the corporate sector would aid in this educational effort by developing vocational education programs, organizing and participating in human relation seminars, and contributing to the development of social agencies and counseling programs. In this context, the traditional power structure could predetermine the issues (racism, legal and social organization, and education) while reasserting their legitimacy and hegemony. In the end, after many attempts at reorganization and desegregation as well as other social and school reform, the non-white community understood this dynamic and opted for limited community control.

At the alternative school level, the impact of corporate control was also felt. As the earlier discussions have indicated, the corporate model became the main organizational scheme. In addition, their representatives (from Kodak and parents espousing liberal philosophy) were rapidly integrated and permitted to participate in educational decision making traditionally considered outside their domain with little resistance. For example, they were allowed to participate in the hiring of school personnel, the development of programmatic structure and content, and the evaluation of individuals and programs. Consequently, the school's organizational model and personnel in no way contradicted corporate social relations and needs. Moreover, the methodology for which they were in part responsible provided a suitable market for many of their

commercial products. These included such educational software as film, micro-fiche, audio-visual aids, and programmed instructional materials produced by such local firms as Xerox and Eastman Kodak.

In summary, corporate leaders in Rochester were able to maintain their hegemony through their active participation in the definition and resolution of grievances and the acceptance by many in the community of corporate liberal philosophy. As a result, corporations exerted a subtle but nonetheless pervasive force in the determination of both the perception of problems and the limits of reform. With individual consciousness so closely tied to that of the corporate mind, reforms become, as Gabriel Kolko found during the Progressive Era, "the political rationalization of business and industrial conditions...operated on the assumption that the general welfare of the community could best be served by satisfying the needs of business."¹ Reform as the rationalization of business values does not represent a contradiction in terms, rather it seems to be the logical response given the economic environment. As historian James Weinstein has said, "In a society dedicated to material progress, businessmen should lead, using a philosophy not aimed at understanding the world but changing it to their own advantage."² Therefore, the contradictions involved in efforts at reform lie not with reformers but with the economic system itself. Consequently, in Rochester corporate leaders and/or their representatives were able to blunt socio-economic criticism by

¹Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), pp.2-3.

²James Weinstein, The Capitalist Revolution: A History of American Society Through 1890-1919, (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

channeling reform energy into institutional areas where reforms can be formulated under their supervision.

Are the Most Lasting School Reforms
Those That Reflect a More Efficient Mechanism
for Performing the Traditional School Functions?

Revisionist historians and radical economists contend that educational reform has been both a liberal and cyclical phenomenon. During the Progressive Era, liberalism was expressed educationally in such reforms as manual training, vocationalism, civics, guidance counselling, compulsory attendance, kindergarten, and the development of junior and senior high schools. As responses to the urbanization and industrialization, these reforms reflected a strong anti-urban bias, need for social control, and unrelenting faith in the expert, as well as corresponding to the social relations needed for the new modes of production. In addition, the radical scholars conclude that changes in school organization and methodology gave the illusion of major reform and renewed faith in the accommodating capacity of the economic and social system. However, these scholars have found that over a period of years as the socio-economic crises have subsided most reforms were either eliminated or have become more conservative where far from their humanitarian and pedagogical origins they emphasized social discipline and order. Having come full circle from an apparent leadership role in social and economic reform, the lasting school reforms reasserted traditional functions of sorting, socializing, and holding students while reaffirming the socio-economic order.

The type of socio-economic upheaval that was prevalent at the turn

of the century was again prominent in the early and mid-1960's in Rochester. In this most recent crisis period, the disenfranchised were minority groups who were seeking a larger role in society. It has been our contention that the violent and non-violent disruptions, together with the alienation surrounding the increasingly technological orientation of work had caused a threatened Rochester society to initiate liberal reforms in which education, government (welfare), and business were to be the ameliorative agencies for social and economic inequality.

In education, the major attempt at reform was the school Reorganization and Desegregation Plan. The plan itself had humanitarian and pedagogical origins. However, this focus was soon lost when it was reduced to a bitter fight for social and economic survival among the lower classes. Although some pedagogical reforms were enacted in traditional classroom settings, with the plan's annulment the overall school organization reverted to its original status as the schools became increasingly alienated and segregated.

Although these events suggest a cyclical phenomenon suggested by the radical scholars, they are by no means persuasive. At no time did the reorganization plan ever become fully activated. While the plan's advocates were planning its implementation, others in the community were preparing its elimination. The City Council, by resorting to political deception in calling for new elections and reducing allocations, doomed the plan before it was ever fully implemented. Without a reasonable chance, it would be inaccurate to suggest a truly cyclical phenomenon. However, in the study of the alternative school, the cyclical effect is more fully evidenced.

The alternative school's original year of operation was marked by considerable flexibility in the school organization and methodology, as well as having extensive parental involvement in the school's decision-making apparatus. However, throughout the second year, the school became increasingly more conservative in its structural outlook. The increased demands by the Board of Education and Central Administration for more accountability and "restructure", necessitated changes that were in line with traditional school organization and functioning. As a result, in recent years the program has become highly structured and teacher-directed while permitting less meaningful parental involvement. Furthermore, the school has become a haven for those families who do not want to send their children to a largely non-white and inferior school.

Specifically, the pedagogical reforms initiated at the school were representative of liberal school reforms throughout the country during the study period. For the most part, these reforms such as individualized instruction, value clarification, open educational methods, among others, seem too romantic responses to a violent and highly structured society. But in a different sense, these reforms like their progressive corollaries were, in fact, the real embodiment of anti-urbanism and lack of respect for life. Jonathan Kozol explains this paradox in his book Free Schools:

Free schools, then, cannot with sanity, with candor, or with truth, endeavor to exist within a moral vacuum...The passive, tranquil and protected lives white people lead depend on strongly armed police, well-demarcated ghetto. While children starve and others walk the city streets in fear on Monday afternoons, the privileged young people in the free schools of Vermont shuttle their hand-loomed back and forth and speak of love and "organic process." They "do their thing." Their thing is sun and good food, eighteenth century houses, and a box of baby turtles; somebody else's thing can be starvation, broken glass, unheated rooms and rats inside the bed

with newborn children. The beautiful children do not wish cold rooms or broken glass, starvation, rats, or fear for anybody; nor will they stake their lives, or put their bodies on the line, or interrupt one hour of the sunlit morning or sacrifice one moment of the golden afternoon, to take a hand in altering the unjust terms of a society in which these things are possible.¹

Most reforms initiated during this period reflected the narrow outlook suggested by Kozol that educational reform could somehow substitute for serious social and economic change. This permitted many individuals to ignore the preconditions of the socio-economic upheaval and misplace their social responsibility. Presently, rather than benign or innocent misdirection, as many might claim, the continued use of some reforms show the propensity to become more subtle mechanism for social control. For example, the use of behavioral objectives in individualized instruction.

Individualized instruction with a behavioral basis shows the capacity to perform the traditional school functions more efficiently. Far from their original goals, this type of individualized learning can become an efficient mechanism for sorting students. Despite using content, language, and methodologies that often are foreign to many minority groups, this type of instruction perpetuates the commonly held myth that all students will have an equal opportunity at success. Although changing the methodological elements, the basic formula for success remains unchanged; competitive achievement tests. These tests have been shown in a number of studies to work against lower social classes while giving the appearance of meritocratic sorting. In addition, individualized

¹Jonathan Kozol, Free Schools, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p.10.

instruction which emphasizes private rather than social objectives and specific rather than general goals, promotes the type of socialization necessary for the technological workplace. In other words, individuals who will work independently and follow rules and regulations, while responding to external rewards.

In summary, despite attempts to alter the structure and content of instruction in Rochester, most major reforms initiated in recent years have not survived the reform period. Those reforms that have continued to exist on a limited scale seem to have capability to perform the traditional school functions efficiently while preparing students for future industrial roles.

Summary

The general interpretive framework of the radical scholars suggested in Chapter I seems to be supported by the historical events that shaped efforts towards reform in Rochester during the study period. Demographic changes necessitated by inequalities in material and social conditions acted as a catalyst for the riots of 1964. In response, the community initiated liberal reforms that were both rationalistic and humanitarian and that sought to quell the incipient rebellion. In part, these reforms were both formulated by and served the purposes of corporate leaders. Subsequently, many reforms were withdrawn and those that remained reflected the social relations in the workplace and performed schooling's traditional functions more efficiently.

It is difficult to make generalizations from the historical study of modern social and school reform in Rochester. In part this difficulty originates in Rochester's uniqueness among metropolitan areas. Rochester

was chosen for the study because its demographic, economic, social, and educational characteristics seemed ideally suited for the type of analysis advocated by both the radical revisionists and economists. The close association between the public and private sectors, the social upheaval, the sophistication of the liberal and non-white organizations, and the highly technologically oriented corporate sector, provided the environment described by radical scholars necessary for reform. However, most metropolitan areas do not have these composite characteristics or have them to a lesser degree, thus making generalizations uncertain.

There are other limiting factors which preclude comprehensive statements due, on the one hand, to the ideological immaturity of educational revisionism and, on the other hand, the application of radical economic thought to education. As exemplified by the recent changes in the revisionists' ideological perspective by such prominent revisionists as Michael Katz and Joel Spring, as well as the continuing debate over the role liberal and economic philosophy in school reform among the radical scholars, the theoretical framework is still being formulated, and these scholars are just beginning to understand with any precision the internal dynamics of the reform process in a capitalist society. Until this theoretical and ideological framework is more fully developed around such concepts as the correspondence principle, generalization in the form of causal claims will be tentative.

The methodological and ideological difficulties associated with the study of social and school reform in Rochester gives the interpretation a parochial and conditional status. Yet, these difficulties do not seriously undermine the integrity of the arguments raised by the radical

scholars. Rather, they point to the need for additional community studies that will permit generalizations and ideological refinements. Such research might include a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between vocational requirements, educational reforms, and labor market shortages. Also needed are additional studies of educational reform in which socio-economic and demographic variables are different qualitatively and quantitatively from those in Rochester. Additionally, as Clarence Karier has suggested, primary historical studies are necessary to determine the precise relationship between liberal educational philosophy and economic structure.

Although the period studied in Rochester was atypical in some respects, the history of reform in Rochester may show the pattern of the future. As the economy continues to become technologically oriented, it will require new types of skilled laborers and social relations of production. In such an environment it will be increasingly important for schools to reproduce the types of highly trained individuals that will work independently in organizational hierarchy and who will accept the prevailing socio-economic conditions as given. This will require new educational methodologies and philosophies that will legitimate the system and veil its contradictions. Some examples of this are already forthcoming. At a recent Kodak School Services Symposium at Rochester Institute of Technology (Fall, 1976) for school supervisory personnel, the topics under consideration were "Developing Media to Fit Alternative Learning Needs", "Programmatic Innovations in Training at Kodak", "Building Quantitative Skills Through Vocational Education", "Recent Partnerships in Career Education Locally", and "A Corporate Psychologist

Looks at the New Breed of Employee". All of these topics seem to indicate corporate concern with changing educational methodologies so that they correspond to the types of skills and social relations found in the workplace. Another less obvious example is the emergence in cities like Boston and Madison (Wisconsin) of plans for the reorganization of school districts through the development of alternative schools in order to circumvent desegregation and other issues concerned with distributive social justice.¹ As these examples seem to indicate, educational reform continues to provide the labor needs for corporate leaders while serving as a bromide for social and material inequalities. In so doing, educational reform and reformers are betraying their noblest ideals and blunting consideration of more substantial and egalitarian alternatives.

¹The National Alternative Schools Program at the University of Massachusetts is currently documenting the pervasiveness of the misuse of alternative schools as a substitute for desegregation and a detention center for students with disciplinary problems.

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A P P E N D I X A

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RIOT AREA
USING CENSUS TRACT DATA

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank	
				Highest (1)	Lowest (89/93)
				1960	1955
Total population	318,611	332,488	-4.2		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	29.6	24.0			
% 18 years to 64 years	56.4	65.0			
% 65 years and over	14.0	11.0			
Non-white - number	24,228	7,845	208.8		
% of total population	7.6	2.4			
Foreign born - number	42,044	49,127	-14.4		
% of total population	13.2	14.8			
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	120,528	na			
% of total population	37.8	na			
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	Italy	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	41.6	45.7			
% with 13 years or more	13.1	11.7			
Median number of years completed	10.1	9.6			
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$5,104	\$3,076			
Families (1960 only)	\$6,361	na			
Labor force - total	138,013	151,167	-8.7		
% of population over 14	57.4	56.7			
% unemployed	5.9	5.7			
% females	39.6	35.2			
Occupation - total employed	129,849	142,406	-8.8		
% Professional-Managerial	18.2	17.9			
% Service Workers-Laborers	15.5	13.5			
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	45.2	na			
Housing units - total	107,295	101,231	6.0		
% vacant	4.0	1.6			
% deteriorated & dilapidated	14.7	na			
Households = occupied housing units	102,997	99,487			
% one-person units	20.2	11.3			
% renter occupied	48.6	48.6			
persons per household	2.97	3.18			
persons per multi-person household	3.46	3.45			
Population in group quarters	13,106	16,400	-20.1		
% of total population	4.1	4.9			

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank	
				Highest (1)	Lowest (90)
	1960	1950	1950-60	1960	1950
Total population	1,015	1,236	-17.9		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	11.9	8.0		87	88
% 19 years to 64 years	69.5	70.9		2	3
% 65 years and over	18.6	21.1		12	1
Non-white - number	110	84	31.0		
% of total population	10.8	6.7		20	7
Foreign born - number	80	195	-59.0		
% of total population	7.9	15.8		78	35
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	254	na			
% of total population	25.0	na		80	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	56.8	65.5		11	6
% with 13 years or more	12.6	6.0		33	50
Median number of years completed	8.6	8.4		80	76
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$1,551	\$910		87	86
Families (1960 only)	np	na			
Labor force - total	506	655	-22.8		
% of population over 14	54.8	56.3		75	63
% unemployed	14.6	20.6		4	1
% females	12.3	18.6		89	88
Occupation - total employed	432	519	-16.8		
% Professional-Managerial	12.0	12.5		48	49
% Domestic-Labor	46.6	50.6		3	1
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	70.8	na		1	
Housing units - total	202	178	13.5		
% vacant	3.0	5.1		49	2
% deteriorated & dilapidated	12.9	na		42	
Households = occupied housing units	196	180	8.9		
% one-person units	61.2	44.4		5	1
% rental units	89.9	88.0		5	4
persons per household	1.90	2.29		84	84
persons per multi-person household	3.32	3.33		68	70
Population in group quarters	643	823	-21.9		
% of total population	63.3	66.6		1	1

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (\$9/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	664	1,219	-45.5		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	36.9	26.3		11	34
% 18 years to 64 years	54.2	61.8		73	82
% 65 years and over	8.9	11.9		80	27
Non-white - number	10	7	42.9		
% of total population	1.5	.5		35	30
Foreign born - number	102	292	-65.1		
% of total population	15.4	24.0		30	5
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	343	na			
% of total population	51.7	na		13	
Ethnic concentration by country	Italy	Italy			
[over 5% foreign born in 1950, or					
over 10% foreign stock in 1960]					
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	53.8	71.5		22	3
% with 13 years or more	9.5	1.5		42	88
Median number of years completed	8.8	5.0		65	88
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	np	np		--	--
Families (1960 only)	np	na		--	
Labor force - total	238	538	-55.8		
% of population over 14	51.0	56.8		86	57
% unemployed	5.9	12.5		40	5
% females	37.0	27.7		66	85
Occupation - total employed	224	471	-52.4		
% Professional-Managerial	7.1	11.8		79	54
% Service Workers-Laborers	15.6	26.0		35	5
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	37.0	na		67	
Housing units - total	210	313	-32.9		
% vacant	15.2	2.9		1	11
% deteriorated & dilapidated	37.6	na		10	
Households = occupied housing units	178	304	-41.5		
% one-person units	10.7	15.5		77	15
% renter occupied	74.2	73.7		15	11
persons per household	3.73	3.51		3	16
persons per multi-person household	4.06	3.97		6	3
Population in group quarters	0	152	--		
% of total population	0	12.5		89	8

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (89/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	2,058	3,288	-37.4		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	28.3	15.3		61	81
% 18 years to 64 years	63.0	74.7		7	1
% 65 years and over	8.7	10.0		82	49
Non-white - number	1,409	1,320	6.7		
% of total population	68.5	40.2		3	2
Foreign born - number	78	201	-61.2		
% of total population	3.8	6.1		88	88
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	208	na			
% of total population	10.1	na		88	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	55.8	46.1		15	49
% with 13 years or more	9.3	15.8		45	19
Median number of years completed	8.6	9.4		79	40
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$1,894	\$1,563		86	83
Families (1960 only)	\$4,283	na		80	
Labor force - total	964	1,750	-44.9		
% of population over 14	62.2	61.3		12	9
% unemployed	14.7	11.0		3	9
% females	47.8	37.1		4	15
Occupation - total employed	822	1,557	-47.2		
% Professional-Managerial	12.9	11.8		43	55
% Service Workers-Laborers	40.9	26.0		6	6
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	66.4	na		3	
Housing units - total	753	1,017	-26.0		
% vacant	7.4	2.7		11	13
% deteriorated & dilapidated	29.1	na		15	
Households = occupied housing units	697	985	-29.2		
% one-person units	31.7	30.7		12	7
% renter occupied	81.6	85.1		9	6
persons per household	2.79	2.49		73	81
persons per multi-person household	2.62	2.15		20	80
Population in group quarters	112	837	-86.6		
% of total population	5.4	25.5		9	4

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank	
				Highest (1)	Lowest (90)
	1960	1950	1950-60	1960	1950
Total population	5,167	5,448	-5.2		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	29.1	20.3		57	77
% 19 years to 64 years	59.7	69.1		10	8
% 65 years and over	11.2	10.6		63	43
Non-white - number	2,662	610	336.4		
% of total population	51.5	11.2		6	6
Foreign born - number	219	440	-50.2		
% of total population	4.2	8.1		87	85
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	678	na			
% of total population	13.1	na		86	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	51.7	49.1		30	46
% with 13 years or more	9.4	11.2		44	31
Median number of years completed	8.9	9.2		59	42
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$2,908	\$2,261		79	77
Families (1960 only)	\$3,878	na		83	
Labor force - total	2,319	2,656	-12.7		
% of population over 14	60.1	58.8		26	32
% unemployed	11.0	7.9		10	24
% females	39.3	39.6		40	10
Occupation - total employed	2,065	2,441	-15.4		
% Professional-Managerial	11.5	13.1		55	45
% Domestic-Labor	44.0	23.6		4	11
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	68.5	na		2	
Housing units - total	2,189	2,284	-4.2		
% vacant	8.5	4.9		9	4
% deteriorated & dilapidated	28.3	na		18	
Households = occupied housing units	2,003	2,174	-7.9		
% one-person units	39.4	32.5		8	5
% rental units	87.0	84.9		7	7
persons per household	2.47	2.39		80	83
persons per multi-person household	3.42	3.07		55	83
Population in group quarters	235	243	-3.3		
% of total population	4.4	4.5		9	8

	1960	1950 ^s	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (89/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	505	1,188	-57.5		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	43.2	18.4		3	79
% 18 years to 64 years	51.8	70.0		85	5
% 65 years and over	5.0	11.6		89	30
Non-white - number	442	456	-3.1		
% of total population	87.5	38.4		1	3
Foreign born - number	15	148	-89.9		
% of total population	3.0	12.4		89	49
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	37	na			
% of total population	7.3	na		89	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	74.4	69.4		1	4
% with 13 years or more	np	4.8		--	60
Median number of years completed	6.8	8.1		89	83
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	np	\$1,361		--	84
Families (1960 only)	np	na		--	
Labor force - total	130	554	-76.5		
% of population over 14	42.1	55.1		88	75
% unemployed	np	16.9		--	2
% females	42.3	24.3		13	87
Occupation - total employed	120	459	-73.9		
% Professional-Managerial	6.5	11.0		81	57
% Service Workers-Laborers	61.7	40.6		1	3
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	62.7	na.		10	
Housing units - total	135	259	-47.9		
% vacant	0	.7		89	72
% deteriorated & dilapidated	91.1	na		1	
Households = occupied housing units	135	254	-46.9		
% one-person units	20.0	21.1		22	10
% renter occupied	87.4	89.4		6	3
persons per household	3.70	2.88		4	76
persons per multi-person household	4.37	3.38		2	61
Population in group quarters	6	335	-98.2		
% of total population	1.2	28.2		35	3

^s1950 data were adjusted for 1960 boundary change

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (89/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	1,723	3,303	-47.8		
Age distribution					
% under 13 years	39.6	28.5		5	13
% 18 years to 64 years	55.1	64.1		57	50
% 65 years and over	5.3	7.4		88	78
Non-white - number	1,426	1,607	-11.3		
% of total population	82.8	48.7		2	1
Foreign born - number	82	474	-82.7		
% of total population	4.8	14.4		86	42
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	191	na			
% of total population	11.1	na		37	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	64.5	73.2		4	1
% with 13 years or more	3.4	2.3		81	83
Median number of years completed	7.8	6.3		86	86
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$2,491	\$1,962		84	81
Families (1960 only)	\$3,444	na		85	
Labor force - total	663	1,463	-54.7		
% of population over 14	58.0	57.8		53	49
% unemployed	25.6	11.3		1	7
% females	37.0	32.9		68	65
Occupation - total employed	493	1,295	-61.9		
% Professional-Managerial	2.7	7.3		89	87
% Service Workers-Laborers	52.9	41.8		2	2
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	64.4	na		6	
Housing units - total	524	921	43.2		
% vacant	8.8	2.2		8	19
% deteriorated & dilapidated	69.5	na		2	
Households = occupied housing units	478	898	-46.8		
% one-person units	22.4	17.0		18	14
% renter occupied	80.5	78.5		12	9
persons per household	3.48	3.41		7	33
persons per multi-person household	4.20	3.90		4	4
Population in group quarters	59	244	-75.8		
% of total population	3.4	7.4		16	12

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (59/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	5,008	4,885	2.5		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	47.2	28.1		1	20
% 18 years to 64 years	47.0	64.5		88	40
% 65 years and over	5.8	7.4		87	80
Non-white - number	3,305	1,051	214.5		
% of total population	66.0	21.5		4	4
Foreign born - number	570	1,281	-55.5		
% of total population	11.4	26.2		48	3
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	1,051	na			
% of total population	21.0	na		83	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	U.S.S.R.			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	60.1	58.4		7	21
% with 13 years or more	5.3	3.4		69	74
Median number of years completed	8.5	8.2		81	81
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$3,676	\$2,307		75	76
Families (1960 only)	\$4,318	na		79	
Labor force - total	1,703	2,176	21.7		
% of population over 14	58.7	57.9		40	48
% unemployed	12.8	10.8		7	10
% females	38.5	35.4		50	30
Occupation - total employed	1,485	1,938	-23.4		
% Professional-Managerial	6.0	10.3		85	63
% Service Workers-Laborers	39.1	23.9		7	9
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	63.8	na		7	
Housing units - total	1,375	1,417	-3.0		
% vacant	6.8	1.6		15	33
% deteriorated & dilapidated	44.9	na		8	
Households = occupied housing units	1,281	1,388	-7.7		
% one-person units	12.9	9.4		60	30
% renter occupied	81.3	71.4		10	15
persons per household	3.89	3.43		2	29
persons per multi-person household	4.32	3.68		3	16
Population in group quarters	27	128	-78.3		
% of total population	.5	2.6		51	25

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (89/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	5,041	5,112	-1.4		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	34.1	25.3		15	39
% 18 years to 64 years	54.5	63.1		67	65
% 65 years and over	11.4	11.6		61	31
Non-white - number	1,572	44			
% of total population	31.2	.9		9	23
Foreign born - number	405	557	-27.3		
% of total population	8.0	10.9		77	60
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	1,161	na			
% of total population	23.0	na		82	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	40.8	44.3		55	55
% with 13 years or more	9.8	7.3		39	43
Median number of years completed	9.9	9.6		39	38
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$4,648	\$3,217		60	42
Families (1960 only)	\$6,056	na		47	
Labor force - total	2,100	2,240	-6.3		
% of population over 14	58.4	54.8		48	77
% unemployed	7.0	2.6		31	79
% females	38.6	34.2		49	45
Occupation - total employed	1,952	2,181	10.5		
% Professional-Managerial	13.8	14.6		41	40
% Service Workers-Laborers	24.2	12.6		13	38
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	54.4	na		24	
Housing units - total	1,635	1,560	4.8		
% vacant	5.4	1.3		28	47
% deteriorated & dilapidated	25.4	na		23	
Households = occupied housing units	1,547	1,541	.4		
% one-person units	16.2	8.4		36	35
% renter occupied	48.2	44.1		42	46
persons per household	3.26	3.31		28	42
persons per multi-person household	3.70	3.52		13	40
Population in group quarters	0	15	--		
% of total population	0	.3		89	70

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (39/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	3,255	3,404	-4.4		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	37.3	27.7		8	22
% 18 years to 64 years	52.5	60.9		82	87
% 65 years and over	10.2	11.4		74	35
Non-white - number	1,498	133			
% of total population	46.0	3.9		7	11
Foreign born - number	161	364	-55.8		
% of total population	4.9	10.7		85	64
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	525	na			
% of total population	16.1	na		84	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	--	--			
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	46.3	51.4		45	41
% with 13 years or more	7.3	4.1		55	66
Median number of years completed	9.4	8.9		45	50
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$4,260	\$3,010		66	56
Families (1960 only)	\$5,772	na		58	
Labor force - total	1,449	1,383	4.8		
% of population over 14	65.7	58.1		3	85
% unemployed	12.8	4.0		8	62
% females	40.3	29.6		28	79
Occupation - total employed	1,263	1,326	-4.8		
% Professional-Managerial	5.0	12.0		87	52
% Service Workers-Laborers	29.6	15.2		11	27
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	54.2	na		26	
Housing units - total	1,026	1,007	1.9		
% vacant	6.7	1.3		17	46
% deteriorated & dilapidated	19.5	na		32	
Households = occupied housing units	957	994	-3.7		
% one-person units	15.4	8.4		42	36
% renter occupied	52.7	48.2		38	38
persons per household	3.39	3.40		11	35
persons per multi-person household	3.83	3.62		9	27
Population in group quarters	6	24	-75.0		
% of total population	.2	.7		69	52

	1960	1950	% Change 1950-60	Rank Highest (1) Lowest (89/88)	
				1960	1950
Total population	581	578	1.9		
Age distribution					
% under 18 years	2.0			89	
% 18 years to 64 years	72.7			1	
% 65 years and over	25.3			3	
Non-chite - number	11				
% of total population	1.8			34	
Foreign born - number	135				
% of total population	23.0			7	
Foreign stock* (1960 only) - number	272	na			
% of total population	46.8	na		28	
Ethnic concentration by country [over 5% foreign born in 1950, or over 10% foreign stock in 1960]	U.S.S.R				
Education of persons age 25 and over					
% with 8 years or less	47.8			41	
% with 13 years or more	15.2			23	
Median number of years completed	9.3			49	
Median income					
Families & unrelated individuals	\$2,568			83	
Families (1960 only)	np	na		--	
Labor force - total	446				
% of population over 14	76.5			1	
% unemployed	5.8			42	
% females	41.0			23	
Occupation - total employed	416				
% Professional-Managerial	29.1			11	
% Service Workers-Laborers	18.2			29	
Mobility - % moved 1955-1960	66.2	na		4	
Housing units - total	538				
% vacant	12.5			2	
% deteriorated & dilapidated	19.7	na		30	
Households = occupied housing units	471				
% one-person units	83.9			1	
% renter occupied	100.0			1	
persons per household	1.21			89	
persons per multi-person household	2.32			89	
Population in group quarters	18				
% of total population	3.1			18	

A P P E N D I X B

COMPOSITE MAPS FOR CRITICAL DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

I. HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION LOSS BETWEEN 1950 and 1960

Percent Population Loss

6.3%-13.2%


13.3%-20.1%

20.2%-34.0%

34.1%-47.8%



[Loss of entire city 4.2%]



the Rochester-Monroe County Airport

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

II. HIGHEST DEGREE OF DETERIORATION AND DILAPIDATION OF HOUSING UNITS

Percent Deteriorated or Dilapidated

16.9%-29.2%


29.3%-41.5%

41.6%-66.3%

66.4%-91.1%



[All housing units in city 14.7%]



City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

III. HIGHEST PREVALENCE OF RENTER OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS

Percent Renter Occupied


55.9%- 70.5%

70.6%- 85.2%

85.3%-100.0%



[All housing units in city 48.6%]/



Rochester-Monroe County Airport

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

IV. HIGHEST DEGREE OF POPULATION MOBILITY, 1955-1960*

Percent Moved

52.0%-58.2%


58.3%-64.5%

64.6%-70.8%



[Percent of city population
moved 45.2%]

*Percent of persons five years and
over who had a different residence
in 1955.



Rochester-Monroe County Airport

Tract 29

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

V. HIGHEST NUMBER OF PERSONS PER MULTI-PERSON HOUSEHOLD

Persons Per Multi-Person Household


3.72-3.98

3.99-4.25

4.26-4.52



[City average 3.46]



the Rochester-Monroe County Airport

Tract 89

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts


VI. HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF NON- WHITE POPULATION

Percent Non-White

8.7%-21.8%
21.9%-34.9%
35.0%-61.2%
61.3%-87.5%



[City average 7.6%]



Rochester-Monroe County Airport

Tract 1 P/

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

VII. HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF ADULTS WITH EIGHT YEARS OR LESS EDUCATION

Percent Eight Years or Less Education

47.8%-52.2%


52.3%-56.6%

56.7%-65.5%

65.6%-74.4%



[City average 41.6%]



Rochester-Monroe County Airport

Tract 89

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

VIII. HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED PERSONS IN LABOR AND SERVICE OCCUPATIONS

Percent Laborers and Service Workers

17.8%-25.0%


25.1%-32.3%

32.4%-47.0%

47.1%-61.7%




[City average 15.5%]



Rochester Municipal Airport

IX. LOWEST MEDIAN INCOME OF FAMILIES

* Not reported



At Rochester, Monroe County Airport

774-9 22

City of Rochester

1960 Census Tracts

X. HIGHEST RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT


Unemployment Rate

6.8%- 9.9%
10.0%-13.0%
13.1%-19.3%
19.4%-25.6%



[City unemployment rate 5.9%]

• Not reported



A P P E N D I X C

THE DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN ROCHESTER IN 1970

School	Range of Median Family Income	Average Median Income	Total Population	Total Population Ages 0-4	Black Ages 0-4	Total Ages 0-4	Total Ages 5-14	Black Ages 5-14	Total Ages 15-17	Total Ages 5-17	Total Ages 0-17	Ratio Children to Adults	School Enrollment	# Free Lunches	% Free Lunches	% Mobility	# School Age Children AFDC	% Ages 5-17 AFDC
1	11,502-16,804	13,897	15,299	341	9	633	38	208	841	1182	3.48	236	46	19.5	17.5	31	3.70	
2	5,217-8,236	6,936	5,572	680	656	1434	1351	288	1722	2402	1.32	957	548	57.3	31.6	874	51.00	
3	1,648-6,543	4,545	3,180	296	269	541	507	156	697	993	2.20	388	270	69.6	40.9	319	45.80	
4	6,615-6,857	6,705	4,379	574	558	1128	1089	269	1397	1971	1.22	617	423	68.6	48.8	508	36.40	
5	2,757-9,004	7,430	5,609	592	69	808	89	215	1023	1675	2.47	1551	350	63.5	48.0	299	29.20	
6&9	2,090-8,428	5,936	10,602	1533	1344	2775	2341	626	3401	4934	1.15	1184	727	61.4	65.6	1218	35.80	
7	10,104-11,367	10,727	8,179	795	38	1324	22	379	1703	2498	2.27	586	110	18.8	24.7	92	5.40	
8	8,713-10,817	9,406	7,165	578	30	1103	79	291	1394	1972	2.63	526	188	35.7	59.4	329	23.60	
11&33	8,281-11,903	10,270	16,803	1631	142	2822	286	831	3653	5284	2.18	1635	546	33.4	34.1	702	19.20	
13	7,013-11,933	8,908	5,358	518	135	799	205	247	1046	1564	2.43	481	202	42.0	63.7	345	32.98	
14	4,943-7,614	6,481	5,005	614	418	1062	730	223	1285	1899	1.64	854	323	37.8	67.1	818	63.70	
15	5,020-8,895	7,072	7,201	375	95	596	227	149	745	1120	5.43	276	150	54.3	76.4	195	26.20	
16	4,111-11,420	10,117	10,803	972	200	2049	547	495	2544	3516	2.07	719	135	18.8	29.4	250	9.80	
17	6,715-8,951	7,857	6,217	754	256	1203	338	278	1481	2235	1.78	794	420	52.9	46.8	611	41.30	
19&10	6,289-8,984	7,782	9,167	1002	888	2186	1912	480	2666	3668	1.50	1077	505	46.9	46.9	1032	38.70	
20	7,012-8,007	7,598	6,140	842	432	1400	633	379	1779	2621	1.34	614	503	81.9	93.1	1058	59.50	
21	8,567-9,790	9,013	5,419	499	17	986	14	270	1256	1755	2.09	457	178	38.9	35.2	149	11.80	
22	7,906-10,112	9,350	9,655	905	115	1410	168	403	1813	2718	2.55	940	515	54.8	75.2	462	25.50	
23	8,507-12,174	10,249	8,206	449	4	801	13	235	1036	1485	4.53	415	65	15.7	27.3	80	7.70	
24	8,902-11,427	10,622	8,006	648	15	1329	49	349	1678	2326	2.44	416	80	19.2	26.5	177	10.50	
25	8,204-9,607	8,972	5,086	527	77	898	164	255	1153	1680	2.03	540	202	37.4	27.7	233	20.20	
27	5,745-8,381	7,244	7,387	1004	510	1730	869	418	2148	3152	1.34	942	680	72.2	52.6	1023	47.60	
28	8,544-1,484	10,389	6,206	534	98	1088	151	308	1396	1930	2.22	691	276	39.9	49.0	158	11.30	
29&58	7,356-9,785	8,156	5,799	642	315	1111	508	239	1350	1992	1.91	993	415	41.8	27.2	560	41.50	

School	Range of Median Family Income	Average Median Income	Total Population	Total Population Ages 0-4	Black Ages 0-4	Black Ages 0-4	Total Ages 0-4	Black Ages 5-14	Total Ages 5-14	Total Ages 15-17	Total Ages 5-17	Total Ages 0-17	Ratio Children to Adults	School Enrollment	# Free Lunches	% Free Lunches	% Mobility	# School Age Children AFDC	% Ages 5-17 AFDC
30	8,294-10,240	9,319	7,273	852	10	1305	18	391	1696	2548	1.85	552	176	31.90	24.7	232	13.7		
31	6,913-10,494	8,137	5,639	336	158	538	255	148	686	1022	4.52	355	156	44.00	52.9	220	32.1		
34	7,315-11,006	9,742	8,043	801	13	1438	13	405	1843	2644	2.04	631	146	23.10	29.5	262	14.2		
35	7,479-11,445	10,267	6,600	602	23	1044	56	266	1310	1912	2.45	586	147	25.10	27.1	150	11.5		
36	7,721-11,459	9,510	13,461	1227	204	2118	334	634	2752	3979	2.38	914	441	48.20	57.5	754	27.4		
37	9,004-11,706	10,721	8,966	887	144	1543	252	421	1964	2851	2.14	715	56	7.80	47.8	128	6.5		
38	10,195-13,210	11,236	3,800	295	0	592	51	492	1959	3006	2.43	560	49	8.80	27.2	55	6.8		
39	10,124-10,979	10,449	10,540	1047	40	1467	51	492	1959	3006	2.51	647	148	22.90	25.2	114	5.8		
40	10,191-11,249	10,911	4,446	557	3	754	3	204	958	1515	1.93	476	52	10.90	17.4	77	8.0		
41	9,656-11,433	11,221	9,062	717	2	1435	8	431	1866	2583	2.51	564	76	13.50	30.1	81	4.3		
42	11,432-12,185	11,797	5,672	509	0	1032	2	280	1312	1821	2.71	667	42	6.30	13.9	23	1.8		
43	9,183-11,465	10,417	7,162	557	16	1134	9	361	1195	2052	2.50	521	130	25.00	41.3	77	5.2		
44	9,991-11,954	10,727	5,107	427	10	835	36	223	1058	1485	2.44	552	76	13.80	54.3	08	10.2		
46	11,071-15,360	12,300	5,291	405	7	954	12	320	1284	1689	2.13	294	53	18.00	26.0	20	1.6		
49	1,935-15,763	11,221	12,382	550	22	525	28	250	775	1325	8.34	327	19	5.80	16.8	11	1.4		
50	9,585-11,736	11,156	4,786	314	12	571	20	200	771	1085	3.40	339	91	26.80	47.0	41	5.3		
52	10,755-11,898	11,385	5,119	431	2	914	0	249	1163	1594	2.21	392	92	23.50	13.9	61	5.24		
Totals		386,108	295,792						62911	90730	102.11	25981	9807	37.74		13982	22.2		
District Mean (excl 26858) SD		9,417	7,214.4						2212	2.49	633	239.2							
Range	1,648-15,804		1,936.6	2,784.3					990	1.28	279.2	196.1							

School	Total Population	Total # Living Units	# People Per Unit	# Units Owner Occ	# Units Renter Occ	Total Units Eval	% Rent	# 1.51+ Per Month	% Over Occupied	# Owner Occ/Over Occ	# Renter Occ/Over Occ	# Units Lacking Plumbing	% Units Lacking Plumbing	# Units Valued \$10,000-14,999	Median Value	Owner Occupied	% Below City-wide average	# Renter Units \$60 or Less	# Renter Units \$80	# Renter Units \$100	Median Rent	% Low Rent
1	5,299	2,381	2.23	769	1,314	2,083	63.08	5	0.24	1	4	35	1.68	3	26,300	3	.39	12	100	171	156	6.69
2	5,572	1,649	3.38	425	914	1,339	68.25	39	2.91	8	31	65	4.85	197	10,400	46	.35	151	362	.650	86	23.10
3	3,170	1,349	2.36	66	1,009	1,075	93.86	56	5.20	5	38	136	12.65	26	11,800	39	.39	159	470	794	81	30.00
4	4,379	1,294	3.38	268	757	1,025	73.96	52	5.07	10	41	54	5.26	167	8,900	62	.31	39	218	490	91	23.70
5	5,609	2,266	2.48	151	1,547	1,698	91.10	36	2.12	2	34	90	5.30	60	11,400	39	.73	185	551	1,006	89	23.70
6	10,602	3,336	3.18	193	2,671	2,864	93.26	150	5.23	9	132	380	13.26	129	8,600	66	.83	389	1,354	2,133	79	36.00
7	8,179	2,885	2.84	812	1,591	2,403	66.20	7	0.29	0	7	80	3.32	12	17,000	1	.47	59	157	441	119	6.15
8	7,165	2,610	2.75	773	1,393	2,166	64.31	23	9.06	1	22	21	.96	142	12,900	18	.36	57	281	655	102	16.00
11	16,803	5,800	2.90	2,543	2,352	4,895	48.04	31	0.63	13	18	82	1.67	191	15,900	7	.51	116	442	1,118	101	13.00
13	5,358	2,292	2.34	423	1,477	1,900	77.73	26	9.36	5	21	96	5.05	134	12,100	31	.67	114	412	760	98	20.00
14	5,005	1,885	2.66	145	1,405	1,550	90.64	52	3.35	5	47	210	13.54	105	8,300	72	.41	163	562	1,040	85	28.00
15	7,201	4,189	1.72	159	3,370	3,529	95.49	77	2.18	1	40	622	14.62	37	13,200	23	.27	388	998	1,879	95	18.00
16	10,803	3,605	3.00	1,914	1,173	3,087	37.99	18	0.58	12	6	38	1.23	39	15,600	2	.03	70	178	422	110	9.20
17	6,217	2,250	2.76	432	1,245	1,677	74.23	39	2.32	8	31	65	3.87	234	9,600	54	.16	95	394	771	91	24.00
19	9,167	2,906	3.15	950	1,478	2,428	60.87	43	1.77	14	29	31	1.27	314	11,600	33	.05	67	423	808	95	24.08
20	6,140	1,944	3.16	395	1,160	1,555	74.59	58	3.72	9	49	63	4.05	242	9,000	61	.26	103	463	831	85	31.00
21	5,419	1,913	2.83	761	800	1,561	51.24	18	1.15	8	10	31	4.98	287	11,200	37	.71	69	257	523	90	23.50
22	9,655	3,581	2.70	1,417	1,433	2,850	50.28	21	0.73	6	15	93	3.26	373	12,100	26	.32	151	529	977	87	26.00
23	8,206	4,102	2.00	506	2,932	3,438	85.28	50	1.45	4	46	41	11.92	14	20,300	2	.76	178	532	960	120	12.00
24	8,006	3,588	2.23	1,577	1,526	3,102	49.16	14	0.45	0	14	79	2.54	240	14,400	75	.21	92	307	620	109	14.00
25	5,086	1,745	2.92	688	660	1,348	48.96	13	0.96	3	10	18	1.33	130	12,900	18	.89	38	140	378	95	15.00
27	7,387	2,313	3.19	441	1,322	1,763	74.98	60	3.40	10	50	49	2.77	214	10,200	48	.52	145	527	933	86	28.00
28	6,206	2,163	2.87	1,197	729	1,926	37.85	10	0.51	1	9	35	1.81	108	14,900	9	.02	38	116	283	108	10.00
29	5,799	2,086	2.78	502	1,188	1,690	70.29	29	1.71	4	25	137	8.10	152	12,300	30	.27	174	390	643	95	18.00

School	Total Population	Total # Living Unit	# People Per Unit	# Units Owner Occ	# Units Renter Occ	Total Units Eval	% Rent	# 1.51+ Per Month	% Over Occupied	# Owner Occ/Over Occ	# Renter Occ/Over Occ	# Units Lacking Plumbing	% Units Lacking Plumbing	# Units Valued \$10,000-14,999	Median Value	Owner Occupied	% Below City-wide Average	# Renter Units \$60 or less	# Renter Units \$80	# Renter Units \$100	Median Rent	% Low Rent
30	7273	1751	4.15	712	697	1409	49.46	11	0.78	3	8	25	1.77	131	12,700	18.39	46	170	397	95	17.7	
31	5639	2847	1.98	163	2258	2421	93.26	34	1.40	6	28	337	13.91	49	13,500	30.06	158	548	931	108	17.2	
34	3043	2853	2.82	1057	1278	2335	54.73	18	0.77	1	17	92	3.94	102	14,200	9.64	63	268	652	98	16.0	
35	6600	2544	2.59	612	1457	2069	70.42	8	0.38	0	8	97	4.68	55	14,400	8.98	57	200	565	109	9.8	
36	13461	4730	2.85	2081	1851	3932	47.07	33	0.83	9	24	69	9.75	390	13,800	18.74	186	566	1013	95	20.0	
37	8966	3070	2.92	1688	935	2623	35.64	11	0.41	6	15	35	1.33	81	14,600	4.79	23	111	260	119	9.4	
38	3800	1250	3.04	675	376	1051	35.77	4	0.38	1	3	47	4.47	59	16,900	8.74	20	53	129	116	8.0	
39	10540	3601	2.93	2038	1136	3174	35.79	5	0.25	3	5	39	1.22	66	16,800	3.23	32	128	532	103	8.0	
40	4446	1422	3.13	796	56	1306	39.05	5	0.38	4	1	6	.45	19	16,800	2.38	22	45	241	102	4.0	
41	9062	3328	2.72	1751	1142	2893	39.47	8	0.27	7	1	56	1.93	38	17,200	2.17	34	149	387	115	10.0	
42	5672	1830	3.10	1326	346	1672	20.69	5	0.29	4	1	8	.47	33	18,400	2.48	11	26	57	149	4.0	
43	7162	2471	2.90	1583	603	2186	27.56	11	0.50	7	4	13	.59	135	16,000	8.52	29	84	169	118	9.1	
44	5107	1754	2.91	1021	469	1470	31.47	4	0.67	5	5	20	1.34	61	14,500	5.97	18	70	175	110	11.0	
46	6291	1857	2.85	1131	585	1710	34.09	5	0.29	3	2	26	1.51	15	21,400	1.32	16	26	76	130	1.0	
49	12382	2341	5.29	1805	1371	2176	63.00	14	0.64	0	14	33	1.51	11	19,600	1.36	29	92	562	110	4.0	
50	4786	1838	2.60	943	624	1567	39.82	22	1.40	6	16	12	.76	36	17,400	3.81	62	124	209	179	9.0	
52	5119	1758	2.91	1183	374	1557	24.02	8	0.51	4	4	12	.77	29	17,100	2.45	11	36	105	116	6.68	
Totals (Exclu 26&58)	295792	105377	117.57	37072	51457	88529	58.12	1142		208	875	3847	4.34		586,800							
Mean	7214.4	2570.2	2.87	904.2	1255.1	2159.2		27.9		5.07	21.34	93.83			14,312							
S.D.	2784.3	993.3	5.749	611.6	687.5	849.1		27.16		3.73	23.26	126.20			3,779							

A P P E N D I X D

CONSTITUTION OF POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL

The Policy Council of the
Interim Junior High School

The "Interim" Junior High School is to be unique in its structure and its responsiveness to the community which it serves. The School embodies a bold attempt to implement a more humanistic and personalized philosophy of education, and should become a working model which might be adopted by traditional schools. The belief of those who have nurtured the idea into reality and of those who have dedicated themselves to implementing the concept is that a "Policy Council" is basic to the entire project.

This Council is responsible to the Board of Education for the long-range development and maintenance of the Interim Junior High School. The Council will be composed of representatives of the immediate school community - students, staff and parents of students in the school. To meet its responsibilities to the Board the Council will propose basic policy for the school. Policy decisions, implemented by appropriate Board resolution, will affect the general overall operation of the school; and the impact of these decisions will be viewed in terms of weeks, months or years as differentiated from day to day decisions which require immediate response by the professional staff.

Accountability Model for the Interim Junior High School

Subject to overall responsibility in the Board of Education, the Council, Director, Staff and Students will carry the responsibility for the operation of the Interim Junior High School to meet its learning

goals. The model for accountability is:

Students - accountable to teachers

Teachers - accountable to Director

Director - accountable to the Policy Council

Policy Council - accountable to:

1. The Board of Education

(a) Report to the Board (including an annual educational, operational and budget audit).

(b) Respond to Board requests for information.

(c) Submit one and three year plans annually.

2. The Superintendent of Schools

(a) Report on School development bi-monthly, (including an annual educational, operational, and budget audit).

(b) Cooperate with procedures as they coordinate with Learner-Centered Education and the policies of the school.

(c) Budgetary accountability.

(d) Respond to requests for information.

3. Parents of students enrolled at school

(a) Respond to requests of individual parents.

(b) Hold "town" meetings twice each year

(1) October and March

(2) Present one and three year plans for open review, discussion, and improvement

(c) Publish bi-monthly reports on school developments.

(d) Publish policy statements of school, noting recommended changes.

(e) Report of annual educational, operational and budget audits.

Responsibility of Policy Council

Three basic functions are performed by the Policy Council. It develops and recommends to the Board policy statements, systematically reviews policy statements (at least annually), and reviews educational practices.

1. Policies should be recommended to the Board in the following areas (to be evolved by the present committee):

School Philosophy
 Student Goals
 Curriculum
 School "Climate"
 Community Involvement and Resources
 Parental Involvement
 Staff Utilization and Improvement
 Staffing Procedures
 Evaluation
 Budget Development
 Cost Effectiveness
 Dissemination
 School Volunteers
 Future School Developments
 (Other topics will evolve as the Policy Council grows)

2. Goals and Objectives:

(a) Advise the Board in the formulation of broader educational goals and long-term objectives of the school which will give direction to the Director and staff. The method of implementation is determined by the staff and Administrator.

(b) Review these goals and objectives with the Board and with the staff at least annually, to assess the need for change and for evaluation of practicability.

(c) Review with the staff and Director the learning objectives established by the staff for students, to note areas of need, strength, or redirection.

3. Educational Practices:

The Program Administrator is accountable for all of the educational practices of the school. The Policy Council observes school practices, holds open discussions regarding the translation of policies into programs, and publishes annual reports on educational, operational, and financial outcomes. Specifically, the Policy Council:

(a) Cooperates with appropriate Central Office Staff on the preparation of the school's annual budget to be submitted to the Rochester Board of Education.

(b) Publishes a written audit of each year's expenditures.

(c) Publishes an annual evaluation of the school's educational program and operational procedures.

(d) Conducts a cost-effectiveness study, which will relate the educational audit and the budget.

(e) Conducts open discussions, at least quarterly, with the staff and Administrator in a joint effort to translate plans into programs and practices.

(f) Works cooperatively with the staff and Administrator to develop the active involvement of parents and the mechanisms for coordinating and facilitating that involvement. There will be varying levels of involvement and the Council will keep parents informed of the needs and ways of utilizing their capabilities at all levels.

(g) Works cooperatively with the staff and Administrator to involve students, staff and parents in staff selection, development and evaluation. In practice, the representative group will cooperate with appropriate Central Office staff and make recommendations to the Administrator. Such recommendations will be reviewed by the Administrator and submitted to the Board.

4. Staff:

The effectiveness of this school will be a direct function of the extent to which the Council and the school staff operate in a close, harmonious relationship.

Operations

The total Policy Council meets at least ten times each school year, and establishes procedures for meeting its responsibilities in each of the areas identified above. Decisions are made by simple majority of members present at a regular announced meeting. The Council may establish more restrictive procedures in cases where consensus is vital.

The Policy Council sets up appropriate committee structures to implement its responsibilities. Committees, with the exception of the

permanent evaluation committee, have a one year term, but can be renewed as required. Consultants and other specialists may also be engaged by the Policy Council.

The initial committee organization might include:

- Goals and Objectives
- Parents and Community
- Evaluation
- Budget and cost Effectiveness

Membership and Terms of Office

The Policy Council will include parents, staff, and students. The present committee must work out procedures for selection so the Policy Council is broadly representative. The image of the Council membership as honorary must not be allowed to develop. Requirements and obligations of membership must be clearly stated and the necessary commitment secured of prospective members. The term of office shall be two years for parents and staff. Half of each group should be elected each year. Student terms shall be one year. The Policy Council is composed of:

Parents	6
Staff	5 (Program Administrator is permanent member)
Students	<u>4</u>
Total	15

The Policy Council elects a chairman from among the parent representatives to serve a term of one year.

Additional Suggestions for Membership and Terms of Office

Two proposals have been made:

13 members

- 4 parents - one elected to represent each quadrant of the city
- 4 staff - selected by staff by simple majority vote
- 4 students - selected by students by simple majority vote
- 1 program administrator

17 members

- 5 parents - two from Monroe district, one each from Charlotte, West, Frederick Douglass
- 5 staff - including director
- 5 students - two from Strong, one from each of Anthony
- 2 consultants

This is suggested by these enrollment figures:

210 Monroe
79 Charlotte
124 West
87 Douglas

This representation can be shifted as enrollment shifts.

